Does Gendered Labor Force Structure Affect Adult Children's Provision of Transfer to Their Elderly Parents? An Examination of the Late-Middle-Aged Generation by Shieh, Ching-yi Agnes
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: DOES GENDERED LABOR FORCE STRUCTURE 
AFFECT ADULT CHILDREN’S PROVISION OF 
TRANSFER TO THEIR ELDERLY PARENTS? AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE LATE-MIDDLE-AGED 
GENERATION
Ching-yi A. Shieh, Doctor of Philosophy, 2005
Dissertation directed by: Professor William Falk
Professor Rebeca Wong
Department of Sociology
Adult children are key supporters of elderly parents, providing both monetary 
and time resources. In the existing literature, the most commonly used approach to 
assess this intergenerational transfer process is the “need versus ability” model. It 
posits that parents with higher need are more likely to receive support, whereas adult 
children equipped with better support-giving ability are more likely to give transfers. 
In addition, adult children’s transfer motivation, including altruism, reciprocity, and 
rational calculations, all provide theoretical insight into the question of transfer 
differentials.
Using the 1992 and 1996 Health and Retirement Study (HRS 92-96), this 
dissertation goes beyond the need, ability, and motivation model to examine how 
adult children ages 51 to 61 satisfy their non-coresident parents’ need. This project 
incorporates gender norms and adult children’s labor force participation constraints to 
assess the gendered division of transfer practices. The effects of spouses’ and 
siblings’ roles, resource competition between grandchildren and their grandparents, 
resource competition between two living parents, and adult children’s life course 
transition, are also considered. 
Statistical analysis shows that both gender norms and the gendered labor force 
structure affect adult children’s transfer behaviors. Adult sons tend to use monetary 
transfers to substitute for time contributions because their opportunity costs in the 
wage market are high. Conversely, because the social norms construe women as 
primary caregivers, adult daughters’ time contributions to parents do not decrease 
even when they are well-paid. Spouses of adult children may either be transfer 
supporters or resource competitors to their parents-in-law. While siblings are 
important in transfer practices, this study finds that sisters are more likely to 
substitute for adult children’s caregiving roles, whereas brothers’ contributions 
supplement adult children’s transfer efforts. Finally, adult children’s transfer practices 
are sensitive to their employment transitions. Adult children who stayed in the labor 
force from 1992 to 1996 are the most likely to increase their amount of monetary 
transfers. On the other hand, those who retired from their paid jobs in the studied time 
interval are more likely to increase their time contributions.
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Over recent decades, the number of Americans age 65 or older has grown as a 
proportion of the entire population, and the size of this age group continues to 
expand. Researchers estimate that by 2030, when the baby boomers are between 65 
and 85 years old, the ratio of elderly to working age adults will increase to 36 percent
(Curran, McLanahan and Knab, 1998).  The share of population over age 80 in the 
United States among all elderly is already large—about 26% in year 2000 (National 
Research Council, 2001). This unprecedented aging phenomenon poses multiple 
challenges to the society as a whole. A critical implication of the changing age 
structure is that the economy is likely to generate fewer resources per capita in the 
foreseeable future. As a result, “intergenerational equity” has begun to attract the 
attention of policymakers and the general public.
An aging population increases the social costs of a society. Over the years, the 
cost of public programs for seniors has placed fiscal pressure on government at all 
levels. Some scholars argue that the future of elders in the U.S. is a manageable social 
burden (Getzen, 1992) and that the corresponding trend of declining fertility has 
lessened the burden of working age adults to provide for children (Burtless, 1993). 
Others, such as Preston (1984), contend that elders are competing with children for 
limited social resources, and that the wellbeing of future generations is threatened 
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because the government directs resources to the elderly rather than to young people. 
Taking into account the anticipated growth of the senior population and the debates it 
has generated, the question of who will be responsible for the wellbeing of the elderly 
will become continually more significant. Because of the controversy that this issue is 
likely to generate, policy makers, social scientists and the general public must 
evaluate the ways in which the social costs associated with elderly caregiving can be 
diminished and diluted.  
In contemporary American society, family members provide the majority of 
elder care because state benefits tend to be inadequate and market services are usually 
costly. Even in Europe, where welfare state policies are more generous, state 
provisions have the effect of encouraging family members to provide intra-household 
transfers for their needy elders rather than crowding out family participation in care 
(Kohi and Künemund, 2003). On the other hand, elders may prefer receiving transfers 
from their family members. Because intra-household support involves emotional 
comforts and love, it is likely that elders who receive family support would feel 
respected and valued in the family.
Since the spouses and siblings of seniors have similar levels of morbidity and 
mortality, adult children usually play an important role in providing assistance to 
senior citizens. As in many other countries, American social norms unambiguously 
regard parent-child support as a long-term process. When children are young, parents 
provide the help they need. As children grow, it is implicit that they will reciprocate 
and provide for their parents’ later-life wellbeing. This feedback and exchange 
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process between parent-child generations has an important sociological meaning. 
From a functionalist perspective, intergenerational support could enhance the 
wellbeing of young children and older parents. When families provide a solid safety 
net to the individual social actors, the society as a whole would also be better-off.  
While U.S. family structure has experienced tremendous changes over the past 
decades, the value of giving support among family members still holds. Indeed, the 
concept of intergenerational support will become even more important in the near 
future because most adults will have older living parents during their lifetime.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the determinants that affect 
intergenerational support. Specifically, my analysis attempts to explain what are the 
major factors causing adult children’s support-giving differentials to their elderly 
parents. I use adult children’s life course constraints as the key framework to assess 
how adult children’s paid-work experience, family structure, and socio-economic 
ability may affect their support-giving behaviors. I also evaluate whether certain 
elderly parents’ characteristics can have an impact on the intergenerational-support 
outcomes. 
Throughout this dissertation, the term “intergenerational transfer” will be 
interchangeably used with the concept of “intergenerational support”. In the field of 
Demography, researchers use “intergenerational transfer” to describe the ongoing 
reciprocal relationship between parents and their children, and define it as “a generic 
term used to describe the flow of resources within the extended family” (Soldo and 
Hill, 1993). The direction of the resource flow often changes with people’s life course 
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transitions. Soldo (1996) asserts that there are three intergenerational transfer capitals 
worthy of research: (1) space, usually measured by intergenerational coresidence, can 
be viewed as a proxy to evaluate the demand of support; (2) time, refers to time spent 
on caregiving chores or companionship, and (3) money, which includes giving and 
receiving financial and other material resources.  Although each type of transfer has 
its own definition, these transfer capitals are more likely to be complementary than 
mutually exclusive. For instance, adult children who share a residential space with 
unhealthy parents have the closest proximity to provide caregiving services to their 
parents. Living under the same roof also increases adult children’s likelihood to pay 
for their parents’ expenses. In this case, intergenerational coresidence, monetary and 
time transfers are simultaneous and the parents are the major beneficiary. However, it 
is also common for a two-way transfer. For example, older parents may provide 
child-care assistance and receive financial feedbacks from their adult children. 
Through the exchange process, elderly parents and their adult children each obtain the 
resources they need.  
The complexity of an intergenerational relationship that features three transfer 
capitals and two directions requires that intergenerational transfer researchers focus 
their research to attain analytical clarity. In the case of this dissertation, only transfers 
from adult children to their parents will be discussed since this is the more important 
transfer direction for understanding elderly caregiving. It is also necessary to exclude 
coresident parents and adult children from these analyses to avoid endogenous 
causality. Intergenerational coresidence may imply that parents are highly dependent 
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on their adult children’s support. However, unless we have detailed information 
regarding parent-child coresidence history and motivation, it would be difficult to sort 
out the causality between intergenerational coresidence and the level of monetary and 
time transfers. For example, in order to conveniently provide monetary and time 
transfers, some adult children may choose to live with their needy parents thereby 
coresidence is the result, but not the cause, of the transfer behavior (monetary and 
time transfer → intergenerational coresidence).  While in other situations, if adult 
children have been living with their parents for a period of time, they may provide 
monetary and time transfers anyway regardless of their parents’ need. This means that 
intergenerational coresidence would result in monetary and time transfers 
(intergenerational coresidence → monetary and time transfer), and parents’ 
dependence may or may not affect the likelihood or amount of support given by the 
adult children. Since one of my research purposes is to examine whether parents’ 
characteristics have an impact on the monetary and time transfer outcomes, I must 
exclude coresidence cases so that the casual relationship can be defined in a clear 
manner.
In today’s world, more and more elderly-care services are purchased from the 
market due to the joint effects of a changing demographic profile and the growth of 
the labor force economy. Only a few decades ago, the picture was quite different from 
what it is today.  Men were the family breadwinners and most women were 
homemakers. The high fertility and low survival chances of the elderly usually 
resulted in children receiving most intergenerational support including time and 
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money; caregiving to elder parents was not as common as it is today. When it was 
necessary, unemployed women would take up the responsibility of caring for elderly 
parents.  Men, on the other hand, tended to engage in income-generating activities to 
satisfy the financial need of their families.  The household division of labor simply 
reflected the dominant norms at the time—men contributed financially because  they 
had the ability to “survive” in the labor market, while women provided time because 
they had the “natural capacity” to perform caregiving services and child-care tasks. 
Today, prolonged life expectancy has meant that adult children are more 
likely to have living parents at older ages. Moreover, significant declines in fertility 
have meant that elders have fewer adult children to help support them. As a result, it 
is common for adult children to provide money and/or time to their older parents. 
Moreover, since adult children tend to have fewer siblings, they are less likely to 
share transfer duties with their brothers and sisters, and must bear a greater proportion 
of elderly-care responsibilities. It is reasonable to expect that this strains the division 
of labor in married adult children’s families. When there are few siblings to share 
elderly care responsibilities, the spouses of adult children may be called upon to help, 
playing a complementary or substitute role to fulfill their parents-in-law’s need. 
While spouses of the married adult children are a potential source of support, 
there are reasons to believe that in married dyads, time transfer responsibilities are 
absorbed mostly by wives rather than by husbands. In addition to the gender norm, a 
fundamental issue underlying this phenomenon is that, again, men and women have 
different transfer resources and abilities. When caring for an elderly parent becomes 
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necessary, monetary transfers can supplement time transfers. But the use of monetary 
transfers to replace time transfers is contingent on the wherewithal of adult children. 
Where do adult children find the funds to pay for caregiving? In the absence of 
financial resources to purchase elderly-care services from the market, at least one 
family member must perform the caregiving tasks on their own, and typically this has 
been a woman. 
In spite of the convergence of labor force participation for men and women 
over the past decades, a gendered wage gap still exists (Chang, 2000). Women 
continue to earn less than men. Because of their relatively low wages, purchasing 
elderly-care services can be too expensive for adult daughters and daughters-in-law. 
Moreover, because women are often viewed as primary caregivers, they may be 
obligated to bear the caregiving burden regardless of their work status. In a society 
where the majority of women are part of the labor force, adult daughters and 
daughters-in-law must balance paid work and family responsibilities. Adult sons with 
higher wages can stay in the labor force and purchase elderly care services in lieu of 
their time contribution, while adult daughters and daughters-in-law may need to 
restrict their paid-work hours or career development in order to fulfill their caregiving 
duties. The long term consequence of this gender gap is that men pursue career 
achievements and accumulate savings before reaching their retirement age while 
women’s potential for self-fulfillment, and their own financial wellbeing in the later 
years, may be sacrificed. The fact that gender inequality is prevalent in elderly-care 
practice indicates that the society as a whole should make efforts to minimize 
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women’s caregiving burden. To achieve this goal, not only the existing gender norm 
needs to be modified, but the gendered wage structure of the labor force should also 
be regulated thereby enhance women’s financial ability to afford market services.
Key questions
Intergenerational transfer practices are embedded in an intricate social-
economic nexus. A gendered labor force, social norms, adult children’s family 
structure, adult children’s ability to provide resources, and elderly parents’ needs are 
all intertwined in intergenerational transfer processes. In the coming decades, as the 
baby-boom cohorts begin to enter old age and the size of the aging population grows, 
the problem of an unequal division of labor in elderly-care tasks will become more 
acute. It is therefore essential to answer following questions: 
1. Do adult children of different sexes utilize transfer capitals differently? To
be specific, do adult sons provide more financial transfers than adult 
daughters? Compared to adult sons, are adult daughters more likely to 
provide time transfers to their elderly parents? 
2. If the answers to the above questions are positive, to what extent do adult 
daughters’ decisions to be caregivers (spending time) reveal a gendered 
labor force effect? That is, do adult daughters’ lower wages relative to 
adult sons’ reduce their ability to provide financial transfers, and cause 
them to increase their time contribution to their parents? Conversely, do 
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adult sons use greater amounts of monetary transfers to stay in the labor 
force and limit their time transfers as much as possible? 
3. Can we argue that adult daughters tend to use monetary and time transfers
simultaneously because these two types of transfers are “supplements” to 
each other, while adult sons consider monetary transfers as “substitutes” 
of their time transfer?
4. What role do spouses of adult children play in intergenerational transfer 
practices? When spouses themselves need support, do they compete for 
resources with their parents-in-law? 
5. To what extent can the involvement of adult children’s siblings in the 
intergenerational transfer process serve as a replacement, or supplement, 
to adult children’s own transfers? Do brothers and sisters’ patterns of 
transfer affect individual adult children’s transfer provision decisions?
6. When adult children are obligated to support their own children, do they 
transfer less resources to their elderly parents?
7. If both elderly parents are living, do they compete with each other for 
adult children’s resources?   
8. To what extent does adult children’s ability and parents’ later-life need 
affect adult children’s actual provision of transfers?
9. In the long-term, do adult children adjust their transfer plans with their 
own future life course transition in mind?
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The main objective of this project is to explore the nature and the complexity 
of intergenerational transfers between adult children and their elderly parents. Gender 
inequality in the labor market and socially defined gender roles are likely to affect 
adult sons and daughters’ intergenerational transfer behaviors in different ways. As 
the members of the “sandwich generation” who have older parents and financially 
dependent children, adult children ages 51 to 61 may experience multiple constraints 
related to their life course transition. On the one hand, some of these adult children 
may still shoulder the responsibility to support their financially dependent children. 
On the other, although spouses and siblings of the adult children may help to share 
the intergenerational transfer burdens, because these family members are also aging 
themselves, they could potentially increase adult children’s transfer pressure, too. For 
instance, if spouses of the adult children are much older and have poor health, adult 
children would have to make efforts to balance their support duties between their 
spouses and elderly parents.  Work on this topic is particularly relevant in exploring
gender inequality. It helps to revisit the family roles of women beyond their child-
bearing and child-rearing years. The lengthening longevity witnessed by the 
demographic transition has expanded women’s family responsibilities. At earlier 
ages, women have to take care of their young children which often resulting in 
limited labor force participation. As they enter late-middle ages, women are also more 
likely than men to be the primary caregivers for the elders in the family. In short, it is 
worthwhile to ask how different life course transition experiences between women 
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and men create the inequality in the social world, and discuss what the social 
implications are for the future generation.   
I use a nationally representative, longitudinal dataset (Health and Retirement 
Study, 1992 and 1996) to examine how adult children of the pre-baby boom 
generation (men and women born between 1931 and 1941) find equilibrium between 
their work and family lives before reaching retirement age. The investigation of this 
cohort has special importance for understanding intergenerational transfer processes. 
Because a significant proportion of people in this age category have older parents 
who need care, and because many women of this cohort also work outside the home, 
this study provides a unique opportunity to examine late-middle-aged adult children’s 
intergenerational transfer practices associated with their labor force participation 
experiences. An analysis focused on both adult sons and daughters’ work and family 
responsibilities will help us to understand women’s positions relative to men, and can 
serve as a guideline for a graying society. 
Structure of this study
In this dissertation, I will use theoretical and empirical analyses to answer the 
questions raised in the prior sections.  This dissertation is organized as follows: 
In Chapter 2, a review of existing literature will be presented. The first part of 
the literature discusses the relationship between life course transitions and 
intergenerational transfers. Although the goal of this dissertation project is to explain 
the causal relationship of transfer to parents, a brief summary of transfers from 
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parents to their children is also included, with the hope of enhancing the reader’s 
understanding of intergenerational transfer studies. The second component of this 
literature review chapter addresses how gendered social norms mandate adult 
daughters as the primary caregiver and push them into the family sphere, and how 
gendered labor force structure potentially endows adult sons with a better ability to 
provide monetary transfers by giving them higher rewards in the labor market. This 
gender effect also applies to adult children’s spouses and siblings—wives and sisters 
are often delegated as male adult children’s substitutes for time transfers, whereas 
husbands and brothers are supposed to bring money to the family in order to defray 
caregiving costs. This chapter ends with an extended discussion of other influential 
factors on intergenerational transfer practices, and suggests the contributions of this 
study.
The conceptual framework and study hypotheses are presented in Chapter 3. I 
describe the conceptual definitions of gendered division of transfer by incorporating 
gender norm and gendered labor force structure into the discussion. The study 
hypotheses are constructed along five lines: (1) adult children’s sex and labor force 
participation experiences; (2) the effect of adult children’s family network in the 
transfer practices, including (a) adult children spouses’ characteristics and (b) adult 
children siblings’ characteristics; (3) resource competition between children and 
elderly parents of the adult children; (4) adult children’s support-giving ability; and 
(5) elderly parents’ need. 
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Chapter 4 presents the research methods. It gives details about the data, 
sample, variables, and explains the analytical strategies of this dissertation. 
Descriptive statistics are also provided in this chapter to depict the compositions of 
the samples. Presentation of the findings begins in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, adult 
children’s monetary transfers from 1992 to 1996 are discussed, and the parallel 
analyses for time transfers are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 offers an 
overall conclusion, discusses social and policy implications, and provides suggestions 




Intergenerational transfers involve three elements—parent-child coresidence, 
time transfers, and monetary transfers. These transfer “capitals”—the term adopted by 
Soldo (1996)— are usually complementary of each other. In this study, the main 
focus is the transfer from adult children to their older parents. Parents who encounter 
economic constraints or functional limitations, or both, and cannot satisfy their own 
need, are more likely to receive transfers from their adult children. However, parents’ 
need itself is a “necessary but insufficient” condition for their receipt of transfers. The 
incidence and the amount of transfers depend not only on parents’ need, but also on 
adult children’s ability to give transfers. The need to receive transfer, and the ability 
to give support, are closely related to people’s life course transition experiences 
(Boaz, Hu, and Ye, 1999). Adult children’s transfer motivation is crucial, too, 
because motives signify the effect of situational and contextual changes, which can 
help us to interpret the various transfer outcomes in the structures of social relations 
(Kohli and Künemund, 2003).
Intergenerational coresidence
Intergenerational coresidence can be viewed as a proxy of dependence. 
Parent-child coresidence is not uncommon, yet the frequency of coresidence varies by 
parents’ and adult children’s life course stages. Empirical studies show that in the 
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United States parents’ and children’s life course transitions greatly affect their need 
and ability, and coresidence can serve as an intergenerational support strategy. 
Although the main concern of this study is the receipt of transfers of elderly parents 
from their adult children, the following paragraphs briefly discuss why parents living 
with younger-aged adult children tend to receive less intergenerational support from 
their coresident children.
Adult children as coresidence beneficiary
In U.S. society, intergenerational coresidence of parents and younger adult 
children usually benefits the children more than the parents. Younger adult children 
who live with their parents tend to lack the ability to establish an independent 
residence of their own (DaVanzo and Goldscheider. 1990). In recent decades, because 
young adults stay in school longer, they are more likely than their parents’ generation 
to delay their timing of nest-leaving. Staying at home means that younger adult 
children have greater chances to receive support from their parents. As a type of in-
kind transfer, parents who share their living spaces with young adult children also 
extend their monetary and time transfer-giving years until their children become 
independent (Yi, Coale, Choe, Zhiwu, and Li, 1994).
Parent-child coresidence also continues after adult children finish their 
education. Now returning to the parental home is no longer uncommon among adult 
children who recently completed their college education, who are between jobs, or 
who experience marital dissolution (Goldschider, and Spear, 1992; DaVanzo and 
Goldscheider, 1990; White, 1994). Intergenerational coresidence precipitated by this 
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situation is usually initiated by children (either never move out, or move back to 
parental home) and benefits the children but not the parents (Rossi, 1993; Speare and 
Avery, 1993).  By living with their parents, young adults are able to enjoy economies 
of scale, although it is not without other cost-benefit considerations and often results 
in a loss of privacy (Alwin, 1996; Avery, Goldschider, and Spear, 1992; DaVanzo 
and Goldscheider, 1990; White, 1994). 
In most of these families, the reciprocal transfers from children to their 
coresidence parents are limited. Adult children’s financial and non-financial 
contributions such as sharing utility bills and housework responsibilities are relatively 
low. Younger adult children are less likely to reciprocate than adult children of older 
ages. Empirical studies point out that there is almost no change or just a slight 
increase in transfers from children in their 20s to their parents, yet the likelihood for 
adult children to provide transfer to parents increase with their age. On the other 
hand, coresidence parents’ support to adult children generally declines after children 
reach age 30 (Coony and Uhlenberg, 1992; Sprize and Ward, 1995).
Older parents as coresidence beneficiary
Although the aging population has increased tremendously in the United 
States, the proportion of elderly who live with an adult child has gradually diminished 
throughout the twentieth century. Elders today simply have fewer adult children with 
whom they could live (Schoeni, 1998).  Value changes, adult children’s employment 
and migration opportunities, as well as financial status improvements among elderly 
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parents, have all resulted in the decline of intergenerational coresidence between 
elders and their adult children (Crimmins and Ingegneri, 1990; Kramarow, 1995). 
Although the proportion of elderly parents who coreside with their adult 
children has been decreasing, about 20% of the older parents lived with their adult 
children in the most recent decade (Lee and Dwyer, 1996; ward, Logan, and Spitze, 
1992). The aging process creates dependence. Intergenerational coresidence in this 
scenario is more beneficial to the parents than to adult children. Lee and Dwyer 
(1996) argue that the probability of parent-child coresidence increases with parents’ 
advancing age. Likewise, Pezzin and Schone (1999) also suggest that the likelihood 
of intergenerational coresidence increases when parents suffer from functional 
limitations that are highly associated with old age. Living with parents establishes a 
close proximity for adult children to provide either financial or non-financial 
assistance to their parents. For parents who have difficulties performing activities of 
daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) such as eating, 
bathing, preparing meals, shopping, or managing money, coresidence with adult 
children is a practical option for them to fulfill their later-life needs (Pezzin and 
Schone, 1999). 
Other than parents’ age and functional difficulities, studies have also found 
that elderly parents’ sex and marital status are important determinants of 
intergenerational coresidence. Elderly mothers are more likely than fathers to live 
with their adult children (Speare and Avery, 1993; Weinick, 1995). While widowed 
elders have a higher likelihood of living with their adult children, once elderly 
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parents’ economic status and health are considered, unmarried seniors with secure 
income and fewer functional difficulties would prefer to live alone (Aquilino, 1990; 
Krivo and Mutchler, 1989; Worobey and Angel, 1990). 
Finally, recent literature also demonstrates a racial/ethnic difference in respect 
to intergenerational coresidence. Blacks are more likely than whites to live in a multi-
generation household. The coresidence of Hispanic parents and their adult children is 
likely triggered by the economic need of both generations (Crimmins and Ingegneri, 
1990). Compared to non-Hispanic whites, Asian adult children are significantly more 
likely to live with their elderly parents (Burr and Mutchler, 1993; Speare and Avery, 
1993).  In sum, a higher level of intergenerational coresidence is found in the 
minority households than in the non-Hispanic white families.
Monetary and time transfers
Transfer from parents to their adult children
The most widely used approach to conceptualize the intergenerational transfer 
process is by addressing need and ability of each generation (Boaz, Hu, and Ye, 1999; 
Chatters and Taylor, 1993; Eggebeen and Hogan, 1990; Eggebeen, 1992). When adult 
children are still young, the amount of transfers from parents to their children is 
generally far greater than the reverse. Parents, however, do not give transfers equally 
to every child. Children who are less well-off financially than their siblings are more 
likely to receive monetary transfers from their parents (McGarry and Schoeni, 1995; 
McGarry and Schoeni, 1997; Wong, Capoferro and Soldo, 1999). Furthermore, adult 
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sons who are in school or unemployed have a higher likelihood to receive parental 
support (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Some parents consider that giving transfers 
to their children is indeed an investment for their own future wellbeing. By providing 
resources to their children, parents expect to receive certain levels of feedback in the 
long run. Nevertheless, research shows that parents are inclined to invest more in 
better educated children who are likely to yield greater returns (Lee and Aytac, 1998). 
In the following section, I will address how parents’ need and adult children’s 
ability affects monetary and time transfers from adult children to their parents. 
Effect of elderly parents’ need 
Parents’ receipt of monetary and time transfers is strongly influenced by their 
need (Couch, Daly, and Wolf, 1999; Eggebeen, 1992; Lee and Dwyer, 1996; Pezzin 
and Schone, 1999). Like intergenerational coresidence, parents’ need for monetary 
and time transfers also alter with their life course transitions.
It is more than apparent that the parents’ need is highly correlated with their 
age. Because advancing age is associated with degrading health and functional 
conditions, older parents are more likely to obtain time transfers from their adult 
children (Boaz, Hu, and Ye, 1999; Dwyer, 1995; Pezzin and Schone, 1999). Also, 
since oldest-old parents have a higher risk of being poor than their young-old 
counterpart (Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1994), their financial needs are certainly 
greater and they are more likely to receive monetary transfers.
Life expectancy has increased tremendously over the past decades. However, 
living longer does not necessarily mean that quality of life has improved. 
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Demographically women live longer than men.  The longer life expectancy is often 
accompanied by chronic health conditions and functional limitations and economic 
difficulties (Estes, 2001; Smith and Kington, 1997). Based on this rationale, parents’ 
sex has an impact on their receipt of transfer because older mothers may have higher 
later-life needs than fathers. While male elders usually acquire support from their 
wives, older women do not. Women often provide caregiving services to their older 
husbands and when they become older and need support, they rely on adult children 
for assistance. For this reason, the likelihood for mothers to receive monetary and 
time transfers from their adult children is higher than fathers (Dwyer, 1995; Moen, 
Dempster-McClain, and Williams, 1992). 
The economic status of the elderly has improved remarkably over the past 
years, and it is often thought that elderly today are financially better-off than their 
counterparts in the prior generations. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to assume 
that all seniors are wealthy (Collins, Estes, and Bradsher, 2001; Smeeding, 1990). 
Economic stratification among the U.S. elderly is relatively sharp, as a consequence 
of the retirement and individual’s socioeconomic histories over the lifetime (Crystal, 
1996). 
Parents’ socioeconomic status often plays a decisive role in their economic 
wellbeing, which may directly affect their receipt of monetary transfers. Because 
retired parents lack wage income, parents’ assets are particularly important when 
assessing parents’ need because these take life course transitions and wealth 
accumulations into account. Instead of assuming elders’ financial security as a “one-
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time-only” phenomenon, investigators should treat elders’ economic states as a 
“cumulative process” because people’s early life experiences may result in social 
stratification at older ages (Collins, Estes, and Bradsher, 2001; Pampel and Hardy, 
1994; O’Rand, 1996). Parents with greater financial resources will be less likely to 
require monetary transfers from their adult children. 
 Parents’ financial status also has an impact on their health, which further 
affects their acquisition of time transfer. Although diagnostics and treatment have 
been enhanced by advanced medical technologies, elders have varying abilities to 
access medical services. In the United States, elders with more financial resources are 
better positioned to take advantage of high quality medical services, are healthier, and 
enjoy a better quality of life. Conversely, less affluent elders may put their health at 
risk by delaying the timing of their diagnosis and necessary treatment. Therefore, 
economic resources have a decisive effect on the health wellbeing of the elderly. 
Elders who can afford better quality health-care services are healthier than those who 
can’t, and thus require less time transfers from their adult children (Smith and 
Kington, 1997). 
Elders’ years of education, although not precisely reflecting their actual 
financial situations, could serve as a proxy to evaluate financial need. Compared to 
their less educated counterparts, parents with higher educational attainments may 
have had better-paid life-long jobs before they retired, and have accumulated more 
wealth over their lifetime. Therefore, it is not surprising that parents with longer years 
of schooling may have lower needs for monetary transfers. Parents’ education may 
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also affect their receipt of time transfer. Empirical studies find that better-educated 
individuals tend to have better knowledge to monitor their own health conditions, 
parents with higher educational attainment usually need less instrumental assistance 
from their adult children (Pampel and Hardy, 1994; Smith and Kington, 1997). 
Parents’ marital status is an indicator of their later-life need. Married parents 
are more likely to have stable economic situations and their spouses can provide 
immediate support, so married parents are less likely to receive monetary and time 
contributions from their adult children. Widowhood increases parents’ need for 
support and substantial numbers of elderly parents who receive time and monetary 
transfers are widowed parents (Eggebeen, 1992; Roan and Raley 1996). Empirical 
studies also note that widowhood raises parents’ perception of a need to acquire 
assistance from their adult children (Curran, McLanahan, and Knab, 1998). Yet 
elderly widows’ need for support shows a discrepancy after controlling for parents’ 
socioeconomic characteristics. In the most recent decade, elderly widows have 
become more independent and require less support. McGarry and Schoeni (2000) 
contend that this is because Social Security benefits and income growth among the 
elder population have enhanced older widows’ self-care ability. 
Contrary to widowhood, parents’ marital dissolution due to divorce may have 
a different effect on intergenerational transfer outcomes. A key issue related to 
parents’ divorce and receipt of transfer is the quality of parent-child relationship. 
Parents’ divorce often weakens parent-child relations and reduces parents’ receipt of 
transfers (Eggebeen, 1992, Kaufman and Uhlenberg, 1998; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; 
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Lye, 1996). However, the timing of parents’ divorce and parents’ sex are essential in 
this regard. Furstenberg and his colleagues attest that fathers and mothers who 
divorced at later ages tend to receive similar levels of transfers from their adult 
children. Moreover, while parents’ divorce during a child’s childhood years increases 
transfers with mothers, early-divorce sharply lowers transfers to fathers (Furstenberg, 
Hoffman, and Shrestha, 1995). Women are more likely than men to have child 
custody after divorce, meaning that, in the long-run, their wellbeing may be better 
than that of the men because they are more likely to receive support from their 
children (Curran, McLanahan and Knab, 1998; Shapiro and Lambert, 1999; 
Silverstein and Bengtson, 1997). The high divorce rates in recent decades and the sex 
differential in the establishment of support networks have a long-term implication for 
men and women. An examination of parental marital status and the quality of parent-
adult child relations after parental marital dissolution will enhance our understanding 
of how parents’ life course experiences may affect adult children’s motivation to 
reciprocate. 
Effect of adult children’s ability 
Although parents’ need is a crucial determinant in the transfer process, if adult 
children do not have the ability to provide the required resources, it is unlikely 
transfers will be made. Adult children’s access to time and monetary resources is the 
key factor of whether they are able to give transfers. Adult children’s ability varies 
throughout the different life course stages, and the possession of monetary and time 
resources often reflects their life constraints. It is also worth mentioning that transfers 
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of monetary and time resources are usually simultaneous. Each practice could be the 
substitution, or the supplement, to the other. Therefore, adult children are likely to 
adjust their transfer strategies when they perceive a possible change in their ability to 
provide for their parents. 
Compared to younger adult children, adult children of older ages tend to have 
better ability to provide monetary and time transfers because they are more likely to 
have stable marriages and secure financial statuses. Yet it is important to note that the 
positive relation between adult children’s age and parents’ receipt of transfers may 
have a threshold. Because older workers are subject to age barriers in labor markets 
(Ginn and Arber, 1994), adult children at retirement age may encounter an income 
constraint and be less likely to provide high levels of monetary transfers to their 
parents. Adult children who have reached retirement age may also suffer from health 
problems that prohibit them from providing time transfers to their parents as well. In 
other words, adult children’s age may have a non-linear effect on their financial and 
time transfer behaviors. 
The reason why adult children’s marital status may affect their ability to 
provide intergenerational transfer is rather straightforward. Marital status has a great 
impact on an individual’s wellbeing, especially for women. After a marital 
dissolution, women usually suffer a significant decrease in their standard of living yet 
men are more likely to experience an increase in their income (Holden and Smock, 
1991). Therefore, adult daughters who have experienced a marital dissolution may be 
less likely than divorced sons to provide monetary transfer to their parents. White and 
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Peterson (1995) posit that unmarried adult children are likely to receive financial 
support from their parents but not the reverse. However, there is a reason to believe 
that unmarried adult daughters would provide time transfers to their parents. 
Unmarried adult daughters may use time transfer in exchange for their receipt of 
financial resources and are not obligated to contribute their time resources to people 
other than their own parents.
Conversely, an intact marriage ensures a stable financial status due to income 
pooling with the spouses. For married adult children, a spouse may become a
potential source of support for the parents-in-law. The division of labor between the 
married couple provides more flexibility for households with elderly-care need. 
Hence, compared to the unmarried adult children, married adult children may have a 
greater ability to give financial and time transfers to their old parents. 
Due to data limitation, to date, research on racial/ethnicity differences in 
intergenerational transfers mainly delineates the transfer differentials between non-
Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black populations; few studies have examined the 
transfers in Hispanic and Asian families. It is nevertheless clear that different racial 
groups have their own cultural uniqueness in terms of fulfilling elderly transfer 
responsibility. 
Racial effect in U.S. is often intertwined with adult children’s work, gender, 
and marriage constraints. Compared to non-Hispanic white adult children, black 
adults are less likely to provide monetary transfer to their parents. Nevertheless, the 
smaller amount of monetary transfer from black adult children to their parents is 
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associated with their economic disadvantages relative to whites. First of all, studies 
indicate that the racial composition of the labor market creates a wage gap between 
blacks and whites, with the wage rate significantly lower in the occupations with high 
densities of black workers (Hirsch and Schumacher, 1992; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). 
Second, the high unemployment rate among the inner-city black population also 
reduces their ability to provide financial transfers to their parents (Browne, 2000; 
Johnson, 1995). The high marital disruption and out-of-wedlock birth rates among 
black women also constrain black women’s financial situations. The multiple 
economic pressures experienced by the black adult children can thus explain their low 
financial transfers. After controlling for adult children’s socio-economic status, the 
likelihood for black adult children to provide financial transfers to their parents 
becomes similar to that of whites (Taylor, 1988; Wong, Capoferro, and Soldo, 1999). 
Interestingly, the financial transfer from Asian adult children to their parents 
is significantly affected by adult children’s birth order. The East Asian culture 
strongly emphasizes the value of filial piety. The oldest adult children usually have 
the greatest responsibility for their parents’ later-life wellbeing. First-born Chinese 
and Korean adult children are significantly more likely than their siblings to give 
financial transfers to their elderly parents. With close proximity, older Japanese adult 
children also have a high likelihood to provide financial resources to their parents 
(Ishii-Kuntz, 1997). 
As for time transfers, studies show that blacks and Hispanics have higher filial 
responsibility expectations than do whites, and the difference is only marginally 
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attenuated by controls for socio-demographic and other factors (Burr and Mutchler, 
1999; Lee, Peek, and Coward, 1998). The high incidence of intergenerational 
coresidence makes black elders highly likely to receive support (Chatters and Taylor, 
1993; Taylor, 1988). Hispanic elders also expect their adult children to provide time 
transfer or live with them when they are in need (Burr and Mutchler, 1999). Asian 
adult children’s time transfer to their parents is influenced by the cultural value of 
filial piety. Providing time transfers is a widely accepted norm among the Asian 
communities, regardless of adult children’s social-economic ability. Nevertheless, 
children’s provision of time transfer is also based on parents’ social interactions. 
Parents tend to receive higher level of time transfer from their adult children if they 
do not interact frequently with other friends or relatives (Ishii-Kuntz, 1997).
Adult children’s support-giving ability can be assessed from their economic 
conditions, too. Having greater income and assets increases the likelihood for adult 
children to give transfers. Adult children with higher educational attainment usually 
have better earning potential. Higher wages provides an opportunity for adult children 
to use financial transfers to substitute for time transfer, and having more household 
assets is positively related to the financial transfer to the parents (Couch, Daly, and 
Wolf, 1999). Since adult children who are not well educated usually occupy the lower 
strata of the occupational hierarchy, their limited income may compel them to offer 
more time transfers instead. 
As a sandwich generation with both dependent children and elderly parents, 
adult children with living elderly parents may also shoulder the responsibilities of 
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supporting their financially dependent children. As mentioned in the earlier sections, 
the increase in young adults’ years of education implies that adult children at their 
twenties may still rely on their parents to pay for their education and daily expenses. 
Because household resources are often limited, elderly grandparents have to compete 
with their grandchildren for the transfer resources. In their 1999 study, Couch et al. 
found that having more children under age 18 would significantly decrease adult 
children’s monetary contribution to their elderly parents, yet there is no significant 
evidence to prove that adult children would use time transfer as a supplement (Couch, 
Daly, and Wolf, 1999). 
Other factors affect adult children’s transfer 
Adult children’s transfer motivation 
Besides parents’ need and adult children’s ability, another component 
affecting adult children’s transfer outcomes is their transfer motivation. Transfer 
motivation is a complex pattern and is likely to interact with other factors. Assuming 
individual adult children have a single well-defined motivation would be unrealistic 
(Kohli and Künemund, 2003).
Altruism is a commonly adopted theory to assess transfer motivation. It posits 
that affection, moral duty, and sense of obligation are the incentives causing transfers. 
Adult children who are altruistic would transfer resources to their needy parents 
because they are concerned about the welfare of their parents (Becker, 1974; Becker 
1991).
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Other than altruism, some argue that exchange theory can also shed light on 
the intergenerational transfer study. This theory contends that one provides resources 
or gifts to others because they anticipate a future return. Hence, children with an 
exchange motive may provide transfers to their parents in exchange for future 
bequests (Bernheim et al, 1985; Cox, 1987). 
Transfers could be based on reciprocity as well. The concept of reciprocity is 
indeed parallel to the arguments made by exchange theory (Zissimopoulos, 2001). 
Both theoretical perspectives involve rational calculation and psychological 
expectations, and the return-transfer can be made by the transfer recipient 
immediately or in the long-run.  For instance, studies point out that adult children’s
schooling may trigger the reciprocity effect and influence parents’ receipt of 
intergenerational transfers (Ikkink, van Tilburg, and Knipscheer, 1999). Since some 
parents consider giving monetary transfers to better educated adult children as an 
investment, they hope that these children will yield a larger return in the future; thus, 
one can expect that adult children with longer years of schooling will give to their 
parents based on the principle of reciprocity (Lee and Aytac, 1998; Lin et al, 2000). 
Spouses’ role in the transfer practice
In a marriage dyad, couples often negotiate a household strategy and make 
attempts to maximize the wellbeing for the members of the family. Husbands and 
wives can have a division of labor when they make plans regarding how and who 
should give what kind of transfers. However, although spouses may share transfer 
responsibilities with adult children, the task assignment is often gender-specific. The 
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decision-making power between husbands and wives is mostly unequal. Older, better 
educated spouses and spouses with a greater amount of earning tend to occupy an 
advantaged position in the negotiation process. In the United States, many women 
marry an older husband, and husbands often possess a higher earning potential than 
their wives in the labor market. Hence, wives frequently substitute for adult sons’ 
caregiving role within the household, while husbands’ transfer involvement is merely 
complementary to adult daughters’ transfer contributions (Zissimopoulos, 2001).
Yet certain characteristics of the spouses may alter the transfer dynamics. Like 
elderly parents, older spouses are more likely to have poor health and functional 
limitations. When spouses are in poor health, adult children may have to perform the 
caregiving tasks for their parents and spouses at the same time. This may curtail adult 
children’s original amount of transfers to their parents, and thus spouses may be 
deemed as competitors with their parents-in-law for scarce resources. Empirical 
studies show that having unhealthy wives may cause adult sons to perform the elderly 
care tasks on their own. To do this, adult sons must reduce their labor market time so 
that they have spare hours being caregivers (Couch, Daly, and Wolf, 1999). In short, 
spouses’ sex, age, and health are all related to adult children’s intergenerational 
transfer outcomes.
Siblings’ role in transfer
Siblings also play an essential role in intergenerational transfer. Often, one 
sibling provides the majority of care to aging parents and other brothers and sisters 
are less involved (Ingersoll-Dayton, et al., 2003; Suitor and Pillemer, 1996).  
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Nevertheless, having siblings implies that individual adult children may have more 
people to share the caregiving burden (Campbell and Martin-Matthews, 2003), with
sisters most likely to provide time transfers to parents. In a 1995 study Ettner argues 
that women with more siblings spend fewer hours on care, and sisters have a greater 
impact on adult children’s caregiving burden than brothers. Having more sisters 
means two things. First, it allows adult sons to find someone else to replace them in 
the time transfer tasks. Second, it implies that an individual adult daughter may have 
fewer time transfer burdens. 
As for monetary transfers, it is likely that siblings divide the transfer 
responsibilities based on their own financial situations. Although it is not clear 
whether in United States brothers transfer a greater amount of money than sisters;
there is evidence that this is the case in the selected Asian countries (Lin et al., 2000).   
Gendered intergenerational transfer practices 
Transfers involve division of labor. According to Durkheim, the function of a 
division of labor is to seek for the need which it supplies, because people are mutually 
dependent and incomplete. The sexual division of labor is the “source of conjugal 
solidarity”, which is important to the human world (Simpson, 1966).  Although he 
seldom discussed women as a social category, Durkheim’s work did contain a theory 
of women and their place in the society.  In Durkheim’s eyes, any claim for equality 
between men and women or rejection of the sexual division of labor would be 
primitive, unnatural, and dysfunctional (Lehmann, 1990). He posits that women 
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should seek for equality in the functions which are commensurate with their nature, 
and we have no reason to suppose that women may ever be able to fulfill the same 
functions in the societies as men (Simpson, 1966). Although sociologists are no 
longer as interested in Durkheim’s theories as they once were, it is clear that today’s 
women are still expected to seek self-fulfillment in the family sphere. The gendered 
division of care, therefore, is anticipated by the general public and people rarely 
question the fairness and social implication of this phenomenon.
In the intergenerational transfer literature, the preference hypothesis suggested 
by Lin and her colleagues posits that norms expect female adult children to carry 
more caregiving duties (Lin et al, 2000). It is often taken for granted that daughters 
should be the primary caregivers to their parents because by “nature” women are 
more caring and loving than men. Women themselves often feel obliged to look after 
their elders. However, it is crucial to recognize that the concept of “women as better 
caregivers” is powerfully reinforced by gendered social institutions. 
Statistics show that in the U.S., among all informal caregivers of the elderly, 
29% are daughters and 23% are wives, yet only 8% are sons and 13% are husbands 
(cited from Ettner, 1992).  Numerous studies suggest that daughters spend a 
considerable amount of time helping their elderly parents. When parents have need 
for support due to health or functionality problems, it is usually adult daughters, not 
adult sons, who provide assistance to the parents (Aronson, 1992; Matthews and 
Rosner, 1988; Silverstein, Parrot, and Bengtson, 1995; Weinick, 1995; Wolf, 
Freedman, and Soldo, 1997). Men on average spend less time on caregiving tasks, 
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unless paid services are unaffordable or no female family members are available to 
help with the caregiving work (Matthews and Rosner, 1988; Wolf, Freedman, and 
Soldo, 1997). Furthermore, after marriage, adult daughters’ caregiving 
responsibilities are often transferred to their husband’s families. Consequently, many 
women are caregivers throughout every stage of the life course. Once the society 
widely accepts this particular pattern, men seem to have a legitimate excuse to steer 
clear of filial care tasks (Campbell and Martin-Matthews, 2003). 
Gendered labor force structure and its effect on adult children’s transfer
Economists have also elaborated on the gendered division of labor.  In A 
Treatise on the Family, Gary Becker argues that men and women are assigned 
different tasks based on the principle of maximizing the wellbeing of the family. 
“Optimal decisions for those in a multi-person household must take into account the 
skills of the different household members and conflicts in their incentives. The theory 
of comparative advantage implies that the resources of members of a household 
should be allocated to various activities according to their comparative or relative 
efficiencies” (Becker, 1991). By this logic, family members with greater earning 
potential, usually the husbands, should engage in paid work, whereas wives should 
spend their time on household chores and caregiving tasks. Becker indicates, 
however, that each household member can participate in both market and family 
sectors under certain conditions. If a household operates in an “efficient” way, “one 
member of the household would invest in both market and household capital, and 
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would allocate time to both sectors” (Becker, 1991). In the U.S., as we can see, many 
women allot their time to their paid-jobs and families.
Likewise, the concept of “family adaptive strategy”, raised by Moen and 
Wethington (1992), states that “families mobilize and modify their plans and 
behaviors as their circumstances change”. This theoretical perspective suggests that 
family members have to sort out a viable solution to sustain and maximize their 
family wellbeing in the face of outside constraints. It suggests that macro structural 
barriers may have an impact on the micro household decision-making process. 
Additionally, this statement also reminds us to think about “why society provides 
fewer options for women within family adaptive strategies?”. Whenever the division 
of labor between a married dyad becomes necessary, certain levels of negotiation may 
occur. However, the negotiation processes and outcomes are sensitive to the intra-
household power structure and the economic forces outside the home. Women’s 
relative disadvantage in the wage market not only results in their double burden, it 
also deprives them of their decision-making power in the family.
Because the socialization process stipulates that men should work outside the 
home to generate income and women should center their lives on their families, few 
would challenge that men are permitted to use financial resources to replace for their 
time transfers and women can provide necessary care to the parents. Nonetheless, the 
idea that sons should provide monetary transfers and daughters should provide care at 
home may be further manifested in the labor force. When women join in the labor 
force, it is plausible for adult children to purchase elderly-care services in order to 
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accommodate women’s work schedules. Yet, the decision to provide monetary 
resources rather than time transfers involves a series of calculations. Whether quality 
caregiving services can be purchased largely depends on adult children’s income. If 
purchasing professional caregiving services is unfeasible, based on Becker’s theory, 
there must be someone staying at home, or to straddle the work and family sectors at 
the same time, to ensure caregiving services are performed. 
So who should contribute his/her time? Since most adult children obtain 
income by engaging in paid work, whether adult children should stay in the labor 
force or perform caregiving duties on their own is based on an appraisal of 
comparative advantage in the market place. Members with greater earning ability in 
the labor force have a persuasive rationale for staying there. Therefore, men typically 
remain in the labor force, leaving women to accommodate caregiving. 
Amott and Matthaei (1991) contend that the labor market is stratified by sex, 
and that stratification penetrates the primary, secondary, and the underground sectors 
of the economy. Their discussion of gender-biased economic inequality in the labor 
force provides a useful analytical framework for examining how the macro-economy 
extends its influence to the household level. A gendered opportunity structure has the 
effect of pushing women into the family sphere as caregivers. When families need 
someone to perform time transfer tasks, women usually have to take the role because 
the opportunity costs for them to quit jobs or shorten work hours are smaller than 
male workers, and this is particularly true for women from poor and working-class 
families (Walker, Pratt, and Eddy, 1995).
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The gender composition of occupations has an influential effect on women’s 
earnings (Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995). Women engaged in female-dominated jobs 
are likely to earn less, because social forces sort men and women into different career 
tracks, with male-dominated occupations more materially rewarded. Controlling for 
the human capital factor does not explain the pay gap between men and women  
(England et al., 1996; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993; Wood, Corcoran, and Courant, 
1993). Even when women engage in the male- dominated occupations, they are also 
pressured to move out from those positions rather than to stay (Maume, 1999). 
The gendered wage gap is also observed across racial boundaries (Cotter, 
Hermsen, and Vanneman, 1999; Cotter, DeFiore, Hermsen, Kowalewski and 
Vanneman, 1997; Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995; Maume, 1999; Petersen and 
Morgan, 1995; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). Furthermore, women are more likely than 
men to join the labor force intermittently and are less likely than their male coworkers 
to get promotion and on-the-job-training; this results in a substantial pay difference 
between both sexes (Barron, Black, and Loewenstein, 1993; Blau, Ferber, and 
Winkler, 1998; Maume, 1999, Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). Work experience and 
seniority have a vital influence on works’ pay rates. When women are continuously 
employed, their wage differential compared to men decreases markedly (Light and 
Ureta, 1990). 
Considering the above, it is not surprising that men’s better ability to provide 
monetary transfers and women’s delegation to give time transfers are the 
consequences of the gendered labor force structure. The gendered labor force endows 
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men and women with different “ability” by providing men higher wages to purchase 
elderly-care services to replace for their time transfers, yet compelling women to 
either give up their paid job outside the home or to make efforts to be a paid worker 
and a caregiver simultaneously. We can infer that for men, the financial transfer is a 
substitution for their time transfers. The high opportunity cost of job turnover 
provides a legitimate reason for men to fully concentrate on their paid jobs and 
delegate family responsibilities to their wives, sisters, or elderly care professionals. 
Jobs generate income, and the income can again be used to pay for the expenses of 
the caregiving need. This is very similar to Marx’s arguments in Capital. Part of 
men’s earnings from the labor force are used as the capital for pursuing future profits, 
and the price to pay for the caregiving services is rather trivial in comparison to the 
price of leaving their jobs. With their financial ability, they are also more likely to 
have the power to negotiate with their other household members and to make major 
decisions for their families. 
The discussion above provides the rationale to conduct this study. I attempt to 
examine whether adult sons and daughters’ paid-work experiences influence their 
intergenerational transfer outcomes. I presume that unlike men who use monetary 
resources to “substitute” their time transfers, employed women tend to use time 
transfers as a “supplement” to their monetary transfers. While the disparity of labor 
force participation between both sexes has decreased tremendously, and dual-earner 
families have become more common in the U.S., it is unusual for employed women to 
forgo caregiving duties completely. With their economic disadvantages in the labor 
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market, purchasing full elderly-care services may be less affordable for them. Thus, 
women with family duties may need to forgo their wage (either by withdrawing from 
the labor force completely or becoming a part-time worker), or make efforts to 
balance their full-time job and caregiving responsibilities simultaneously. Either way, 
women sacrifice their own career development, earning potential, and leisure time. 
Moen and her colleagues (1995) provide an argument regarding working 
women’s constraints. They contend that the majority of married couples do not 
pursue two high-powered careers. Rather, most couples choose to utilize “scale back 
strategies” to balance their work and family lives, and wives often disproportionately 
occupy the scaled-back positions. The work-family scale back strategies not only 
occur in child-bearing and child-raring years, it is also widespread among women at 
other life course stages (Becker and Moen, 1999). Middle and late-middle-aged wives 
who decide to drop out from the labor force often cite their caregiving commitments 
as the most important reason (Ettner, 1995; Ruhm, 1996). Women’s time spent on 
elderly care duties do not decrease because they are employed (Wolf and Soldo, 
1994). It is, therefore, not surprising that employed wives have a higher level of stress 
when they have to shoulder the caregiving responsibilities and the work duties at the 
same time (Aronson, 1992; Fredriksen and Scharlach, 1999; Marks, 1998; Moen, 
Robinson and Dempster-McClain, 1995; Starrel, et al, 1997).  Role conflicts caused 
by shuffling between the public and the private spheres increase women’s stress, and 
bring harm to their psychological wellbeing and physical health. In sum, the 
challenges of combining work and family still pose serious obstacles and dilemmas 
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for women but at this point, “do not seem to affect men in the same way” (Blau, 
1998). 
Contribution of this project
Gender norms and a gendered labor force structure have a negative 
consequence on women’s wellbeing. A functionalist perspective might conclude that 
the gendered division of labor is beneficial in that men and women are assigned to the 
most suitable positions within the society according to their gender traits. Yet the fact 
that working adult daughters are relegated to the household sphere as the family 
caregivers reflects skewed social values and an underlying conflict in contemporary 
American society. The complex interaction between the micro household dynamics 
and the macro opportunity structure that affect intergenerational transfer outcomes 
requires a new paradigm to bridge the gap. The extent to which adult children 
dedicate their time or monetary resources to their parents involves a decision-making 
process, and the gender norms as well as labor force structure may play fundamental 
roles in this decision.  
While numerous studies have shown that women are disproportionally the 
caregivers to the elderly, few studies focus on the relationship between adult 
children’s labor force participation and their intergenerational transfer behaviors. 
Sarkisian and Gerstel (2004) recently observed that adult children’s wage is an 
important predictor in explaining the gender gap in time transfers. But they do not 
provide any additional insight into how adult children’s spouses and siblings 
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influence the transfer practices. Their research does not address how resource 
competition between adult children’s financially dependent children and elderly 
parents may affect the transfer outcome either. Moreover, without a longitudinal 
examination, it is impossible to know how adult children adjust their transfer plans to 
accommodate elderly parents’ and their own life course transition needs in the long 
term.
To fill this research gap, this project offers a comprehensive framework to 
address whether adult sons and daughters’ adoption of different transfer capitals is a 
response to structural barriers. The central issue to be assessed is how gender norms 
and a gendered labor market result in women’s financial disadvantages relative to 
men, thereby reducing their ability to provide monetary transfers to their parents. The 
observable “care-gap” between adult sons and daughters is resulted from the male-
dominated wage market. I also address spouses’ and siblings’ roles in transfer 
practice because gender norms in caregiving not only affect adult children but also 
change the care pattern of other family members. This family network variation may 
have an indirect but strong impact on adult children’s contributions to their elderly 




Conceptualization and Study Hypotheses 
I turn now to a presentation of the overall theoretical model and hypothetical 
relationships, which guide the empirical part of my study. The model is, to some 
degree, an amplification and extension of Soldo’s intergenerational transfer model. 
And, of course, all relationships proposed in my extension of Soldo’s work draw 
heavily on the literature cited above. Most of these relationships, especially with 
exogenous variables, are examined in nearly all sociological research (e.g., using age, 
race, education, etc.)
Conceptualization of this study
Based on the literature review, the rationale of this dissertation is, because of 
the gender norms and women’s disadvantaged status relative to men in the labor 
force, men and women would develop different intergenerational transfer strategies. 
Employed women adopt time transfers as a supplement to their smaller amount of 
monetary transfers. Adult sons, who usually have a greater opportunity cost for 
forgoing their wages, will therefore use monetary resources to replace their time 
transfers.  I presume that once adult daughters are paid equally as their male 
counterparts, their transfer options expand. Augmentations in adult daughters’ wages 
will encourage them to increase their amount of monetary transfer, and decrease their 
42
amount of time transfer. When endowed with sufficient financial ability, adult 
daughters, like adult sons, will use monetary contributions to offset their time 
transfers because their opportunity costs in the labor market increase.
Family members of the adult children also play a prominent role in 
intergenerational transfer practice. The outcomes of intergenerational transfer often 
reflect adult children’s and other family members’ joint decisions. Adult sons and 
adult daughters collaborate with their spouses and siblings regarding who should 
provide what kind of support. The division of transfer is jointly determined by adult 
children, spouses, and siblings based on a principle of utility maximization. Monetary 
and time transfer responsibilities are assigned by individuals’ earning potential and 
time availability, which, again, are mostly a function of transfer providers’ sex. 
Spouses’ and siblings’ transfer commitments can be very helpful to adult 
children, yet we can create a typology to further examine the meaning of the transfer 
assistances provided by adult children’s spouses and siblings. In this study, I propose 
that spouses and siblings could either “substitute” or “complement” adult children’s 
transfer duties.  Specifically, if spouses’ and siblings’ transfer involvement is 
associated with an increase in adult children’s transfer likelihood or amount, we can 
conclude that spouses’ and siblings’ efforts are “complementary” to adult children’s 
transfer, because their contributions add extra components to what adult children have 
already provided. On the other hand, if spouses’ and siblings’ transfer involvement 
significantly decreases adult children’s transfer likelihood or amount, they arguably 
play “replacement or substitute” roles, because their contributions are associated with 
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a decline in adult children’s transfer duties. Spouses’ and siblings’ sex may be 
relevant to this complementary-substitution relation. In the monetary transfer 
practice, wives and sisters are more likely to play a complementary role to the male 
adult children because women have smaller wage advantages in the market. In time 
transfer practice, wives and sisters are prone to be substitutes to adult sons, while 
husbands and brothers are likely to offer complementary assistance to the adult 
daughters.  
While spouses often collaborate with the adult children providing transfers to 
the elders, they may sometimes become resource competitors to elderly parents. 
Adult children who are required to provide support to their aging and unhealthy 
spouses will have to cut down the amount of transfers to their parents. In this case, 
spouses are no longer the helpers to adult children. Rather, they create extra 
caregiving responsibilities for adult children. It can be assumed that adult daughters 
are particularly vulnerable because they tend to marry older husbands. 
Having financially dependent children restrain adult children’s transfer to 
their parents. If adult children have two living parents who live separately, the father 
and the mother are likely to compete for adult children’s resources with each other. 
However, if both parents are still living together, providing monetary transfer to one 
of the parents may indeed benefit both. 
Adult children with better support-giving ability are more likely to provide 
monetary and time transfers to their parents, and the amount of transfers will be 
greater. Based on the literature review chapter, adult children’s ability can be assessed 
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by their age, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, household assets, and health 
status. Adult children at younger ages, with longer years of schooling, greater amount 
of household assets, and better health, would have better transfer ability.
Parents with higher levels of need are more likely to receive monetary and 
time transfers from their adult children. Parents’ need can be conceptualized by their 
various characteristics. Those who are older, suffer from functional limitation, 
unmarried, less educated, and have financial difficulties are more likely to acquire 
transfers from their adult children. 
Occasionally, adult children with good ability may not provide transfers to 
their parents, or parents who are in low need of support may receive a relatively high 
level of transfers from their adult children. When these situations happen, one may 
conclude that adult children’s transfer motivation may have played a part in their 
transfer behaviors. For instance, as a way of reciprocating to their parents, adult 
children who are better educated may provide more time transfers than their less 
educated counterparts although the opportunity costs for them to limit their work 
hours are higher. Additionally, adult children may be motivated to provide a certain 
amount of transfers in order to obtain a future bequest from their parents if their 
parents have relatively good financial status. However, it is more likely that this 
situation will happen in the transfer to fathers’ scenarios because elderly fathers tend 
to be financially better-off than elderly mothers. 
The principles presented above may apply to current as well as the future 
transfers. However, whether adult children continue to give certain level of transfers 
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in the long-run is also contingent on their future life course transition needs. Once 
adult children themselves begin to enter the young-old and exit from the labor force, 
their monetary and time resource holding also changes. When adult children become 
older, they may use time transfers to substitute or complement their monetary 
transfers because their financial ability may have decreased due to retirement. 
Two aspects of adult children’s transfer behaviors must be examined: transfer 
incidence and amount of transfer. The former investigates the likelihood and 
prevalence of transfers. The latter assesses the magnitude of transfers. The study 
would be incomplete in the absence of either analysis. Giving transfers to the parents 
is not the same as fulfilling parents’ needs. For parents who encounter financial 
hardships, for example, several small amounts of monetary contributions would 
obviously not be as useful as a single large-amount transfer. However, simply 
investigating transfer amounts without evaluating the incidence would also bias the 
study results because most adult children do not give any transfer. Thus, both transfer 
incidence and transfer amount are included in this study. 
The proposed framework for the cross-sectional analysis using Health and 
Retirement Study 1992 is delineated as Figure 3-1. As the figure shows, adult 
children’s incidence and amount of transfers are driven by adult children’s labor force 
participation experiences, sex, and spouses’ as well as siblings’ characteristics. 
Resource competition between adult children’s younger children and elderly parents 
also affect adult children’s provision of transfer. Rather than using them as key 
explanatory variables, adult children’s ability of transfer and parents’ need are 
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included as controls because the effects of these measurements have been extensively 
probed in the existing literature. 
Figure 3-2 is the proposed model for my longitudinal analysis. In this part of 
study, whether adult children have increased or decreased their amount of transfers 
from 1992 to 1996 are the dependent variables. The major explanatory variables, 
work status transitions, are adopted to examine how adult children’s work status 
transition over time may affect their intergenerational transfer behaviors from 1992 to 
1996. To minimize the likelihood of having endogenous estimation, all other 
independent variables are from the 1992 data.
Study hypotheses
The following hypotheses are built upon the rationale presented above.
Hypotheses for 1992 analysis
1.   Gendered social norms have an effect on adult children’s provision of time 
transfers to their parents. Adult daughters’ incidence of providing time transfer 
and transfer amounts will be higher than adult sons’.
2.  Adult children’s labor force participation has an effect on their provision of 
intergenerational transfer.
2.1:  Adult children who are working for pay are more likely to give monetary 
transfer, and their transfer amount will be higher.
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Dependent variable (1): 
Incidence /amount of 
monetary transfer to mothers
Dependent  variable (2):
Incidence / amount of 
monetary transfer to fathers
Dependent variable (3): 
Incidence / amount of time 
transfer to mothers
Dependent  variable (4):
Incidence / amount of time 
transfer to fathers
Control variables: Adult children’s 
support-giving ability
Control variables: Parents’ need
 Mothers’/fathers’ age
 Mothers/fathers have ADL limitation
 Mothers’/fathers’ education
 Mothers’/fathers’ economic wellbeing
Explanatory variable (1): Adult children’s 
gender 
Explanatory variable (2): Adult children’s labor 
force participation
Explanatory variable (3): Adult children’s 
sibling characteristics
Explanatory variable (4): Adult children’s 
spouse characteristics
Explanatory variable (5): Competition for adult 
children’s resource between adult children’s 
financially dependent children and elderly 
parents







Dependent variable (1): Change in 
amount of monetary transfer to 
mothers, 1992-1996
Dependent  variable (2): Change in 
amount of monetary transfer to 
fathers, 1992-1996
Dependent variable (3): Change in 
amount of time transfer to mothers
Dependent  variable (4): Change in 
amount of time transfer to fathers
Control variables: Adult children’s 
support-giving ability
Control variables: Parents’ need
 Mothers’/fathers’ age
 Mothers/fathers have ADL limitation
 Mothers’/fathers’ education
 Mothers’/fathers’ economic wellbeing
Explanatory variable (1): Adult children’s 
gender 
Explanatory variable (2): Adult children’s work 
status transition from 1992-1996
Explanatory variable (3): Adult children’s 
sibling characteristics in 1992
Explanatory variable (4): Adult children’s 
spouse characteristics in 1992
Explanatory variable (5): Competition for adult 
children’s resource between adult children’s 
financially dependent children and elderly 
parents in 1992







2.2:  Adult sons will provide greater amounts of monetary transfers than adult 
daughters. However, if adult daughters are paid equally, the incidence and 
amount of monetary transfers from adult daughters to their parents will 
increase. 
2.3:   A higher wage rate for adult sons is associated with a smaller likelihood and 
smaller amount of time transfers. Adult sons use their monetary transfers to 
substitute for time transfers.
2.4:  Nevertheless, adult daughters’ time contribution is not influenced by their 
wage rates. Adult daughters use monetary transfers to complement their 
time transfers.
3.  Adult children’s work hour has an effect on their provision of intergenerational 
transfers.
3.1:   Adult children who work longer hours in the labor force are more likely to 
give more monetary transfers. 
3.2:   Longer work hour is negatively related to adult children’s incidence and 
amount of time transfers. 
4.  Support networks have an influence on adult children’s provision of 
intergenerational transfers. 
4.1:   Married adult children are more likely to give monetary transfer, but less 
likely to give time transfer. 
4.2:   Adult children spouses’ characteristics have an effect on adult children’s 
provision of intergenerational transfers. 
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4.2a: When spouses are working for pay, adult children’s monetary transfer 
incidence and transfer amount will be higher.
4.2b: However, spouses’ employment is also associated with higher time 
transfer incidence and greater amount of time transfers for the adult 
children because working spouses are less likely to share their time 
transfer burden. 
4.2c: The greater the age difference between adult children and their spouses 
(spouses’ age-adult children’s age), the less likely adult children will 
provide large amount of monetary transfer to their parents. 
4.2d: The greater the age difference between adult children and their 
spouses (spouses’ age-adult children’s age), the less likely adult 
children will provide large amount of time transfer to their parents. 
4.2f: Healthy spouses increase adult children’s monetary transfer to their 
elderly parents. However, unhealthy spouses compete for monetary 
resources with their parents-in-law.
4.2g: Healthy spouses increase adult children’s time transfer to their elderly 
parents. Nevertheless, unhealthy spouses compete for time resources 
with their parents-in-law.
4.2h: The greater the years of education difference between adult children 
and their spouses (spouses’ years of education-adult children’s years 
of education), the more likely adult children will provide large amount 
of monetary transfer to their parents. 
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4.2i: The greater the years of education difference between adult children 
and their spouses (spouses’ years of education-adult children’s years 
of education), the more likely adult children will provide large amount 
of time transfer to their parents. 
4.3:   Siblings’ characteristics have an effect on adult children’s provision of 
intergenerational transfers.  
4.3a: Having more brothers may substitute for adult children’s monetary 
transfers.
4.3b: Having more brothers may complement adult children’s time transfers.
4.3c: Having more sisters may complement adult children’s monetary 
transfers.
4.3d: Having more sisters may substitute for adult children’s time transfers.
4.3e: Siblings’ monetary transfer involvement may complement adult 
children’s monetary transfers.
4.3f: Siblings’ time transfer involvement may complement adult children’s 
time transfers.
      4.3g: Having any sibling lives with parents may complement adult 
children’s monetary transfer, but substitute adult children’s time 
transfer responsibilities.
5.   Competition for adult children’s resources: Resource competition between adult 
children’s financially dependent children and elderly parents have an impact on 
adult children’s monetary and time transfers to their parents. 
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5-1:  Having more financially dependent children is associated with a lower 
likelihood and amount of monetary transfer to parents.
5-2:  Adult children who provide financial transfer to their children tend to give 
smaller amount of monetary resource to their parents. 
   5-3:  If both elderly parents are living and live together, adult children will be 
more likely to give monetary transfer, and the transfer amount will be 
greater.
   5-4:  If both elderly parents are living and live together, adult children will be less 
likely to provide time transfer, and the transfer amount will be smaller.
   5-5:   If both elderly parents are living but live separately, the two parents will 
compete for adult children’s resources. Mothers will be more likely than 
fathers to receive greater amount of monetary and time transfer from their 
adult children.   
6.   Adult children’s ability: Adult children of younger ages, who are whites, have 
longer years of education, greater amount of household assets, and good health, 
will have better ability to provide transfers to their elderly parents. If the reverse 
relationship is found, adult children’s transfer motivation may be more important 
than their ability.
7.   Parents’ need: Older, less educated parents, parents who have functional 
limitations and financial difficulties, tend to have higher need and will receive 
more transfers from their adult children. If the reverse relationship is found, adult 
children’s transfer motivation may be more important than their ability.
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Hypotheses for longitudinal analysis (1992-96):
1.  Over time, adult daughters will be more likely than adult sons to decrease their 
monetary transfers.
2.  However, adult daughters will be more likely than adult sons to increase their time 
transfers.
3.  Adult children’s transition in labor force participation will influence their 
monetary and time transfer behaviors.
3.1:   Adult children who stay in the labor force from 1992 to 1996 are more 
likely to increase their amount of monetary transfer, but the amount of time 
transfer is less likely to expand. 
3.2:   Conversely, adult children who worked in 1992 but left their paid-jobs in 
1996 (retired or became homemaker) will be less likely to increase their 
amount of monetary transfer, but their time transfer may increase.
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Chapter 4
Data, Sample, and Methods
Data
To examine proposed relationships, the data of Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) is used for my statistical analyses. The HRS is a national panel study that, 
“intended to provide data for researchers, policy analysts, and program planners who 
are making major policy decisions that affect retirement, health insurance, savings, 
and economic wellbeing” (HRS Documentation, 1999). The data were first collected 
in 1992; surveys were subsequently conducted every other year since. For this 
project, I use the 1992 (the first wave) and the 1996 (the third wave) data. 
The first wave of HRS contains information of 7,607 respondents aged 51-61 
in 1992. For currently married respondents, spousal records are also available 
(N=4,950 spouses). Conducting intergenerational transfer studies using the HRS has 
several merits over other datasets. First, there are sufficient cases of the 1931 to 1941 
birth cohort, which allows investigators to examine how late-middle-aged adult 
children balance their family roles as parents and as adult children. Since a large 
proportion of adult children of this birth cohort have older parents, and many women 
in this age group have labor force participation experiences, the HRS provides a good 
opportunity for the researcher to explore how adult children, especially adult 
daughters’ labor force participation and life course constraints, can play a role in their 
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elderly-care outcomes. Past studies have focused largely on men’s labor force 
participation experiences and their later-life wellbeing. By giving more attention to 
women, my research addresses this prior emphasis.
Second, the HRS has very detailed information regarding monetary and time 
transfers, including transfer incidences and amounts, as well as sources and directions 
of transfers. In addition to the respondents’ characteristics, parents’, spouses’, and 
siblings’ characteristics are also available. This allows the investigator to assess how 
family support networks affect the incidence and quantity of transfers. This is a very 
critical aspect of intergenerational transfer because support from spouses and siblings 
should affect adult children’s constraints. 
The third advantage of using HRS to conduct this research is, because this is 
panel data, one can trace transfer variations over time. One the one hand, as parents’ 
need for support increases with the aging processes, adult children may adjust their 
patterns of transfers so that their provisions of resources can better satisfy their 
parents in the forthcoming years. On the other, because the late-middle-aged adult 
children and their spouses are also aging, they may have to modify their transfer 
strategies by taking their own need into account. With its longitudinal feature, the 
long-term dynamics of change in transfer can be evaluated. 
Structure of the 1992 data
As stipulated, HRS contains rich information needed for this dissertation 
project. However, the questions used for my analysis belong to various data files and 
some details regarding data processing should be discussed here. 
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As in most other data sources, every HRS respondent reported his/her 
demographic background and work history regardless of marital status. These records 
can be found in the personal-level data file. 
Information on household income, assets, housing,  is recorded in the 
household-level data file. If a respondent was unmarried, he or she was designated to 
be the interviewee for the household-level questions (they are the “primary 
respondents”, also called R1 respondents). All unmarried respondents are primary 
respondents. Nevertheless, in a married pair or partnered relationship, the person most 
knowledgeable about the household financial matters was assigned as the primary 
respondent. They were responsible for answering all the household-level questions. 
The spouse or partner of the primary respondent did not participate in the household-
level interview, and they were defined as the “secondary respondent” (R2) of the 
study. Using household identifiers, the household-level file can be easily merged with 
the personal-level data. 
In addition to the household data file, HRS has another file called “Section E” 
data file. This file contains information on respondent’s family structure and 
intergenerational transfer behavior by respondent parents’ sex. In single households, 
the lone respondent was always the Section E respondent. In married or partnered 
households, only one person answered the questions. Females, males answering for 
females who refused the interview, and primary respondents in a same-sex couple 
were chosen to be the Section E respondents of the married / partnered households. 
Therefore, the Section E respondents are not necessarily the R1 of the households. 
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Furthermore, there is no Section E respondent for 55 households (HRS 
Documentation, 1999).
Parents’ characteristics are recorded in separate files in HRS. Each parent has 
an individual record. I processed the data by parents’ sex. 
For this study, I included the personal, household, Section E, and parents’ file 
and merged them altogether. Respondent’s personal-level file is used as the main 
frame, which means this research project is based on adult children’s perspective. 
Because parents’ characteristic file has been divided by their sex, the finalized dataset 
for my analysis should be viewed as “adult children’s transfer to their mothers in 
1992”, and “adult children’s transfer to their fathers in 1992”.     
Structure of the 1996 data 
To proceed with my longitudinal analyses, the 1996 HRS (the third wave 
data) is merged with the 1992 records if adult children’s fathers, mothers, or both, 
continued to survive in 1996. Although the 1996 data are not the most recent 
publicly-released data, there are several reasons to use it rather than the 2002 data 
(which is the most recent publicly released data).  While HRS traces its survey 
respondents on an every other year basis, the information collected in 1996 would be 
the latest records that precisely reflect the life course transitions of the 1992 
interviewees. Starting from 1998, the HRS is merged with the Assets and Health 
Dynamics among the Oldest Old  dataset (AHEAD, the respondents were age 70 and 
older in 1993). While the age range of the respondents after the 1998 series contains 
individuals age 50 and above, attrition of the 1992 respondents would cause 
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insufficient counts for the required statistical control in my study. In the 1998 and 
subsequent data, there were greater losses of adult children from the 1992 study and 
elderly parents who had died. When parents no longer survive, these cases are 
censored and some analyses would not be as informative as the estimations based on 
a greater sample size. Therefore, the 1992 and 1996 datasets are the best combination 
to serve my study purposes. Investigations based on this four-year period are 
methodologically plausible with adequate time interval to allow me to conduct 
statistical analyses with reliable estimations. 
Sample
To be eligible for this study, the adult children had to be between age 51 and 
61, and have at least one non-coresident biological parent surviving in year 1992. 
Transfer from adult children to their stepparents is not considered in this study 
because HRS does not provide detailed information on stepparents’ characteristics, 
making it impossible to perform statistical controls. Also, because very few transfers 
were given from adult children to their stepparents, excluding these cases from my 
study will not affect the analysis results to a large extent. The 1996 sample contains 
follow up cases of the 1992 adult children. Adult children who participated in both 
1992 and 1996 survey and still have at least one biological parent living in 1996 are 
included in the follow up sample.
HRS collects the intergenerational transfer data by parents’ sex. Adult 
children reported the transfer incidence and transfer amount to their mothers and 
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fathers separately, even in the households with two living parents. Thus, there are two 
finalized samples for my 1992 analysis—“adult children transfer to mother’s 
sample”, and “adult children transfer to father’s sample”. The samples for my 1996 
analysis are created in the same manner. See Table 4-1.
As Table 4-1 shows, the 1992 transfer to mother’s sample has 5175 adult 
children, which is comprised of 2619 adult sons and 2556 adult daughters. The total 
number of adult children (5175) equals the number of mothers, so there is no repeated 
measurement problem in the statistical analysis and the cluster control is not required. 
In 1996, only 1160 adult sons and 1180 adult daughters stay in the sample, a total of 
2340 adult children and their elderly mothers. 
The size of transfer to father’s sample is smaller than that of the transfer to 
mother’s sample, reflecting fathers’ higher morbidity and mortality than mothers. In 
1992, 2444 adult children (also equals to total number of fathers) are included in the 
study. The size of this sample decreases to 889 in 1996, comprised by 501 adult sons 
and 388 adult daughters. 
Table 4-1: Data source and sample size
Transfer to mother’s sample Transfer to father’s sample
Son Daughter Total Son Daughter Total
HRS 1992 2619 2556 5175 1380 1064 2444
HRS 1996 1160 1180 2340 501 388 889
Data source: Health and Retirement Study, 1992 and 1996.
60
I did not reduce the 1992 sample size to match the 1996 one. There are two 
reasons for this: First, the 1992 analysis is a baseline, cross-sectional examination. To 
reflect a general transfer pattern in that year, it is more suitable to keep all the adult 
children who are qualified for this study in the sample. Using only a portion of the 
adult children for the 1992 analysis would introduce a sample selectivity problem 
because by doing so, many parents with greater need for support would be excluded 
from the first wave analysis because they are less likely to stay in the sample until 
1996. If I were to select the sample this way, the project can only capture adult 
children’s transfer practices to their “better-off” parents, and the generalization power 
of my study results would decrease markedly due to the sample selection bias. 
Second, because very few adult children had provided any transfer to their elderly 
fathers in 1992, further reducing the sample size would cause problems in the 
multivariate regression analysis. Thus, it is more favorable to maximize the 1992 
sample size. 
Research variables
All the information used in this project comes from adult children’s 
perspectives. The following variables are operationalized to reflect the research 
hypotheses.
Dependent variables
The incidence and amount of monetary and time transfers to the parents are 
the outcome variables for this study. The 1992 and 1996 HRS first ask adult children 
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whether they had provided at least 500 dollars of monetary transfer, and at least 100 
hours of time transfer to their living parents in the past 12 months. If the answers are 
positive, the actual amounts of monetary and time transfers are recorded. The 
monetary transfer includes direct money transfer, gifts, and money paid for parents’ 
medication. The time transfer refers to time spent on providing daily-care tasks to the 
parents, such as helping parents eating, bathing, etc., in the past 12 months; this 
measurement excludes adult children’s time transfers in work around the house and 
companionship1.  Transfers to fathers and mothers have separate records. Based on 
given information, the following variables were created:
Dependent variables for 1992 analysis
1. Incidence of adult children ever provided at least 500 dollars monetary transfer to 
their mothers/fathers in the past 12 months. Coded 1 if the adult children had 
given at least 500 dollars to their mothers and fathers, 0 otherwise. 
2. Incidence of adult children ever provided at least 100 hours time transfer to their 
mothers/fathers in the past 12 months. Coded 1 if the adult children had provided 
at least 100 hours time transfers in caregiving tasks, 0 otherwise. 
3. Adult children reported actual amount of monetary transfer to their 
mothers/fathers in the past 12 months. 
1 Information regarding adult children’s time contributions on the work around the house and 
companionship was not collected in the 1992 data, although it has been included as a separate 
variable in the subsequent waves of survey. To be consistent with my 1992 study, the time 
transfer in 1996 still focuses on the daily-care time only.
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4. Adult children reported actual amount of time transfer to their mothers/fathers in 
the past 12 months. 
In addition to above, I also created variables on whether adult children 
provided both monetary and time transfers in 1992. I coded the variable as 1 if the 
adult children offered both types of transfer to their mothers/fathers in 1992, 0 if adult 
children did not give both transfer in the same year. Results of this part of the analysis 
will be presented in the Appendix section. Because very few adult children ever 
provided both transfers to their fathers, multivariate analysis was not performed for 
the transfer to father’s sample. 
Dependent variables for longitudinal analysis, from 1992 to 1996
Categorical variables regarding the change in monetary and time transfer were 
created. The variables were coded as 1 if adult children decreased the amount of 
transfer from 1992 to 1996, coded 2 if transfer amount remained the same, and coded 
3 if transfer amount increased over time. The same coding principle applies to the 
transfer to mother’s and to father’s sample. 
Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables to assess the incidence and amount of transfers are 
adult children’s gender, adult children’s labor force participation experiences, marital 
status, characteristics of adult children’s spouses, characteristics of adult children’s 
siblings, and competition for adult children’s resources between adult children’s 
children and parents. I will first introduce the labor force participation-related 
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variables and then  discuss how other explanatory variables were constructed. 
Although I use different labor force participation variables in the 1992 and 1996 
study, respectively2, all other independent variables are based on the 1992 data to 
minimize endogenous statistical estimation.  
Adult children’s gender and labor force participation experiences in 1992
1. Adult children’s gender: This is a dichotomized variable, adult daughter=1, 
son=0. 
2. Adult children’s work status: If adult children are working for pay=1, 0 if 
otherwise.
3. Interaction term of adult children’s gender and work status: It is created by 
multiplying adult children’s gender and work status. 
4. Adult children’s hourly wage rate (centered at grand mean and logged): This 
variable only applies to working adult children. The original form of this variable 
is a continuous measurement with a mean value of 24.77 dollars. I centered this 
variable at 24.77 and use natural log to normalize the distribution. The coefficient 
in the regression analysis represents the effect of log-wage in relation to the 
average hourly wage rate.
5. Interaction term of adult children’s gender and hourly wage rate: This variable is 
created by multiplying adult children’s gender and hourly wage rate (centered at 
grand mean and logged). 
2 Instead of using adult children’s labor force participation in 1992 for my 1996 analysis, I use adult 
children’s work transition from 1992 to 1996 to investigate adult children’s work effect on the 
intergenerational transfer outcomes. 
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6. Adult children’s weekly work hours (centered at grand mean and logged): This 
variable only applies to working adult children. The original form of this variable 
is a continuous measurement with a mean value of 33.82 hours. This variable is 
then centered at 33.82 and a natural log was performed to normalize the 
distribution. The coefficient in the regression analysis represents the effect of 
logged work hours relative to the grand mean. 
7. Interaction term of adult children’s gender and weekly work hours: This variable 
is created by multiplying adult children’s gender and weekly work hours
(centered at grand mean and logged). 
Adult children’s transition in labor force participation from 1992 to 1996
In the 1996 analysis, adult children’s labor force participation is still the major 
explanatory variable of this study. However, the focus here is how adult children’s 
labor force participation transition affects their intergenerational transfer outcomes. A 
four-category variable was created to delineate these transitions: (1) adult children 
who did not work in 1992 and were not working in 1996; (2) worked in 1992 and still 
working in 1996; (3) worked in 1992 but retired or became homemaker in 1996, and 
(4) did not work in 1992 but worked again in 1996. Each of these categories is then 
created as a dichotomized variable. In the regression analysis, the fourth variable, 
“did not work in 1992 but worked again in 1996”, is excluded from the models and 
serves as the reference category.
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Other explanatory variables
Variables including adult children’s marital status, characteristics of adult 
children’s spouses, characteristics of adult children’s siblings, and children and
elderly parents’ competition for adult children’s resources are discussed below. These 
variables are all based on the 1992 data and apply to both 1992 and 1996 analysis.  
Adult children’s marital status and spouses’ characteristics: 
Spouses’ characteristics variables only apply to married adult children. They 
are used in sub-sample analysis.
1. Adult children’s marital status: Coded 1 if adult children are married, 0 if 
otherwise.
2. Age difference between adult children and spouses: This variable measures the
actual age difference between the couple. It is calculated as (adult children 
spouses’ age - adult children’s age). 
3. Years of education difference between adult children and spouses: This variable 
measures the actual years of education difference between the couple. It is 
calculated as (adult children spouses’ years of education - adult children’s years 
of education). 
4. Spouses’ work status: If spouses of adult children are currently working for pay 
this variable is dichotomized as 1, 0 if otherwise.
5. Spouses’ health: If spouses are in poor health a value of 1 is assigned, 0 if 
otherwise.
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Adult children siblings’ characteristics: 
1. Number of brothers: Ranges from zero to 13.
2. Number of sisters: Ranges from zero to 13.
3. Any sibling lives with the parents: Coded 1 if any sibling of the adult children 
lives with elderly mothers/fathers, 0 otherwise.
4. Any sibling gave monetary transfer to the parents: If any sibling gave monetary 
transfer to mothers/fathers =1, 0 otherwise. 
5. Any sibling gave time transfer to the parents: If any sibling gave time transfer to 
mothers/fathers =1, 0 otherwise. 
Children and elderly parents’ competition for adult children’s resource:
1. Number of children under age 18: In this study, I define financially dependent 
children as children under age 18. This is a numerical variable range from 0 to 5.
2.  Adult children gave at least $500 to their children: This variable is coded as 1 if 
adult children provided at least $500 transfer to any of their children in the past 12 
months (regardless of children’s age). Coded 0 if otherwise.
3. Biological parents’ living and martial status: This variable has three categories: 
both biological parents living and live together, both biological parents living but 
live separately, and only one parent is living. After these categories were created, 
I constructed three dummy variables: (1) both biological parents living and live 
together=1, 0 if otherwise; (2) both biological parents living but live separately=1, 
0 if otherwise; and (3) only one parent is living=1, 0 if otherwise. The fist two 
variables are included in the regression models to estimate the resource 
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competition between two living parents, controlling for their marital / coresident 
status. The third variable, only one parent is living, is excluded from statistic 
models and serve as the reference category.
Control variables
Adult children’s transfer ability and elderly parents’ need are the intermediate 
effects to be examined in this study3. Control variables to conceptualize adult 
children’s ability and parents’ need are included as followings:
Adult children’s ability
Adult children’s ability is defined by adult children’s characteristics including 
age, race, educational attainment, household assets, and health. Adult children’s 
household income is not included because it will generate a confounding estimation 
with adult children’s hourly wage rate variable.
1. Age: This variable ranges from 51 to 61 years old. 
2. Age squared: To capture the non-linear effect of the age variable.
3. Race: This variable in the HRS has the following categories: White/Caucasian, 
Black/African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific 
Islander, Hispanic/Latino, Brown, combination of black and American Indian, 
and Other. In this study, three dichotomized variables have been created. They 
3 These ability and need variables also help to identify adult children’s transfer motivations, if 
the analytical results illustrate a reversal relationship against the patterns raised by the study 
hypotheses.
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are: (1) non-Hispanic white=1, 0 otherwise; (2) non-Hispanic black=1, 0 
otherwise; and (3) others=1 (mostly are Hispanics and Latinos), 0 otherwise.
4. Educational attainment: The HRS provides information on adult children’s years 
of education, ranging from zero to 17. To estimate the non-linear effect, four 
dichotomized variables are created for my analysis. These variables are: (1) less 
than high school (adult children with zero to 11 years of schooling)=1, 0 
otherwise; (2) high school graduate (adult children with 12 years of schooling)=1, 
0 otherwise; (3) some college (adult children with 13 to 15 years of education)=1, 
0 otherwise; and (4) college and above (adult children who graduated from 
college and above)=1, 0 otherwise.
5. Household assets: This is a constructed variable provided by the HRS. It is a sum 
of the net worth of housing equity, vehicles, savings, money market funds, IRA, 
real estate, debts, and other assets. For this study, the natural logged assets are 
used attempt to normalize the distribution. 
6. Adult children’s health: The HRS has a self-rated health variable of five 
categories: excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor. For this study, a 
dichotomized variable is created if adult children have good or better health=1, 0 
otherwise.
Elderly parents’ need
Parents’ need is conceptualized by parents’ sex, age, functional limitation, 
years of education, and economic wellbeing. Since the sample has been divided as 
transfer to mothers and transfer to fathers, the parents’ sex variable is excluded from 
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the regression models. All the variables below are constructed for transfer to mothers 
and transfer to fathers separately. As a reminder, in HRS, information regarding 
parents’ characteristics is reported by the adult children and therefore the analysis is 
based on the adult children’s perspectives.   
1. Parents’ age: Mothers’ and fathers’ actual age. 
2. Parents have at least one activity of daily living (ADL) difficulty: These variables 
are coded as 1 if mothers and fathers need help on ADL tasks such as eating and 
bathing, 0 otherwise.
3. Parents’ years of education: Mothers’ and fathers’ actual years of education.
4. Parents’ economic wellbeing: HRS provides five categories to describe parents’ 
economic wellbeing. These categories include: 1=excellent; 2=good; 3=fair; 
4=somewhat poor; and 5=very poor.  A value of 1 is assigned if mothers and 
fathers have excellent or good financial situation, 0 otherwise. 
All the control variables are based on the 1992 data, and are used again in the 
1996 analysis.
Descriptive statistics for the samples 
Distributions of adult children and elderly parents’ variables
Tables 4-2 and 4-3 are the weighted descriptive statistics to delineate adult 
children and their parents’ characteristics in 1992. The results are presented by adult 
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children and elderly parents’ sex. These variables are also the independent variables 
in my regression analysis.
Transfer to mother’s sample 
Table 4-2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the transfer to mother’s 
sample. In this sample, 49.39% are adult daughters. A higher percentage of adult sons
than adult daughters were working for pay in1992. About 84% of the adult children in 
this sample are married.
Adult children in this study are 51 to 61 years of age, with adult sons slightly 
older than adult daughters. The racial composition of this sample is about 84% 
whites, 8% blacks, and 8% others. Adult sons are better educated, having more 
household assets, and are healthier than adult daughters.
On average, adult children have two living brothers and sisters, respectively. 
Although not living with their mothers, the analysis found that 17% of these adult 
children have at least one sibling living with their mothers. Adult daughters’ siblings 
have a higher percentage to provide monetary and time transfer than adult sons’ 
siblings.  
Interestingly, adult daughters have a much higher percentage than sons who
provide at least $500 transfers to their children (39.42% versus 3.43%, respectively). 
This may imply that children of the adult daughters may be more likely to compete 
for financial resources with their grandmothers.   
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  Adult children’s characteristics
    Female -- -- 49.39%
    Working for pay 83.07% 62.72% 73.04%
    Married 88.56% 79.15% 83.92%
    Age 55.36 55.15 55.26
    Race
   White 84.16% 83.22% 83.70%
   Black   7.61%   8.50%   8.05%
   Other   8.23%   8.28%  8.25%
    Educational attainment
   Less than high school 19.89% 21.03% 20.45%
   High school graduate 32.47% 40.50% 36.43%
   Some college 20.13% 21.70% 20.90%
   College and above 27.51% 16.77% 22.22%
    Household assets 299810.52 289862.79 294907.26
    Has good health 84.33% 83.99% 84.17%
  Adult children’s sibling characteristics
    Number of brothers 1.88 1.76 1.82
    Number of sisters 1.94 1.84 1.89
  Any sibling lives with mother 17.02% 16.41% 16.72%
  Any sibling gave money to mother   1.31% 12.25%   6.70%
  Any sibling gave time to mother   1.77% 15.18%   8.38%
  Competition for adult children’s resources
    Number of children under age 18 0.02 0.12 0.07
       Gave $500 or more to children   3.43% 39.42% 21.17%
 Both biological parents living and live together 10.44% 10.19% 10.32%
     Both biological parents living and live separately   2.79%   2.00%   2.40%
Mothers’ characteristics
  Age 77.95 77.84 77.89
  At least one ADL limitation 10.14%     9.31%   9.73%
     Years of education 9.78 9.63 9.70
     Excellent or good financial situation 22.16% 23.35% 22.75%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: Information based on adult children’s perspectives. All adult children in the study sample are age 
51 to 61 and not living with their biological mothers. Statistics are weighted.
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The mean age of the elderly mothers in this sample is 78 years, and almost 
10% of them have at least one ADL limitation. Mothers of the adult sons are slightly 
better educated than those of the adult daughters. Finally, from adult children’s 
perspective, 23% of these mothers have either excellent or good financial situation.
Transfer to father’s sample 
Table 4-3 displays the descriptive results for the transfer to father’s sample. In 
this sample, only 43.48% are daughters. Approximately 85% of adult sons and 65% 
of adult daughters were working for pay in 1992. Sons also have a higher percentage 
than daughters got married.
 The racial composition of this sample is similar to the transfer to mother’s 
sample, with 83.06% whites, 7.73% blacks, and 9.21% others. Adult sons are better 
educated than adult daughters, and have a greater amount of household assets. 
Although on average adult sons and daughters have two brothers and two 
sisters, it seems that adult daughters’ siblings are more involved in the monetary and 
time transfer tasks. For instance, while there are 6.18% and 10.02% adult daughters 
indicate that their siblings provided monetary and time transfer to fathers, 
respectively, only less than 1% of adult sons state that their siblings offered either 
money or time transfer to fathers. However, a slightly higher percentage of adult sons 
than daughters reported that at least one of their siblings coreside with elderly fathers.  
As seen in the transfer to mother’s sample, a much higher percentage of adult 
daughters than sons give at least $500 to their children. More adult daughters have 
living fathers and mothers at the same time.
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  Adult children’s characteristics
    Female -- -- 43.48%
    Working for pay 84.77% 64.50% 75.96%
    Married 91.18% 81.63% 87.03%
    Age 55.04 54.52 54.81
    Race
   White 84.01% 81.84% 83.06%
   Black   7.02%   8.64%   7.73%
   Other   8.97%   9.53%   9.21%
    Educational attainment
   Less than high school 17.85% 18.85% 18.28%
   High school graduate 31.13% 40.13% 35.04%
   Some college 21.73% 21.96% 21.83%
   College and above 29.29% 19.05% 24.84%
    Household assets 292796.80 262643.45 279687.56
    Has good health 84.75% 83.97% 84.41%
  Adult children’s sibling characteristics
    Number of brothers 2.00 1.84 1.93
    Number of sisters 2.08 2.02 2.05
  Any sibling lives with father 15.79% 14.03% 15.02%
  Any sibling gave money to father   0.21%   6.18%   2.81%
  Any sibling gave time to father   0.71% 10.02%   4.76%
  Competition for adult children’s resources
    Number of children under age 18 0.01 0.14 0.07
       Gave $500 or more to children   2.53% 41.15% 19.32%
     Both biological parents living and live together   9.32% 10.44%   9.81%
     Both biological parents living and live separately   2.03%   2.54%   2.25%
Fathers’ characteristics
  Age 79.25 78.88 79.09
  At least one ADL limitation   3.01%    2.04%   2.59%
     Years of education 9.55 9.62 9.58
     Excellent or good financial situation 12.12%  10.47% 11.40%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: Information based on adult children’s perspectives. All adult children in the study sample are age 
51 to 61 and not living with their biological fathers. Statistics are weighted.
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Investigation of fathers’ characteristics indicates their mean age is about 79 
years. Compared to elderly mothers, fathers have a lower percentage having ADL 
limitation (less than 3%). However, while fathers received similar years of education 
as mothers, from adult children’s perspective, fathers’ financial status may not be as 
good as mothers’.  In transfer to mother’s sample, 23% of adult children reported that 
their mothers have excellent or good financial situation. Yet in the transfer to father’s
sample, this figure is only 11%.
Adult children’s labor force participation and transition
Adult children’s labor force participation in 1992 
Table 4-4 presents weighted descriptive statistics on adult children’s labor 
force participation experiences in 1992. In the transfer to mother’s sample, 83% of 
adult sons and 63% of adult daughters worked for pay. Among working adult 
children, Table 4-4 shows that sons’ hourly wage rate is 21.43 dollars higher than that 
of the adult daughters’. Also, sons work longer hours than daughters. 
The statistics in the transfer to father’s sample demonstrate a consistent 
pattern. Adult sons have a higher percentage work for pay. They are also better 
rewarded and work longer hours in the labor force. The fact that adult daughters earn 
much less and work shorter hours in the labor force suggests that daughters may be 
pushed to provide less monetary resources yet more time transfers to their parents.
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Table 4-4: Adult children’s labor force participation in 1992
Transfer to mother’s 
sample
Transfer to father’s 
sample
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters














   16.04
 (n=573)






   31.53
 (n=573)
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992. Weighted statistics.
Note: (a): Include all adult children in the sample.
          (b): Include only working adult children. 
Adult children’s work status transition from 1992 to 1996
Table 4-5 describes adult children’s transition in labor force participation from 
1992 to 1996. In the transfer to mother’s sample, while 73.17% of the adult sons who 
worked in 1992 still stay in the labor force in 1996, this figure is lower for adult 
daughters: 52.65%.  About 30% of adult daughters did not work in both years; 12% 
worked in 1992 but retired or became a homemaker after four years. 
In 1996, 889 adult children stayed in the transfer to father’s sample. Again, 
more adult daughters than sons dropped out from the labor force over the study 
period. Since the oldest adult children in 1992 were age 61, these descriptive statistics 
tell us that more women than men chose to leave the labor market before age 65, 
which can be viewed as early retirement. It will be worthwhile to investigate whether 
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early retired adult daughters have more caregiving responsibilities than those who 
stayed in the labor force.
Table 4-5: Adult children work status transition from 1992 to 1996
Transfer to mother’s 
sample
(n=2340)











Did not work in 1992 and 1996 11.88% 29.66% 11.10% 28.33%
Worked in 1992, and still in the 
labor force in 1996
73.17% 52.65% 74.79% 54.10%
Worked in 1992, retired or 
became homemaker in 1996
11.83% 12.22% 10.08% 11.49%
  Did not work in 1992, work 
again in 1996
 3.13%   5.46%   4.03%  6.09%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996. 
Note: Weighted statistics.
Characteristics of adult children’s spouses
Adult children spouses’ characteristics in 1992 are presented in Table 4-6. The 
fact that women tend to marry older men is reflected in both samples. Married adult 
daughters are on average 2 years younger than their husbands. This, in turn, creates 
an effect on the spousal dynamics. First, it is possible that older husbands may have 
more decision-making power than the adult daughters on the household division of 
labor issues. Husbands may designate the intergenerational transfer responsibilities 
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because they have more authority and negotiation power. Second, because older age 
is often related to degrading health, for adult daughters, having older husbands 
implies that their spouses are more likely to be unhealthy. In the transfer to mother’s 
sample, 3.9% adult daughters have a husband in poor health but only 2.4% adult sons 
have a wife with health problems. The percentage difference on spouses’ health status 
is even greater in the transfer to father’s sample. When adult children need to take 
care of their unhealthy spouses, their ability to provide intergenerational transfers to 
parents may decrease.
Table 4-6: Spouses’ characteristics in 1992
Transfer to mother’s 
sample










Mean age difference 
(spouses’ age-Adult children’s age)
-4.46 2.01 -5.44    1.55
Mean years of education difference
(spouses’ years of education-Adult 
children’s years of education) 
-0.43 -0.04 -0.33    0.02
Working for pay 75.11% 88.24% 77.02%  89.66%
Have poor health 2.40%   3.90%   1.73%    4.28%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992. 
Note: (a): Include only married working adult children. 
          (b): Weighted statistics.
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The same table also shows that husbands are more likely than adult daughters 
to stay in the labor force. In both samples, less than 80% of adult sons have wives
working for pay in 1992. However, almost 90% adult daughters indicate that their 
husbands have a paid job.  In general, the years of education difference between adult 
children and their spouses is small—basically less than one year. 
Analytical strategies
Besides the descriptive analysis, this study uses bivariate and multivariate 
regression models to examine proposed causality. The modeling techniques adopted 
in this study are logistic regression, Tobit regression and ordered logit regression. 
Modeling monetary and time transfer incidence
Modeling monetary and time transfer incidence is rather straightforward. 
Since the outcomes are dichotomized (ever provided transfer=1, 0 otherwise), the 
logistic regression model is a suitable method for analysis. The logistic 
transformation can be interpreted as the logarithm of the odds of success vs. failure. 
The logistic transformation of the success probability p is given by:















































For all possible values of x and β, the logistic transformation ensures that p
remain in the (0, 1) interval, and generate meaningful analytical results (Powers and 
Xie, 2000). In this study, the logistic transformation can be interpreted as the 
logarithm of the odds of adult children ever provided transfers vs. did not provide 
transfers to their elderly parents. In the regression tables, I use odds ratios to present 
my results. 
Modeling amount of monetary and time transfers
Modeling the relationship between independent variables and amount of 
transfers involves analyzing censored data. As mentioned earlier, HRS firstly asks 
adult children whether they had given at least $500 dollars in monetary transfers, and 
100 hours in time transfers to their parents. If the answers are positive, the HRS 
further asks the actual values of the transfer amounts. According to Maddala (1999), 
when a normal distributed y* has mean µ and variance σ 2 , and the values of y* are 
only recorded when y* is greater than a constant c, the sample is said to be censored. 
Since the actual transfer amounts in HRS are documented only when the premises of 
giving at least 500 dollars and 100 hours have been achieved, this study also involves 
analyzing censored samples. 
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Originally developed by Tobin (1958), Tobit regression allows researchers to 
investigate the relationships with censored data. It is based on the latent variable 
model:
y x ui i i= +β ' if RHS>0
yi = 0 if otherwise
Where β is a k×1 vector of regressors, xi is a k×1 vector of known constants, 
and ui is the error term. The errors are assumed as normally distributed, with mean 
zero and a common variance σ 2  (Maddala, 1999).  Using the maximum likelihood 









When dealing with censored data, using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression is not ideal. Censored cases with values less than the criterion are 
unobserved. If the OLS regression is adopted and the censored cases are treated as 0s, 
the results would be biased because the estimated intercept are underestimated 
whereas the slopes of the parameters are overestimated. On the other hand, if the OLS 
regression is adopted and all the censored cases are deleted from the dataset, the 
estimation will also be questionable. In that case, the intercept will be overestimated 
yet the slopes will be underestimated (Long, 1997).
In this study, instead of deleting adult children who did not provide more than 
$500 in financial transfer and 100 hour in time transfer, I set 500 dollars and 100 
hours as censor points and use Tobit regression to conduct the statistical analysis. In 
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so doing, all the cases can be kept in the sample and reasonable estimates can be 
obtained without losing the power of generalization. The dependent variables, amount 
of monetary and time transfers, are natural logged4 before the Tobit regression was 
performed. With this procedure, cases of 0 transfers are also considered in the 
regression analysis.
 The results of my Tobit regression analysis are presented in coefficients. 
Because I did not additionally estimate the probability of pr (yi>c), the results cannot 
be directly interpreted as the same way as in the OLS regression5. However, based on 
the sign and significance of the coefficients, I can evaluate the direction of the effects, 
which provides sufficient information for my research purpose.
Modeling adult children’s transfer changes from 1992 to 1996
To examine adult children’s over time changes in transfer amounts, two 
dependent variables, adult children’s change in monetary transfer amount from 1992 
to 1996, and adult children’s change in time transfer amount from 1992 to 1996, are 
created. These variables are constructed with three categories: 1= transfer amount 
decreased from 1992 to 1996, 2= transfer amount stay the same from 1992 to 1996, 
and 3= transfer amounts increased from 1992 to 1996. These categories are measured 
on an ordinal scale. Although the distances between adjacent categories are unknown, 
4 For cases where transfer amount=0, I firstly converted the value as .01 and then log the value.
5 To interpret the Tobit regression results as in the OLS regression, one needs to estimate the 
probability that transfer is greater than the censored threshold, and then multiply the estimated
probability with each coefficient. However, SAS programming does not offer this option so I am not 
able to present this information in my study.
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one can rank the transfer from low to high. In this situation, the parameters vary 
across each category and hence binary logistic regression is no longer suitable for the 
analysis (Powers and Xie, 2000).
I use an ordered logit model to conduct my analysis. Ordered logit posits that:
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This model is known as the proportional-odds model because the odds ratio of 
the event is independent of the category j. The odds ratio is assumed to be constant 
for all categories.
In the ordered logit regression, multiple equations are estimated 
simultaneously. The number of equations equals number of categories in the 
dependent variable minus one (j-1). Therefore, in this dissertation project, two 
equations will be estimated: 
Pooled categories Pooled categories
Equation 1: Transfer decrease versus Transfer stay the same + 
Transfer increase
Equation 2: Transfer decrease +
Transfer stay the same
versus Transfer increase
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Above equations assess the cumulative probabilities of this study. The 
cumulative probability is the probability that y is less than or equal to a particular 
value j.  The cumulative probability of the model can be specified as: (Powers and 
Xie, 2000):
C y j x
x
xi j i i
j i
j i
, Pr( | )
exp( ' )
exp( ' )




Because ordered logit regression provides only one set of coefficients for each 
independent variable, there is an assumption of parallel regression. In other words, 
although the intercepts would be different, the slopes would be essentially the same. 
When interpreting my results, a positive coefficient for an independent variable 
implies all else being equal, as x increases, the odds of observation in the “transfer 
increased” category also increase. On the contrary, a negative coefficient would 
indicate that as x increases, the probability of being in the transfer decreased category 
is relatively higher. The regression results are presented in odds ratio form, and the 
values of the each intercept are also reported in the tables.
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Chapter 5
 Adult Children’s Provision of Monetary Transfers 
In this Chapter, I present the findings for the monetary transfers. I begin with 
the descriptive analysis and then move to the multivariate analysis.
Descriptive analysis 
Adult children’s transfer incidence and amount in 1992
Table 5-1 presents the weighted descriptive analysis results on monetary 
transfer incidence and transfer amount from adult children to their parents in 1992. 
The results are shown by parents’ sex and type of transfer. Number of observations 
for each category is presented in parentheses. As Table 5-1 shows, when monetary 
transfer incidence is assessed, women have a higher percentage than men to be the 
transfer recipients and transfer givers. On the receiving side, elderly mothers have a 
higher percentage than fathers to receive monetary transfers from their adult children 
(3.56% and 1.38%, respectively). On the giving side, more adult daughters than adult 
sons had given $500 or more to their parents. While about 5% and slightly higher 
than 2% of adult daughters ever provided monetary resource to their mothers and 
fathers, respectively, only 2.02% and 0.88% of adult sons ever did so to their mothers 
and fathers.
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Table 5-1: Adult children’s provision of monetary transfers in 1992, by adult 
children and parents’ sex, weighted statistics 




Ever gave $500 or more












Average amount of transfer 












Average amount of transfer,  only transfers>=$500 












Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note:   Number of cases for each cell presented in parentheses
The descriptive statistics on amount of monetary transfer also demonstrate a 
very similar pattern. Compared to adult sons, daughters gave more money to their 
mothers. When all adult children are considered (including adult children who never 
gave a monetary transfer, ever gave transfer but under $500, and ever gave transfer 
equal or greater than $500 in 1992), we can see that adult daughters on average gave 
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$133.85 to their mothers, yet adult sons only gave $46.33. Once we focus the analysis 
on adult children who had given $500 or over to mothers, however, the transfer 
differential between adult sons and daughters become smaller. 
The results in the transfer to father’s sample are somewhat different. When all 
adult children are considered, the mean money amounts transferred to fathers from 
sons and daughters are $32.57 and $36.77, respectively. These two numbers are very 
close to each other. Moving to the analysis on transfer $500 or more, however, the 
results show that adult sons tend to give a much larger amount than adult daughters. 
According to Table 5-1, adult sons gave twice as much as daughters ($3666 vs. 
$1756). Nevertheless, because this analysis is based on only 9 adult sons, it is likely 
that we are getting the extreme values in this case.
Although most adult children did not give monetary transfers, those who ever 
did so provide a relatively large amount of monetary resources to their parents. Figure 
5-1 is a summary of adult children’s average amount of monetary transfer, by parents’ 
and adult children’s sex.  Comparing the bars plotted for the “including transfers 
<=$500” and “ever gave $500 or more only” category, one can easily see that adult 
children who provided transfers more than $500 in 1992 indeed gave an amount 
much greater than $500. This applies to both adult sons’ and adult daughters’ 
transfers.
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Figure 5-1: Mean amount of monetary transfer from adult children 











Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers







Adult children’s transfer incidence and amount in 1996
The purpose of the 1996 analysis is to follow the adult children from the 1992 
sample, and trace their transfer behaviors after a four-year interval. After excluding 
adult children who dropped out from the study6 between 1992 and 1996, the number 
of observations for the 1996 transfer to mother’s and father’s sample goes down to 
2340 and 889, respectively.
6 The most important reasons for adult children to drop out from the 1996 study are death of the elderly
parents and death of adult children themselves. Reasons other than these two are basically un-
identifiable because HRS does not provide such details. Adult children who stayed in the 1996 study 
but have missing values in the research variables to be used for this project are also excluded from the 
samples.
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Table 5-2 is the weighted descriptive analysis of adult children’s transfer 
change from 1992 to 1996. As in the 1992 analysis, transfer to mothers and fathers  
are presented separately. 
The upper part of this Table demonstrates the transfer incidences by adult 
children and parents’ sex. In the transfer to mothers sample, 88.56% of adult sons 
gave no monetary transfers in 1992 and 1996; 9.77% of them gave transfers in 1996 
but did not in 1992; and only 1.01% of them continually gave money to their mothers 
over the four year period. Higher proportions of adult daughters than adult sons 
provided monetary resources to their elderly mothers. Adult daughters made more 
transfer efforts than adult sons over the study years. In 1996, a total of 9.46% adult 
daughters reported that they had provided monetary transfers to their mothers. 2.68% 
of daughters gave money in both 1992 and 1996. 
Compared to mothers, fathers have smaller percentage to receive monetary 
transfers from their adult sons and daughters. Approximately 93% of adult sons and 
daughters did not provide monetary resources to their senior fathers in 1992 and 
1996. Although 5.95% of adult sons did not give transfers in 1992 yet made 
contributions in 1996, only 0.26% of the adult sons continually gave money to their 
fathers over the study years. 
In 1996, 5.12% of adult daughters offered transfers to their fathers. 4.37% of 
these transfers are from daughters who did not give any transfers to their fathers in 
1992. Conversely, 1.97% adult daughters stopped giving money to their fathers 
during the study interval. 
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Table 5-2: Changes in provision of monetary transfers from adult children to 





Incidence: Ever gave $500 or more in 1992 and 1996
Both adult sons and daughters
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 88.21% 92.89%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   8.28%   5.28%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +)   1.84%   0.47%
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   1.67%   1.36%
Adult sons only
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 88.56% 92.88%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   9.77%   5.95%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +)   1.01%   0.26%
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   0.65%   0.91%
Adult daughters only
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 87.84% 92.91%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   6.78%   4.37%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +)   2.68%   0.75%
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   2.69%   1.97%
Amount: Changes in amounts given to parents
Both adult sons and daughters
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 88.14% 92.78%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount   9.48%   5.75%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount   2.38%   1.47%
Adult sons only
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 88.51% 92.88%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount  10.43%   6.21%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount    1.06%   0.91%
Adult daughters only
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 87.78% 92.65%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount   8.52%   5.12%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount   3.70%   2.23%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996. Weighted 
statistics.
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The second part of Table 5-2 delineates the increase and decrease in amount 
of monetary transfer. Higher proportions of adult sons than daughters have increased 
their amount of contributions from 1992 to 1996. For instance, while 10.43% of adult 
sons have increased their transfer amount to their mothers, only 8.52% of adult 
daughters raised their amount of contributions over time. For adult sons, 6.21%
increased the transfer amount to their fathers, yet for the adult daughters it was 
5.12%. The analysis also found 1% adult sons decreased their amount of transfer to 
their mothers and fathers after four years. As for adult daughters, 3.70% and 2.23% 
reduced their transfers to mothers and fathers, respectively. 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the changes in monetary transfer incidence over time. 
Although most adult children never give a monetary transfer to their parents in 1992, 
among adult children who remain in the 1996 sample the percentages of adult 
children who engaged in transfer practices grew. It seems that adult children’s 
monetary transfer to their parents is sensitive to their parents’ aging processes. 
Adult sons have a higher percentage than daughters who give monetary 
resources over time.  This phenomenon has two implications. First, adult sons may 
simply delay their timing of giving monetary transfer. Second, adult sons may have 
better financial transfer ability than adult daughters in 1996 and therefore were able to 
participate in the transfer practice more. As described in Chapter 4, adult sons have a 
much higher percentage than daughters to stay in the labor force in 1996. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that sons would have more economic resource to support their 
elderly parents in 1996. 
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Figure 5-3 provides additional evidence to support the arguments that adult 
daughters may have less economic resources than sons to engage in monetary 
transfers over time.  As this figure shows, while greater percentage of adult sons 
increased their transfer amount from 1992 to 96, only about 1% of them decreased 
their monetary contribution. Daughters have a higher percentage to decrease their 
amount of monetary transfer, albeit their parents may have greater need in 1996 than 
in 1992. Again, since women exit from the labor force earlier than men, it is possible 
that daughters would have more financial constraints that prevent them from giving a 
greater amount of money.
Figure 5-2: Change in monetary transfer incidence, by adult 
children and parents' sex and transfer year  








Figure 5-3: Adult children who increased and decreased monetary 
transfer amount, by adult children and parents' sex







Bivariate analysis on monetary transfer incidence and transfer amount
Table 5-3 presents bivariate statistics for the monetary transfer incidence and 
transfer amount. I only show the results for my major explanatory variables, and the 
analysis is not weighted. The dependent variables for transfer incidence are whether 
adult children gave at least $500 in the past 12 months; logistic regression is 
employed to assess the proposed relationship. The results are presented in odds ratios. 
The dependent variables for the transfer amount analysis are the actual amounts of 
transfer made. I censored the value at $500 and used natural log to normalize the 
distribution. Tobit regression models are adopted to perform the analysis and results 
are presented in coefficients.
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Table 5-3: Bivariate analysis on monetary transfer to parents in 1992 using
                  logistic (a) and Tobit regression (b)
Transfer to mothers
(n=5175)
Transfer to fathers 
(n=2444)
Incidence Amount Incidence Amount




















































     19.21***
(0.25)
    2.56***
(0.13)
































Right censored observations 189 32
Uncensored observations 4986 2412
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992. 
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children
ever gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics. Results of major explanatory variables are presented.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001, Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Transfer to mothers
Based on Table 5-3, adult daughters are more likely than sons to give at least 
$500 to mothers, and the amount they give is also higher (p<=.001). These results are 
parallel to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5-1. Adult children’s work 
status does not show a significant effect on the transfer outcomes. Contrary to my 
hypothesis, the adult children’s marriage effect has a negative relationship with the 
transfer likelihood and transfer amount (p<=.001). Married adult children are less 
likely to give money to their elderly mothers,  which may be an indication that adult 
children would prefer to allocate their financial resources to their own families. 
Having more brothers or more sisters significantly reduces the likelihood and 
amount of transfer (p<=.001). Nevertheless, if any sibling gave money to mothers, 
adult children would also have a greater likelihood to give transfer, and the odds ratio 
is very high: 12.31. 
Compared to adult children who did not give money to their own children, 
adult children who did so are 4 times more likely to give financial transfers to their 
mothers (p<=.001). When both biological parents are living but live separately, adult 
children would give a greater amount of transfer to their mothers (p<=.10).
Transfer to fathers
Bivariate results for the transfer to father’s sample show a very similar pattern 
as the transfer to mother’s sample. Daughters are more likely than sons to give 
transfers; married adult children are less likely to give $500 or more to their fathers.  
Siblings’ transfer involvement encourages adult children’s transfer behavior. Adult 
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children who gave money to their own children also give greater amount of financial 
resources to their senior fathers. 
A noteworthy difference between the transfer to mother’s and to father’s data 
is in the transfer to father’s data, adult children who are working for pay have a 
greater likelihood to give money. Compared to their non-working counterparts, 
working adult children are almost twice as likely to give financial resources to 
fathers; their transfer amounts are also greater (p<=.05). 
Another characteristic of the transfer to father’s sample is, one can see there is 
a resource competition between fathers and living mothers. If biological mothers still 
live with fathers, adult children would give a smaller amount of money to their 
fathers (p<=.05). However, if fathers and mothers live separately, adult children 
increase their amount of transfer (p<=.001). This may imply that when fathers obtain 
or share monetary resources with their coresidence spouses, their financial need is 
lower and therefore adult children would reduce their amount of transfer. 
Multivariate analysis, 1992 
Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, all adult children
Tables 5-4 and 5-5 contain the multivariate results of monetary transfer 




Table 5-4 presents the multivariate findings for monetary transfer to mothers. 
Model 1 under the transfer incidence column shows the results without any 
interaction effect; whereas Model 2 includes the adult child sex and working for pay 
interaction. Results for transfer amount analysis are presented in the same way. 
The first hypothesis to be examined is whether there is a gender differential in 
adult sons and daughters’ monetary transfer behaviors. The analysis does not find a 
significant effect between adult children’s gender and transfer incidence. 
Nevertheless, all else being equal, the examination on transfer amount support my 
hypothesis that adult daughters give smaller amount of transfer than son (p<=.001).
The next step is to investigate whether adult children’s labor force 
participation status has an effect on their provision of monetary transfers. The answer 
is yes. Contrary to the hypothesis, working adult children indeed have a smaller 
likelihood of giving transfer, although this result is only marginally significant 
(p<=.10). Yet an examination on the interaction term indicates that when daughters 
work for pay, they are more likely to give transfer (p<=.10). The interaction effect on 
transfer amount is not statistically significant. 
Married adult children have a lower incidence to give money, and the transfer 
amount is significantly smaller (p<=.001). Perhaps it is because married adult 
children tend to spend their monetary resources on their own family members thereby 
reducing transfer to mothers. In the upcoming section, variables of adult children 
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Table 5-4: Monetary transfer to mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using 
logistic and Tobit regression
                                                              N=5175
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2





























Adult children’s sibling characteristics






























     2.83***
(0.09)
Competition for adult children’s resources
     Children compete for resources
















 Parents compete for resources
















 Only mother living (Reference category) -- -- -- --


































  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
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Table 5-4 (cont.) : Monetary transfer to mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics 
                                using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --









































































  Intercept -19.43 -19.18 -13.88 -13.78
  Right censored observations 189 189
Uncensored observations 4986 4986
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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spouses’ characteristics will be included in the model to further address how adult 
children’s marriage affects their transfer outcomes.
Having more sisters significantly reduce the transfer incidence and transfer 
amounts, implying that their contributions have a substitution effect to adult 
children’s monetary transfer efforts (p<=.001). If any sibling gave money to mothers, 
adult children are encouraged to give transfer as well (p<=.001). 
Grandchildren’s resource competition shows an interesting effect. On the one 
hand, having more children younger than age 18 decreases the likelihood and amount 
of transfer to elderly mothers, indicating that adult children do incorporate their 
children’s need when they make transfer decisions (p<=.001). On the other, the 
analysis shows if adult children ever gave at least $500 to their children (regardless of 
children’s age), they become 2.69 times more likely to provide monetary transfer to 
mothers (p<=.001). These two results do not contradict with each other. The key issue 
here is how much money adult children have to spend on their children. If their total 
financial transfer amount to children is not much greater than $500 in the past year, 
giving additional transfer to the elderly mothers would not be unaffordable. 
Conversely, if adult children have many financially dependent children who need 
support, it would mean that adult children must spend a much larger amount of 
money on their youngsters, thereby reduce their ability to give extra transfers to 
senior mothers. 
When mothers still live with adult children’s biological fathers, holding 
everything constant, the transfer amount made by adult children decreases (p<=.05). 
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This is not a surprising result because coresiding parents can share their economic 
resources and thus have a smaller financial need. 
Examinations on adult children’s other characteristics indicate that adult 
children’s ability has a decisive effect on their transfer behaviors. White, better 
educated adult children, and adult children who have more household assets, are more 
likely to give money to their mothers; their transfer amount tends to be greater than 
adult children who do not have these qualities. These results are consistent with the 
existing literature.
Mothers’ need also plays an important role in the transfer practice. Adult 
children give more money to mothers with ADL difficulties (p<=.05). The transfer 
likelihood and amount decline when mothers are better educated and have excellent 
or good financial situations. In short, adult children would provide more monetary 
transfers if their mothers have higher level of need.
Transfer to fathers
Table 5-5 summarizes results of monetary transfer to fathers in 1992. In this 
part of the study, statistical models cannot converge if the interaction term of (adult 
children gender × adult children work for pay) is included in the estimation. 
Therefore, only estimations based on the main effects are presented here. Results on 
transfer incidence and transfer amount are presented side-by- side. 
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Table 5-5: Monetary transfer to fathers in 1992, multivariate statistics using 
logistic and Tobit regression
   N=2444
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)













Adult children’s sibling characteristics
















Competition for adult children’s resources
Children compete for resources








Parents compete for resources








  Only father living (Reference category) -- --





Age squared  1.00
(0.02)
   0.002
(0.003)
Race








  Other (Reference category) -- --
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Table 5-5 (cont.) :  Monetary transfer to fathers in 1992, multivariate statistics  
using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept  7.37 -1.02
  Right censored observations    32 
Uncensored observations  2412
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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From Table 5-5, we can see that holding every factor constant, there is no 
significant evidence to conclude that daughters are less likely than sons to give 
monetary transfer to fathers. However, the odds of giving money are almost twice as 
high among adult children who are working for pay (p<=.10), and the transfer amount 
increases when adult children have a paid job (p<=.05). 
Married adult children are significantly less likely to give transfer, and their 
transfer amount is smaller (p<=.001). Sibling effect has a profound influence on adult 
children’s transfer to fathers. Based on the analysis, having more brothers reduces 
transfer incidence and transfer amount, yet having more sisters complement adult 
children’s monetary contributions. This phenomenon may reflect that brothers may 
have more financial resources than sisters and therefore adult children with multiple 
brothers are able to give less money to their fathers. Like we have seen in the transfer 
to mother’s analysis, if any sibling gave money to fathers, adult children themselves 
are also more like to give transfer (p<=.001).
Investigation on the resource competition effect demonstrates the following 
patterns. First, children of the adult children do not compete for financial resources 
with their grandfathers. Conversely, if adult children ever provided $500 to their own 
children, they are also having a greater likelihood of giving money to their elderly 
fathers (p<=.01). Second, when both biological parents live together, adult children 
would decrease their monetary contribution (p<=.10). And lastly, if fathers no longer 
coreside with adult children’s living biological mothers, adult children would increase 
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the transfer amount (p<=.001), possibly because lone fathers tend to have a high need 
for support.     
An examination on adult children’s characteristics reveals that adult children’s 
transfer ability and motivation may be equally essential with respect of transfer to 
fathers. While having more household assets and good health increase the likelihood 
and amount of giving transfer, the analysis also finds that adult children with higher 
educational achievements do not necessarily give more monetary transfers. This 
contradicts the assumption that adult children with better ability would give more 
financial resources to their parents. 
Finally, fathers’ need is also an important determinant. Adult children are 
more likely to give transfer if their fathers are older or experiencing ADL limitation 
(p<=.05). Higher educational attainment and excellent or good financial situation of 
the fathers reduce the transfer amount made by the adult children (p<=.01). 
Consequently, adult children would give more monetary resources if their fathers are 
in greater need.
Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, working adult children
Transfer to mothers 
Table 5-6 presents the findings on working adult children’s monetary transfer 
to mothers. The sample size for the working adult children sub-sample is 3029. In this 
analysis, I include the adult children’s hourly wage rate and weekly work hour 
variables to examine whether working adult children’s wage rate and work hours 
affect their monetary transfer outcomes.  Interaction terms to examine adult 
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Table 5-6: Monetary transfer from working adult children to their mothers in 
1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=3029
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

















Female* hourly wage rate --  1.21*
(0.08)
--      0.12***
(0.03)






















Adult children’s sibling characteristics






























   3.31***
(0.12)
Competition for adult children’s resources
 Children compete for resources 














     0.49***
(0.08)
 Parents compete for resources
















Only mother living (Reference category) -- -- -- --


















Table 5-6 (cont.) : Monetary transfer from working adult children to their mothers 
                               in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Race












     0.38**
(0.15)
     0.39**
(0.15)
  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --









































































Intercept -58.58 -68.54 -24.15 -23.37
  Right censored observations 114 114
Uncensored observations 2915 2915
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.            
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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daughters’ wage and work hour effects are also included in the analysis (under the 
column of Model 2).   
Model 1 under the transfer incidence and transfer amount columns presents 
the analytical results without interaction effects. Before the interaction terms are 
introduced to the analysis, working adult daughters tend to give a smaller amount of 
transfer than sons (p<=.001). Adult children with higher wages are more likely to 
provide monetary transfers to their mothers (p<=.10), meaning that a higher wage rate 
would enhance adult children’s financial ability and encourage their provision of 
monetary resources. The effect of weekly work hours on transfer incidence and 
amount is not statistically significant.
In Model 2, the interaction term of (adult daughter × hourly wage rate) 
demonstrates that adult daughters’ monetary transfer incidences and transfer amounts 
would increase if they are better paid in the labor force. The interaction term of (adult 
daughter × weekly work hour) indicates that when daughters work longer hours they 
are also more likely to give monetary contributions (p<=.05). These results support 
the proposition that while adult daughters’ disadvantages in the labor force may not 
allow them to give a large amount of monetary resources to their mothers, a more 
equal wage structure between men and women would boost adult daughters’ financial 
ability to contribute.  
Examinations on adult children siblings’ characteristics indicate that having 
more brothers and sisters significantly help working adult children to alleviate their 
monetary transfer burden. The hypothesis that grandchildren would compete for 
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monetary resources with their grandmothers is only partially supported. While having 
more children younger than age 18 reduces working adult children’s transfer 
incidence and transfer amount (p<=.001), ever gave $500 to children increase the 
transfer likelihood and amount instead (p<=.001). Resource competition between two 
biological parents does not show a significant influence in the transfer outcomes.
Adult children’s age is positively related to their transfer behaviors. Older 
adult children are more likely to give transfer, and the amount of contribution is 
greater (p<=.05). However, keep in mind that the oldest adult children in the 1992 
study are only 61 years of age. It is possible that adult children who are older than this 
age threshold would have a different pattern of transfer.
All else being equal, white adult children are less likely than adult children of 
other racial groups (mostly Hispanic) to give transfer (p<=.001). However, black 
adult children are more likely to give more money to their mothers than other children 
(p<=.01). As discussed in the literature review chapter, black adult children’s lower 
amount of monetary transfer relative to whites probably results from their lack of 
financial resources. After controlling for socioeconomic factors, the statement that 
black adult children tend to give less monetary transfer no longer holds. 
Assessment on adult children’s education and assets agrees that adult children 
with better ability have a higher transfer incidence and transfer amounts. Yet 
surprisingly, having good health is related to a decreased probability of giving 
transfer, but it is only marginally significant at alpha level <=.10.
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Working adult children’s transfer is also associated with mothers’ need. 
Mothers with better socioeconomic status are less likely to receive money from their 
adult children. The only exception is mothers’ age effect. Holding everything 
constant, working adult children become less likely to provide monetary contributions
to their mothers (p<=.01), and their transfer amount decreases with mothers’ 
advancing ages (p<=.05).
Transfer to fathers
Table 5-7 summarizes the results of working adult children giving transfer to 
their fathers. The two interaction effects, (adult daughter × hourly wage rate) and   
(adult daughter × weekly work hour) are excluded from the models to ensure the 
stability of the analysis.  
Holding all else constant, working adult daughters are still less likely than 
employed sons to give transfers to fathers, and their transfer amount is lower
(p<=.01). Since the wage and the work hour effects are also included in the models, 
this result points out that working adult children’s gender differential in monetary 
transfer is not influenced by the structure of the labor force. Instead, it may be 
interpreted as the effect of “gender norm”. People often consider working males as 
the major breadwinner, and giving money to the needy family members is their 
responsibility. In contrast, because women are mostly expected to perform the 
caregiving chores, they are somewhat less obligated than men to provide monetary 
transfer to parents. In this part of my study, the result seems to echo the gender norm 
argument.
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Table 5-7: Monetary transfer from working adult children to their fathers in 
1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=1522
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)



















Adult children’s sibling characteristics
















Competition for adult children’s resources
 Children compete for resources








 Parents compete for resources








  Only father living (Reference category) -- --


















  Other (Reference category) -- --
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Table 5-7 (cont.) : Monetary transfer from working adult children to their fathers in 
1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept  89.90 22.25
  Right censored observations    25
Uncensored observations  1497
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Results on working adult children’s marital status, siblings’ characteristics, 
and resource competition are generally consistent with my previous findings. 
However, when looking into working adult children’s age effect, we can see that 
older adult children give less financial contribution to their senior fathers (p<=.05). 
While having more household assets increase the likelihood of giving transfer 
(p<=.001), having longer years of schooling does not. Adult children’s health effect 
accords with the study hypothesis. When working children have good or better health, 
their transfer amount to fathers also expands (p<=.01).
Finally, consistent with existing literature, adult children are more likely to 
give greater amount of money to needy fathers. The effect of fathers’ functional 
limitation is particularly strong. When fathers have at least one ADL difficulty, 
working adult children will increase their transfer incidence and amount (p<=.001). 
Better educated fathers and fathers with excellent or good financial situation are less 
likely to receive transfer from their children.   
Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, married working adult daughters to their mothers
Table 4-8 depicts how married adult daughters incorporate spouses’ need into 
their intergenerational transfer practice in 1992. Since I am particularly interested in 
addressing married working adult daughters’ life course constraints, in this section, I 
focus my study on daughters’ transfer behaviors. It is important to note that after 
using the given criteria to select the sub-sample (working, married adult daughters 
with complete husbands’ records), the statistical analysis on transfer to fathers 
becomes unstable. Therefore, it is impossible to present the transfer to fathers’ results. 
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Table 5-8: Monetary transfer from married working adult daughters to their 
mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=781
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Adult daughter work status











 Age difference 





 Years of education difference 
 (Husbands’ years of education-adult daughters’ years 













Adult daughter sibling characteristics
















Competition for adult daughters’ resources
Children compete for resources








Parents compete for resources




  Both biological parents living and live separately (d)
  Only mother living (Reference category) -- --





Age squared   (d)    (d)
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Table 5-8 (cont.) :  Monetary transfer from married working adult daughters to their mothers 
in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Race








  Other (Reference category) -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept  4.17 -3.57
  Right censored observations    28
Uncensored observations   753
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult daughters ever 
gave $500 or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at $500. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): The age-squared variable is excluded from statistical models for a more stable analysis. 
Unweighted statistics.
(d): Variable excluded from statistical model to achieve stable analysis.   
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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The final sample size for the transfers to mother’s sample is 781 adult daughters. 
These adult daughters are all married and working for pay in 1992. Their wage rate, 
weekly work hours, and husbands’ characteristics are the major concern of this part of 
the analysis.
Based on Table 5-8, because the hourly wage rate and weekly work hour 
variables are centered around the grand mean, we know that compared to those who 
have an average wage, adult daughters whose wage rates are higher will be more 
likely to give their mothers monetary transfer, and the amount of transfer increases 
with their higher wage (p<=.001).  The effect of weekly work hours is not statistically 
significant. In short, all else being equal, adult daughters’ financial reward from the 
labor force may influence their ability to give monetary transfer to mothers.
Husbands’ effect is the major concern of this part of the study. I hypothesized 
that the greater the age difference between the husbands and the adult daughters 
(husbands’ age -adult daughters’ age), the less likely that adult daughters will 
contribute financial resources to their mothers because older husbands may compete 
for monetary resources with their mothers-in-law. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is not 
supported by the statistical analysis. Greater difference in years of education between 
the couple increase the likelihood for adult daughters to give money (p<=.10), 
possibly because better-educated husbands potentially have larger amount of financial 
resources thereby adult daughters are able to give transfer. Compared to daughters 
whose husbands are not working for pay, the odds for daughters with a working 
husband to give monetary transfer is almost 5 times higher (p<=.05). Finally, there is 
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no indication that having a husband of poor health would decrease adult daughters’ 
financial contribution to their mothers. It is likely that poor-health husbands compete 
for time, but not monetary resources with their mothers-in-law. I will discuss this 
issue in the next chapter.
  Siblings’ support plays a very important role in adult daughters’ monetary 
transfer practice. Having more sisters would substitute adult daughters’ transfer 
responsibilities because the analysis shows that sisters significantly reduce adult 
daughters’ likelihood and amount of transfer. If any sibling lives with elderly 
mothers, adult daughters would also have a lower transfer incidence and the amount 
of money they contribute decrease (p<=.05). Siblings’ monetary transfer to mothers 
encourages adult daughters’ transfer behaviors. In addition to what siblings had 
given, adult daughters add extra contribution to their mothers (p<=.001). Hence, adult 
daughters’ and siblings’ financial transfer to mothers complement each other.
Giving money to children has a significant effect on adult daughters’ transfer 
practice. Adult daughters ages 51 to 61 bear the responsibility supporting their 
children and elderly mothers. They do not decrease their transfer amount because of 
their efforts to satisfy children’s need. Conversely, compared to their counterpart who 
did not give at least $500 to their children, adult daughters who did so tend to 
contribute more money to their mothers (p<=.01).
Examinations of adult children characteristics indicate that the adult 
daughters’ ability hypothesis provides a limited explanation of monetary transfers to 
mothers. Transfer amount diminishes with adult daughters’ age (p<=.10). Education
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has a non-linear effect on adult daughters’ transfer outcomes. Using high school 
graduates as the reference group, daughters with college graduate degrees are most 
likely to transfer $500 dollars or higher (p<=.001). However, it is not clear how 
transfer patterns differ among those who do not have a college degree.  The 
hypothesis of better health would increase adult daughters’ transfer potential is not 
supported by the statistics either. 
Examination of mothers’ characteristics only shows that when mothers have 
ADL difficulties adult daughters would increase their transfer (p<=.01. Overall, this 
part of the study posits that husbands’ characteristics and siblings’ support are 
essential to adult daughters’ provision of monetary transfer. When husbands have 
better economic ability adult daughters would be more likely to make financial 
contribution to their mothers. Siblings’ involvement significantly reduces adult 
daughters’ burdens, which may enhance working adult daughters’ wellbeing.
Multivariate analysis, 1992-1996
In the following analysis, my major concern is whether adult children’s work 
transition from 1992 to 1996 has an impact on their monetary transfer in 1996. I use 
ordered logit models to estimate adult children’s change in monetary transfer from 
1992 to 1996. The dependent variable has three categories: amount of transfer 
decreased from 1992 to 1996 coded as 1, amount of transfer stay the same from 1992 
to1996 coded as 2, and amount of transfer increased from 1992 to 1996 coded as 3. 
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Since these three categories can be ranked, the ordered logit regression is a suitable 
tool to perform my estimations.
Four dichotomized independent variables are used to depict adult children’s 
work status transition over time. They are: (1) adult children did not work in 1992 and 
not working in 1996; (2) adult children worked in 1992 and still in the labor force in 
1996; (3) adult children worked in 1992 but retired or become a homemaker in 1996, 
and (4) adult children did not work in 1992 but work again in 1996. If adult children 
have the traits described in any of these variables, a score of 1 is given, coded 0 if 
otherwise. The percentage distribution of these variables has been presented in Table 
3-5. When perform the regression analysis, the fourth variable, “adult children did not 
work in 1992 but work again in 1996” is excluded from the model to serve as the 
reference category.  
Except the work transition variables, all other independent variables are based 
on the 1992 data. Results are presented in odds ratios.
Adult children’s change in monetary transfer amount from 1992 to 1996
All adult children
From Table 5-9, we can see that adult children’s gender has an impact on their 
over time transfer to mothers. Adult daughters are less likely than adult sons to 
increase transfer amount to mothers from 1992 to 1996 (p<=.001). However, adult 
children’s gender does not have a significant effect on transfer to fathers. 
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Table 5-9: Change in monetary transfer amount to parents from 1992 to 1996,
 multivariate statistics using ordered logit regression (a)
   To mothers
  (n=2340)
        To fathers 
           (n=889)
Model 1 Model 1

























Adult children’s sibling characteristics, 1992
















Competition for adult children’s resources, 1992
 Children compete for resource








 Parents compete for resources








  Only mother/father living (Reference category) -- --










Table 5-9 (cont.) :  Change in monetary transfer amount to parents from 1992 to  





Model 1 Model 1
Race
  White  0.44***
(0.15)
     0.27***
(0.28)
  Black  1.16
(0.19)
     0.81
(0.34)
  Other (Reference category) -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept for transfer remain the same (2) -26.64 89.47
  Intercept for transfer increased (3) -32.96 81.75
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if transfer amount decreased, coded as 2 if transfer amount 
remain the same, coded as 3 if transfer amount increased. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): The work status variables are based on the 1992-1996 data. All other variables are based on 
the 1992 data to avoid endogenous estimations.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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As hypothesized, adult children’s change in monetary contribution is sensitive 
to their work transitions. For adult children who did not work in both 1992 and 1996,
the odds ratio, 1.76, indicates that compared to adult children who did not work in 
1992 but re-entered the labor force in 1996, adult children who did not work in both 
years are more likely to increase their amount of transfer (p<=.05). Although adult 
children who did not work in both years may have limited income, when mothers 
become older, these adult children still raise their amount of monetary contribution. 
The odds ratio for adult children who worked in both 1992 and 1996 shows an even 
greater effect in this regard. Compared to adult children who returned to the labor 
force in 1996, adult children who continually stay in their paid jobs over the 4-year 
period are 2 times more likely to increase their amount of transfer (p<=.01). Overall, 
these results point out that adult children’s work transition may affect their transfer 
potentials.  Adult children staying in the labor force have more economic resources 
and a greater potential to increase their amount of transfers than adult children 
otherwise. This situation also applies to the transfer to fathers’ case (p<=.01).    
Unlike in 1992 that married adult children are less likely to give transfer, adult 
children’s marriage effect operates in an inverse direction in 1996. Married adult 
children become significantly more likely than unmarried ones to increase their 
monetary contribution. In the upcoming section, I will further discuss how adult 
children spouses’ characteristics affect the transfer outcome from 1992 to 1996.  
Siblings’ sex affects adult children’s changes in transfer amounts. Having 
more brothers causes a higher likelihood for adult children to increase their monetary 
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transfer to fathers (p<=.01), whereas having more sisters means that adult children 
may be more likely to decrease, or to maintain the same amount of transfer to mothers 
(p<=.01). If any sibling lives with mothers, adult children are likely to increase their 
transfer amount (p<=.05), implying that there is a division of caregiving duty among 
the siblings. Siblings who live with senior mothers may provide more time transfers 
due to the close proximity. Therefore, adult children who do not coreside with their 
mothers may wish to use money to substitute for their limited time contribution, or to 
compensate the expenses that incurred at sibling-mother coresident households. 
Lastly, as we have seen in the 1992 analysis, siblings’ monetary contribution is 
positively related to adult children’s increase in transfer in 1996. Although the 
responsibility of giving parents later-life support often unevenly distributed among 
siblings, the sense of obligation and the comparison among the siblings may cause 
adult children to involve more in the transfer practice.       
Grandchildren compete for resources with their grandfathers (p<=.05). When 
both biological parents live together, adult children would increase their amount of 
transfer. This result is different from four years ago. In 1992, adult children were less 
likely to give transfer if their parents live together because mothers and fathers could 
share their household resources with each other thereby have lower need. In 1996, 
since parents’ need become higher and giving transfer to either parent means both of 
them could indeed benefit from this contribution, adult children would increase their 
transfer amount accordingly. 
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Adult children’s educational achievement has a linear relationship with their 
transfer to mothers’ outcome. Better educated adult children are more likely to 
increase their contribution. This can be explained by two perspectives that I have 
discussed in the literature review chapter. First, adult children with more schooling 
may have higher wage or income, allowing them to make greater amount of financial 
contributions over time. This may be a valid statement here—keep in mind that adult 
children’s wage rate and income variables are not controlled in this model. Hence, it 
is likely that their wage or income effect plays a role in this regard. Second, as posited 
in some studies, better-educated adult children may have received a substantial 
amount of resources from their parents when they were in school. If this is the case, 
better-educated adult children would have a motive to reciprocate their mother’s 
contribution made in earlier years. It is almost impossible to find out which statement 
has a better explanatory power. In reality, these two arguments are not mutually 
exclusive. Adult children’s transfer ability and transfer motivation are both important. 
Finally, at least in this study, parents’ characteristics in 1992 do not significantly 
influence adult children’s transfer adjustments in 1996.  Thus, one may conclude that 
in the long term, adult children’s life course transition, transfer ability, and transfer 
motivation are more important than parents’ characteristics in the respect of making a 
monetary transfer decision. 
Married adult children
Table 5-10 presents the monetary transfer change for married adult children. 
In addition to the independent variables used in the previous analysis, adult children 
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spouse’s characteristics are also included in the regression models to examine 
whether adult children incorporate spouse’s later-life need into their intergenerational 
transfer plans.   
Married adult daughters are less likely than sons to increase their transfer to 
mothers (p<=.01). Work status transition has a significant effect on married adult 
children’s monetary contribution. Compared to those who returned to the labor force, 
adult children with other work transition experiences are more likely to increase their 
monetary transfer amount. Specifically, adult children who continue to work from 
1992 to 1996 have the greatest likelihood to increase. Adult children who retired from 
their jobs or become a homemaker also give a larger amount of monetary resource 
over time, although the odds ratios demonstrate that the size of effect is smaller than 
that of the working adult children’s. In Table 5-9 this variable is not statistically 
significant in either transfer to mothers’ or fathers’ analysis. Based on this result, we 
can infer that all else being equal, a spouse may provide retired adult children with 
some necessary support thereby these adult children can still increase their transfer 
amount to parents.  
Adult children do consider their spouses’ need when they adjust their 
monetary transfer amount to parents. As Table 5-10 shows, older spouses would 
compete for monetary resources with their parents-in-law (p<=.05). When the age 
difference between the spouses and the adult children becomes larger, adult children 
would be more likely to decrease, or to maintain their original level of transfer as they 
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Table 5-10:Change in monetary transfer amount from married adult children to their parents 
from 1992 to 1996, multivariate statistics using ordered logit regression (a)
   To mothers
  (n=2340)
        To fathers 
           (n=889)
Model 1 Model 1

















Did not work in 1992 and worked again in 1996 
(Reference category)
-- --
Adult children spouse’s characteristics, 1992
Age difference 





Years of education difference 














Adult children’s sibling characteristics, 1992
















Competition for adult children’s resources, 1992
 Children compete for resource








 Parents compete for resources








  Only mother/father living (Reference category) -- --
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Table 5-10 (cont.) : Change in monetary transfer amount from married adult children to their 





Model 1 Model 1










  White  0.30***
(0.17)
     0.23***
(0.32)
  Black  0.78
(0.23)
     0.71
(0.41)
  Other (Reference category) -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept for transfer remain the same (2) -41.25   117.00
  Intercept for transfer increased (3) -48.36   107.60
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if transfer amount decreased, coded as 2 if transfer amount remain the same, 
coded as 3 if transfer amount increased. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): The work status variables are based on the 1992-1996 data. All other variables are based on the 1992 data to avoid 
endogenous estimations.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.      
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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did in 1992. If spouses worked for pay in 1992, adult children may have less financial 
constraints and are able to give more money to their fathers in 1996 (p<=.10).
Examinations on siblings’ characteristics indicate that having more brothers 
result in a greater possibility for adult children to expand their transfer to mothers 
(p<=.05), while having more sisters reduce the chance (p<=.01). Analysis on adult 
children’s and parents’ characteristics exhibit coherent results as presented in Table 
5-9. Adult children’s social economic ability and transfer motivation jointly influence 
the transfer outcomes. Nevertheless, parents’ characteristics described by the 1992 
data do not show significant influence on the proposed relationships.   
Summary of monetary transfer
Based on the above discussions, one can understand that it is necessary to 
assess transfer incidences and transfer amounts at the same time, because adult 
children with high likelihoods of giving transfers do not necessarily give large 
amounts.
In 1992, adult children’s labor force participation has a decisive effect on 
adult children’s monetary transfer outcomes. Adult children’s gender is a key factor 
in this regard. The lower likelihood of providing monetary transfers, and the smaller 
amount of monetary contributions of the adult daughters, can both be explained by 
their disadvantages in the labor force. If adult daughters’ wage rate expands, their 
monetary transfer amount becomes closer to the level offered by the adult sons.
In addition to the labor force participation experiences, adult children’s 
transfer behaviors are also strongly influenced by their family support networks. By 
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incorporating spouses and siblings’ characteristics into the analysis, I find that 
spouses and siblings are often the complement, or the substitute, of the adult children 
in transfer practices, although they also constrain adult children and further affect 
adult children’s intergenerational transfer decisions. 
Adult children’s spouses may either compete for the household financial 
resources with their parents-in-law, or help adult children to fulfill their monetary 
transfer obligations. Spouses’ advancing age is negatively related to adult children’s 
transfer, implying that older spouses are competing for resources with their parents-
in-law. Working spouses potentially increase the household income pool, thus adult 
children are able to give more money to their parents.
Siblings’ assistance is very valuable. Having more sisters significantly 
decreases adult children’s transfer amounts clearly validate that sisters’ efforts can 
substitute adult children’s monetary transfer burden. When siblings provide monetary 
resource to parents, adult children are also encouraged to participate in the transfer 
practice.
Grandchildren do not always compete for monetary resources with their 
grandparents. In 1992, when two parents live together, adult children would be less 
likely to give transfer. However, over time, stronger family tie encourages adult 
children’s contributions. Adult children increase their monetary transfer amount in 
1996 if both parents are stay in an intact marriage. In this situation, adult children’s 
transfer to either parent would potentially benefit both parents’ wellbeing.
129
Adult children’s ability offers partial explanations of their transfer. According 
to the analysis, adult children with higher transfer ability do not necessary give more 
money to their mothers and fathers. Some of this variation should be interpreted as 
the consequence of adult children’s transfer motivation. Parents’ need is a more 
critical factor to trigger adult children’s monetary transfer in 1992 than in 1996. For 
instance, in 1992, when parents are better educated and financially better-off than the 
adult children, adult children’s transfer amounts decrease. However, examination of 
parents’ characteristics in the 1996 analysis indicates that the explanatory power of 
parents’ need becomes weaker over time. 
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Chapter 6
 Adult Children’s Provision of Time Transfers 
In this chapter, I present the findings for the time transfers. The time transfer 
examined here refers to caregiving time. It does not include the time that adult 
children spent on helping around the house or companionship. As in Chapter 5, I first 
discuss the descriptive results and then present the regression results. 
Descriptive analysis 
Adult children’s transfer incidence and amount in 1992
Table 6-1 summarizes the descriptive analysis results for the incidence and 
amount of time transfer in 1992. The results are presented by parents’ and adult 
children’s sex. The number of observations for each category is presented in 
parentheses. 
Compared to elderly fathers, a higher percentage of elderly mothers had 
received 100 hours or more in time transfers. Adult daughters are more likely to be 
transfer givers than adult sons. The analysis points out that a very low percentage of 
adult sons had ever provided time transfer to their parents—only 0.66% of elderly 
mothers and 0.53% of elderly fathers acquired time transfers from their adult sons. 
These figures are much higher for adult daughters. Among all adult daughters, 4.69% 
transferred time to mothers and 2.64% to fathers.  
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Table 6-1: Adult children’s provision of time transfers in 1992, by adult children 
                  and parents’ sex, weighted statistics 




Ever gave 100 hours or more












Average amount of transfer 












Average amount of transfer,  only transfers >=100 hours 












Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note:   Number of cases for each cell presented in parentheses.
The analysis on transfer amount also indicates that adult daughters provide 
more transfer than adult sons. When all adult children are considered (including adult 
children who never gave a time transfer, ever gave transfer but under 100 hours, and 
ever gave transfer equal or greater than 100 hours in 1992), adult daughters on 
average gave 48.65 hours to their mothers in the past 12 months.  The mean amount 
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of time adult sons gave to their mothers is 5.13 hours, which is much smaller when 
compared to adult daughters’. Adult daughters also gave a greater amount of time 
than sons in the transfer to father’s sample. The average number of hours transferred 
from daughters to their fathers is 19.34, while it is 5.50 from sons.
Although most adult sons did not give transfer, those who had given 100 
hours or more indeed gave a very large amount. Among children who provided at 
least 100 hours of transfer, on average, adult sons gave 774 hours to their mothers and 
1047 hours to their fathers. Please notice that because very few sons belong to the 
ever gave time transfer category (14 cases transferred to mothers and 5 cases 
transferred to fathers, respectively), it is likely that sons’ very large time transfer 
amount observed in Table 6-1 simply reflects the upper-bound values. In this 
scenario, parents who received time transfers from their adult sons are those with very 
high need, hence the transfer amount was high. 
Figure 6-1 visualizes adult children’s average amount of time transfer, by 
parents’ and adult children’s sex. A majority of adult children did not make time 
contribution equal or greater than 100 hours, yet those who spent time on their 
parents gave very high amount. Daughters gave more time than sons. The only 
exception is in the transfer to fathers: equal or greater than 100 hours category, where 
sons seem to spend longer time taking care of their fathers. However, as mentioned in 
the prior paragraph and in the Table 6-1, there are only five adult sons in this 
particular category thereby the result presented in Figure 6-1 mainly reflects the upper 
bound transfer value.
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Adult children’s transfer incidence and amount in 1996
Table 6-2 is the weighted descriptive analysis of adult children’s change in 
time transfer from 1992 to 1996. As in the 1992 analysis, results on transfer to 
mothers and fathers are both presented in this table. 
The upper part of Table 6-2 summarizes the transfer incidence by adult 
children and parents’ sex. Overall, most adult children in the sample did not transfer 
time to their parents in 1992 and 1996. Approximately 96% of adult sons and 93% of 
adult daughters never provide time transfer to their senior fathers. Also, about 94% of 
sons and 91% of daughters did not give time transfers to their mothers. Compared to 
the monetary transfer results presented in Chapter 5, it is clear that more adult 
Figure 6-1: Mean amount of time transfer from adult children








Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers




children use monetary resources rather than time to fulfill their transfer duties. This is 
not a surprising result because monetary transfer is less restricted by the residential 
proximity and physical distance. When adult children live farther from their parents, 
it is easier for them to use money to replace for their time transfer responsibilities.
Compared to mothers, fathers have smaller percentage to receive time 
transfers from their adult sons and daughters. In 1996, a total of 5.88% of mothers 
and 4.02% of fathers received time transfer. 
Adult daughters made more transfer efforts than adult sons over the study 
years. In 1996, a total of 6.58% and 5.24% adult daughters reported that they had 
provided time transfers to their mothers and fathers, respectively. Among these adult 
daughters who provided time transfer in 1996, 1.16% of them started their transfer to 
mothers and 1.02% started their contribution to fathers since 1992. Only 5% and 3% 
of adult sons provided time transfers to their mothers and fathers in 1996. These 
results indicate that even when parents’ needs increase over the years, adult daughters 
are still the key caregivers.
Nevertheless, the proportions of adult daughters who had withdrawn from the 
caregiving tasks are also significant: 2.70% in the transfer to mother’s sample and 
1.28% in the transfer to father’s sample. There are two possible explanations of this 
finding. First, when parents become older and require more assistance, adult 
daughters may seek other sources of support to share their caregiving burdens and the 
observed transfer incidence among adult daughters may decrease accordingly. 
Second, as the aging process proceeds, husbands of the adult daughters may also need 
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Table 6-2: Changes in provision of time transfers from adult children to their 





Incidence: Ever gave 100 hours or more in 1992 and 1996
Both adult sons and daughters
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 92.55% 94.73%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   5.30%   3.59%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +)   0.58%   0.43%
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   1.57%   1.25%
Adult sons only
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 94.36% 95.65%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   5.19%   3.13%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +) NA  NA
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   0.45%   1.22%
Adult daughters only
 NO in 1992, NO in 1996 (- -) 90.72% 93.48%
 NO in 1992, YES in 1996 (- +)   5.42%   4.22%
 YES in 1992, YES in 1996 (+ +)   1.16%   1.02%
 YES in 1992, NO in 1996 (+ -)   2.70%   1.28%
Amount: Changes in amounts given to the parents
Both adult sons and daughters
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 91.15% 92.62%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount   6.81%   5.69%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount   2.04%   1.69%
Adult sons only
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 93.32% 93.83%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount  6.23%   4.95%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount    0.45%   1.22%
Adult daughters only
The Same: about same amounts given in 1992 and 1996 88.96% 90.99%
Increase: 1996 transfer amount >1992 transfer amount   7.39%   6.69%
Decrease: 1996 transfer amount < 1992 transfer amount   3.65%   2.32%
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996. Weighted 
statistics.
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support (adult daughters in this study project are all in their late-middle-ages, and 
based on the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4-6,  their husbands are even 
older). Therefore, some of the adult daughters may have to reduce time transfer to 
their parents and give part of their time resources to their husbands.
The lower panel of Table 6-2 helps to evaluate the changes in time transfers. 
Most adult children’s time transfer remains the same. More adult daughters than sons 
indicated that their amount of time transfers have increased over time—7.39% for 
mothers and 6.69% for fathers, respectively, compared to 6.23% of adult sons to 
mothers with less than 5% given to fathers. The higher percentage of transfer 
decrease among adult daughters may be caused either by other support-givers’ 
involvement or their extra duties to take care of their aging husbands. Only about 1% 
of adult sons decreased their transfer amount from 1992 to 1996.
Figure 6-2 illustrates the changes in time transfer incidence over time. In 
every category, adult children increased their time transfer involvement after four 
years. This result is expected because when parents become older their demand for 
caregiving also expands. Furthermore, we can also see that the magnitude of increase 
in adult sons’ time transfer incidence is substantial. On the one hand, this may imply 
that adult sons delay their time transfer involvement to later years. On the other, since 
majority of sons did not give transfer at all in 1992, it is not surprising that their 
degree of increase in time transfer in 1996 looks larger than that of adult daughters’.
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Figure 6-2: Change in time transfer incidence, by adult
                   children and parents' sex and transfer year







Figure 6-3 in the next page shows compared to adult sons, a greater 
percentage of adult daughters increased their transfer amount from 1992 to 96. This 
indicates that daughters keep playing a caregiving role over time. As parents’ need 
increases, adult daughters also expand their time transfer amount accordingly. Adult 
daughters also have a higher percentage than sons to decrease their amount of time 
transfer. A reasonable interpretation would be that some adult daughters may have to 
allocate part of their time to their husbands as their husbands also become older. In 
the multivariate analysis I will provide more discussion in this regard. 
138
Figure 6-3: Adult children who increased and decreased time
                   transfer amount, by adult children and parents' sex







Bivariate analysis on time transfer incidence and transfer amount
Table 6-3 presents bivariate statistics for the time transfer incidence and 
transfer amount. The analysis is unweighted. The dependent variables for transfer 
incidence are whether adult children gave at least 100 hours to mothers/fathers in the 
past 12 months. Logistic regression is used to evaluate the associations and the results 
are presented in odds ratios. 
The dependent variables for the transfer amount analysis are the actual 
amount of transfer. The amount of transfer is censored at 100 hours and the 
distribution has been transformed into natural log form. Tobit regression is adopted to 
perform the analysis and results are presented in coefficients.
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Table 6-3: Bivariate analysis on time transfer to parents in 1992 using logistic (a)
                  and Tobit regression (b)
Transfer to mothers
(n=5175)
Transfer to fathers 
(n=2444)
Incidence Amount Incidence Amount
















































































Right censored observations  142   32
Uncensored observations 5033 2412
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992. 
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children
ever gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hours. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics. Results of major explanatory variables are presented.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Transfer to mothers
The bivariate results for time transfer to mothers show that adult daughters are 
7 times more likely than adult sons to give time transfers, and their transfer amount is 
higher (p<=.001). This is consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 
6-1 that daughters bear heavier time transfer duty than sons. Working adult children 
are significantly less likely to give time transfer (p<=.001). Being a married adult 
child decreases the transfer likelihood and transfer amount (p<=.001). 
Having more brothers or sisters significantly reduces the likelihood and 
amount of transfer (p<=.001). Nevertheless, if any sibling gave time to mothers, adult 
children are also encouraged to participate in the time transfer practice (p<=.001). 
Having a sibling live with elderly mothers does not affect adult children’s time 
transfer behaviors.
Financially dependent children do not reduce adult children’s time transfer to 
their mothers. When both biological parents are living and residing together, adult 
children would be more likely to give transfer (p<=.10). However, the examination on 
the transfer amount does not show a significant effect.
Transfer to fathers
Bivariate analysis for the transfer to father’s sample demonstrates that 
daughters are more likely than sons to give transfers (p<=.001). Paid-job curtails 
adult children’s time availability and results in a smaller amount of transfer to fathers 
(p<=.001). Married adult children are significantly less likely to give transfer.
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Although having more brothers means adult children could decrease their 
time transfer efforts (p<=.001), an investigation on sister’s effect does not show a 
consistent pattern. Different from what has been found in the transfer to mother’s 
sample, the analysis shows that if any sibling coresides with fathers, adult children 
would be less likely to give time transfer (p<=.01). Thus, siblings who live with the 
elderly fathers may shoulder the major responsibility of providing care to the fathers. 
There is no evidence to attest that grandchildren would compete for time 
resources with their grandfathers. Finally, if elderly fathers live with adult children’s 
biological mothers, adult children would increase their amount of time transfer to 
fathers (p<=.10). 
Multivariate analysis, 1992 
Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, all adult children
Tables 6-4 and 6-5 summarize the multivariate results of time transfer 
incidence and transfer amount. These regression results are unweighted and presented 
by parents’ sex. In each Table, Model 1 demonstrates the analytical results without 
interaction effect; Model 2 includes an interaction term (adult children female × 
working for pay) to examine whether adult daughters’ paid-job responsibility affect 
their provision of time transfer.
142
Transfer to mothers
Table 6-4 presents the findings for transfer to mothers. The hypothesis that 
daughters are more likely than sons to give time transfer is supported by the statistics. 
Before the interaction term is introduced to the logistic regression model, we can see 
that the odds for a daughter to perform time transfer task is more than 4 times higher 
than a son’s (p<=.001). The examination on transfer amount also shows a parallel 
result that daughters spend longer hours than sons on caregiving chores (p<=.001).
Investigation on adult children’s labor force participation status indicates that 
all else being equal, working for pay potentially constraint adult children’s time 
availability and causes a lower transfer incidence and transfer amount (p<=.001). 
Inclusion of the interaction term further indicates that even when daughters are 
working for pay, they are still more likely than sons to give time transfer (p<=.001), 
although the interaction effect on transfer amount is not statistically significant. 
Based on these results, my research hypothesis that regardless of their work status, 
adult daughters are still more likely than sons to be the primary caregiver is generally 
supported.
Married adult children have a lower incidence to give time resources to their 
mothers, and the transfer amount is significantly smaller (p<=.001). A possible 
interpretation for this outcome is that, due to the coresidence proximity, married adult 
children may firstly spend time on their spouses and therefore limit their contribution 
to mothers. Since mothers in this study do not live with the adult children, it is harder 
for them to receive full attention from their non-coresident adult children. 
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Table 6-4: Time transfer to mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic 
and Tobit regression
     N=5175
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2





























Adult children’s sibling characteristics
































Competition for adult children’s resources








Parents compete for resources
















  Only mother living (Reference category) -- -- -- --


































  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
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Table 6-4 (cont.) : Time transfer to mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using
                               logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --









































































  Intercept -63.64 -61.73 -27.25 -27.16
  Right censored observations 142 142
Uncensored observations 5033 5033
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hours. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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The next step is to examine siblings’ effect on adult children’s time transfer 
behaviors. Table 6-4 shows that having more brothers decrease the likelihood of 
giving time transfer, but this brother effect does not significantly influence adult 
children’s time transfer amount. The hypothesis that sisters substitute for adult 
children’s time transfer responsibilities is supported here. Having more sisters means 
adult children would have a lower time transfer incidence (p<=.001), and their 
amount of transfer also decline (p<=.001). Hence, it is obvious that sisters can help 
adult children to alleviate their time transfer duties to a large extent. Having at least 
one sibling live with the elderly mothers has a similar effect. Among all siblings, 
brothers and sisters who coreside with mothers often perform most caregiving chores 
to satisfy their mothers’ need. In this sense, the non-coresident adult children are no 
longer required to give large amount of time transfer to their mothers. This is not to 
say that non-coresident adult children would completely withdraw from their time 
transfer responsibilities. Holding everything constant, if any sibling ever gave time 
transfer to mothers, adult children would also increase their transfer incidence and 
transfer amount (p<=.001).
The hypothesis that younger grandchildren may compete for time resources 
with their grandmothers is partially supported. Adult children with more children 
younger than age 18 give lower amounts of transfer to their mothers. This result is 
marginally significant at alpha=.10 level. Moreover, there is no evidence to argue that 
two living biological parents would compete for time transfer with each other. When 
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mothers are living with the adult children’s biological fathers, the transfer amount 
made by adult children indeed increase (p<=.10).
Adult children’s ability affects their time transfer. Healthy adult children, and 
adult children who have more household assets, are more likely to give time to their 
mothers. These characteristics are also associated with an increase in transfer amount. 
Older adult children provide more transfer to their mothers (p<=.01). Compared to 
adult children of other race/ethnic groups, white adult children are less likely to give 
transfer. This result supports the widely accepted statement in the literature that adult 
children of racial minority origin tend to give more time to their parents than whites.
Finally, controlling for mothers’ characteristics found that mothers’ age plays 
an important role in the transfer practice. Adult children’s transfer incidence and 
transfer amount has a positive relationship with mothers’ advancing ages (p<=.001).  
Transfer to fathers
Table 6-5 summarizes results of time transfer to fathers in 1992. As in the 
transfer to mother’s analysis, Model 1 results under the transfer incidence and transfer 
amount column are the estimations without interaction effect. In Model 2, the 
interaction term (adult children female × adult children work for pay) is added to the 
analysis. One of the control variables, “father has at least one ADL limitation”, is 
excluded from the model to ensure the converging in the estimation procedure.
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Table 6-5: Time transfer to fathers in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic 
and Tobit regression
   N=2444
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2





























Adult children’s sibling characteristics
































Competition for adult children’s resources








Parents compete for resources
















  Only father living (Reference category)                      -- -- -- --













       0.004+
(0.002)
     0.004
(0.002)
Race
















  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
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Table 6-5(cont.) : Time transfer to fathers in 1992, multivariate statistics using
                               logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --

































































  Intercept      53.52  60.98 6.33 6.09
  Right censored observations 32 32
Uncensored observations 2412 2412
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hours. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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From Table 6-5, Model 1, we can see that holding everything constant, adult 
daughters are more likely than sons to give time transfer to fathers (p<=.05). The 
odds for daughters to give time transfer are doubled when compared to adult sons. 
Adult children who are working for pay become less likely to give time (p<=.01), and 
the transfer amount decrease when adult children have a paid job (p<=.01). 
Nevertheless, in Model 2, the results show that adult daughters’ transfer likelihood 
does not decline with their working status (p<=.001). Instead, working adult 
daughters have a higher incidence to give time transfer to their fathers. 
Married adult children are significantly less likely to give transfer, and their 
transfer amount is smaller (p<=.001). This result points out that spouses of the adult 
children may play an influential role in the time transfer practice and a further 
examination on this regard is necessary. 
While having more brothers reduces transfer incidence and transfer amount to 
fathers, having more sisters does not significantly affect adult children’s time 
contributions. Therefore, the hypothesis that number of sisters has an inverted 
relationship with adult children’s time transfer incidence and amount is not supported 
in this study. However, having any sibling live with fathers significantly reduces adult 
children’s time spent on fathers (p<=.001), implying that intergenerational 
coresidence has a remarkable influence on adult children’s time transfer behaviors. 
Although the distribution of time transfer responsibility among siblings is usually 
uneven, if any sibling gave time to fathers, adult children themselves are also more 
like to give transfer (p<=.001).
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Investigation on the resource competition does not show that grandchildren 
would compete for time resources with their grandfathers. Likewise, there is little 
evidence to attest that two living parents would compete for time transfer with each 
other.
Adult children’s transfer ability is rather critical because a greater amount of 
household assets and good health increase the likelihood and amount of giving 
transfer. Compared to adult children who do not have a high school graduate diploma, 
adult children who graduated from a college have a lower time transfer incidence 
(p<=.05). Since the wage effect is not yet controlled in this part of analysis, it is 
possible that better-educated adult children have a greater opportunity cost in the 
labor force, therefore they have to reduce their time contribution to fathers. 
Lastly, none of the father’s characteristic variables exert a statistically 
significant effect to adult children’s time transfer outcomes. Perhaps other variables 
can better represent father’s need than the ones employed in this study.
Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, working adult children
Transfer to mothers 
Table 6-6 extends my prior analysis and presents the findings on working 
adult children’s time transfer to mothers. In Model 1, variables of adult children’s 
hourly wage rate and weekly work hour are introduced to examine whether working 
adult children’s wage rate and work hours affect their time transfer outcomes.  In 
Model 2, the interaction terms of (adult children female × adult children wage rate) 
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Table 6-6: Time transfer from working adult children to their mothers in 1992,
                  multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=3029
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2





























Female* weekly work hour --  0.13***
(0.46)   
-- -0.03*
(0.01)








Adult children’s sibling characteristics
































Competition for adult children’s resources
Children compete for resources








Parents compete for resources












  Only mother living (Reference category) --














Table 6-6 (cont.) : Time transfer from working adult children to their mothers 
                               in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Race












     0.28**
(0.10)
     0.28**
(0.10)
  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --









































































  Intercept -5.36 -9.88 -31.31 -31.06
  Right censored observations 64 64
Uncensored observations 2965 2965
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hours. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
          (d): Variable excluded from statistical model to achieve stable analysis. 
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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and (adult children female × adult children weekly work hours) are included to 
evaluate adult daughters’ transfer behaviors.
As shown in Table 6-6, Model 1, before taking the interaction terms into 
account, working adult daughters are more likely than sons to give time transfers, and 
their transfer amount is greater (p<=.001). The hourly wage rate variable has been 
centered at the grand mean ($24.77 per hour). We can see that adult children with a 
higher hourly wage rate are less likely to provide time transfers to their mothers 
(p<=.05). The values of the weekly work hour variable are also centered around the 
grand mean (33.82 hours per week). The odds ratio is smaller than 1, meaning that 
longer work hours is negatively related to adult children’s time transfer incidence 
(p<=.05). These two variables, however, do not show a significant effect when 
transfer amount is assessed. 
Once we look into the Model 2 and examine the interaction variables, we can 
see that adult daughters’ higher hourly wage rate does not significantly reduce their 
transfer likelihood, while adult daughters who work long hours in the labor force are 
likely to decrease their amount of time contribution to mothers (p<=.05). In short, 
these results indicate that adult children who have a higher opportunity cost in the 
labor market would be less likely to give time transfer, and because longer work 
hours constrain adult children’s time availability, those who spend longer hours in the 
labor force would have a lower incidence of time transfer. Adult daughters who are 
better-paid in the market do not necessarily relegate their caregiving responsibilities. 
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Yet when they are dedicating long hours in their paid-jobs, they would adjust their 
time transfer amount accordingly.
Being a married adult child is negatively associated with the transfer 
outcomes (p<=.001). Analysis on adult children siblings’ characteristics demonstrate 
the same results shown in the earlier discussions. Having more sisters or having any 
sibling live with mothers ease adult children’s time transfer responsibilities. Any 
siblings’ time contribution increases adult children’s probability of giving transfer 
(p<=.001).
The hypothesis that grandchildren would compete for time resources with 
their grandmothers is partially supported. Having more children younger than age 18 
reduces working adult children’s transfer amount but not transfer likelihood. 
Resource competition between two biological parents exists when both parents live 
together (p<=.10).
Older adult children make a greater amount of contribution (p<=.001). As 
hypothesized, black adult children also spend longer time than others to help their 
elderly mothers (p<=.01). A larger amount of household assets enhances adult 
children’s transfer ability (p<=.001), nonetheless, having good health is related to a 
decreased amount of transfer (p<=.01).
Working adult children’s transfer is also associated with their transfer 
motivation. Analysis based on mothers’ characteristics shows that adult children 
would transfer greater amount of time to mothers with excellent or good financial 
situations (p<=.05). According to the literature, this result may be attributed to adult 
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children’s reciprocity for the support they received from mothers in the past. Or, it 
may be that adult children have a rational calculation in their mind and wish to obtain 
financial bequest from their well-off mothers in the future. 
Transfer to fathers
Table 6-7 summarizes the results of working adult children giving transfer to 
their fathers. The two interaction effects, (adult daughter × hourly wage rate) and   
(adult daughter × weekly work hours) are not included in the models to ensure that 
logistic regression estimations can successfully converge and generate meaningful 
results.  
Holding all else constant, working adult daughters are more likely than 
employed sons to give transfers to fathers (p<=.01). A higher hourly wage rate 
increases the transfer incidence but not transfer amount. 
Results on working adult children’s marital status and siblings’ characteristics 
are consistent with my previous findings. When fathers live with adult children’s 
mothers, adult children would be less likely to give time transfer and the transfer 
amount may decrease (p<=.01). Because fathers tend to receive support from their 
spouses, adult children do not have to give large amount of time transfer.
Variables on working adult children’s ability provide very limited insight into 
their transfer behaviors.  Consistent with what was found in the transfer to mothers’ 
analysis, working adult children will increase their transfer incidence when their 
fathers are financially well-off (p<=.10). Again, this is an indication that adult 
children’s motivation is an important determinant in their time transfer process.  
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Table 6-7: Time transfer from working adult children to their fathers in 1992,
                  multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=1522
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)

















Adult children’s sibling characteristics












Competition for adult children’s resources
 Children compete for resources




 Parents compete for resources




  Both biological parents living and live separately    (d) -0.22
(0.14)
  Only father living (Reference category) -- --


















  Other (Reference category) -- --
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Table 6-7 (cont.) : Time transfer from working adult children to their fathers 
                               in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --

































  Intercept  94.11   2.93
  Right censored observations    12
Uncensored observations  1510
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hours. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
          (d): Variable excluded from statistical model to ensure the converging of the estimation procedures. 
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Transfer incidence and amount in 1992, married working adult daughters to their mothers
Because I am interested in how married working adult daughters’ life course 
constrains their time transfer behaviors, Table 6-8 does not present adult sons’ time 
transfer results. After using the given criteria to select the sub-sample (working, 
married adult daughters with complete husbands’ records), the statistical analysis on 
transfer to fathers become unstable. Thus, in this section, only transfer to mother’s 
results is discussed.
Adult daughters’ wage rate, weekly work hours, and husbands’ characteristics 
are the major focus here. Based on Table 6-8,  it is clear that adult daughters with a 
higher wage rate are more likely to give time transfer, and the amount of transfer 
increases with their advancing wage (p<=.001). In other words, although adult 
daughters with a higher wage rate have a greater opportunity cost in the labor market, 
the gender norms regarding adult daughters’ caregiving obligation may prevent them 
from using financial resources to replace for their time contribution. Longer work
hours fundamentally constrain adult daughters’ time availability and affect their 
transfer outcomes.  All else being equal, adult daughters who spend longer hours in 
their paid-jobs are less likely to give time resources to their mothers (p<=.05), and 
they are also likely to decrease their caregiving time in order to fit their work 
schedules (p<=.05).
In 1992, husbands’ characteristics do not significantly affect adult daughters’ 
transfer to their mothers. It is possible that husbands’ effects will have an influence 
on adult daughters’ time transfer behaviors in the long-term. 
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Table 6-8: Time transfer from married working adult daughters to their mothers in 
1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
   N=781
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Adult daughter work status















Years of education difference 
(Husbands’ years of education-adult daughters’ years 









Husbands have poor health   (d)   (d)
Adult daughters’ sibling characteristics












   Any sibling gave time to mother   (d)    (d)
Competition for adult daughters’ resources
Children compete for resources




Parents compete for resources




  Both biological parents living and live separately   (d) -0.44
(0.32)
  Only mother living (Reference category) -- --





Age squared   (d)   (d)





Table 6-8 (cont.) : Time transfer from married working adult daughters to their 
mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic and Tobit regression
Transfer Incidence (a) Transfer Amount (b)
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept -5.70 -6.08
  Right censored observations    18
Uncensored observations  763
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): For transfer incidence analysis, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children ever 
gave 100 hours or more, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
         (b): For transfer amount analysis, the dependent variable is the logged transfer amount, 
censoring at 100 hour. Results are presented in coefficients.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
(d): Variable excluded from statistical model to ensure the convergence of the estimation procedures.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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For adult daughters, siblings’ assistance plays a complementary, rather than 
substitution role in the transfer practice. Having more brothers and sisters increases
adult daughters’ transfer incidence and transfer amount (p<=.05). In addition, there 
was no support for the hypotheses that grandchildren and living fathers would 
compete for time resources with elderly mothers. 
Examinations of adult daughters’ ability indicate that adult daughters’ 
education has a non-linear effect on their transfer incidence. Using adult daughters 
who received lower than high school education as the reference group, daughters with 
college graduate degrees are most likely to give transfer, followed by adult daughters 
who graduated from a high school (p<=.10). The hypotheses that greater amount of 
household assets and better health would increase adult daughters’ transfer can not be 
supported by the regression analysis. 
Examination of mothers’ need shows that when mothers have ADL 
difficulties, adult daughters are 3 times more likely to give transfer (p<=.01). 
Nevertheless, adult daughters’ time transfer decision is also related to their motives 
because the likelihood and amount of time contribution expands when mothers have 
good financial situations.
Multivariate analysis, 1992-1996
In the following analysis, my focus is on whether adult children’s work 
transition from 1992 to 1996 affects their time transfer in 1996. Ordered logit models 
are employed to estimate adult children’s change in time transfer from 1992 to 1996. 
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The dependent variable has three categories: amount of transfer decreased from 1992 
to 1996 (coded as 1), amount of transfer stay the same (coded as 2), and amount of 
transfer increased (coded as 3).
As in the monetary transfer analysis, four dichotomized independent variables 
are used to describe adult children’s work transition from 1992 to 1996. They are: (1) 
adult children did not work in 1992 and 1996; (2) adult children worked in 1992 and 
still in the labor force in 1996; (3) adult children worked in 1992 but retired or 
became a homemaker in 1996, and (4) adult children did not work in 1992 but 
worked again in 1996. If adult children experienced the transition described in any of 
these variables, a score of 1 is given, otherwise coded as 0. In the regression analysis, 
the fourth variable, “adult children did not work in 1992 but worked again in 1996” is 
the reference category.
Except for the work transition variables, all other independent variables are 
based on the 1992 data to make sure that the estimations are not endogenous. Statistic 
results are presented in odds ratios and by parents’ sex. Due to the nature of variable 
coding, an odds ratio greater than 1 means that adult children with defined 
characteristics are more likely to increase their amount of transfer over time. 
Conversely, an odds ratio smaller than 1 indicates adult children are more likely to 
decrease or maintain the same amount of time transfers in 1996 when compared to 
1992.  These results are unweighted.
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Adult children’s change in time transfer amount from 1992 to 1996
All adult children
Table 6-9 demonstrates that over time, adult children’s gender has an impact 
on their transfer to fathers but not to mothers. Adult daughters are more likely than 
adult sons to increase transfer amount to fathers from 1992 to 1996 (p<=.05). When 
fathers become older, adult daughters as the primary caregiver would spend longer 
hours than sons to fulfill their time transfer responsibilities. My research hypothesis is 
supported.    
The work transition variables affect adult children’s transfer to mothers and 
fathers in a different manner. Compared to adult children who re-entered the labor 
force in 1996, those who did not work in both 1992 and 1996 are more likely to 
decrease or to maintain their transfer amount to mothers (p<=.10). However, the same 
group of adult children are more likely to increase their transfer amount to fathers 
(p<=.01).  Adult children who continually work in the labor force are still more likely 
to increase their transfer to fathers (p<=.05), implying that adult children’s transfer is 
sensitive to fathers’ aging need, regardless of their work hour constraints. This 
variable is not statistically significant in transfer to mothers’ sample. The only 
similarity of the transfer to mother’s and to father’s analysis is that, in both cases, 
adult children who retired or became a homemaker are likely to increase their transfer 
over time. This result is somewhat consistent with the literature that substantial 
number of adult children would leave the labor force in order to fulfill their 
caregiving duties. 
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Table 6-9: Change in time transfer amount to parents from 1992 to 1996,
                  multivariate statistics using ordered logit regression (a)
   To mothers
  (n=2340)
        To fathers 
           (n=889)
Model 1 Model 1

























Adult children’s sibling characteristics, 1992
















Competition for adult children’s resources, 1992
 Children compete for resource




 Parents compete for resources








  Only mother/father living (Reference category) -- --










Table 6-9 (cont.) : Change in time transfer amount to parents from 1992 to 1996,





Model 1 Model 1
Race
  White  0.96
(0.20)
     2.99**
(0.35)
  Black  2.35***
(0.24)
     3.92***
(0.42)
  Other (Reference category) -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept for transfer remain the same (2) -9.63 -2.00
  Intercept for transfer increased (3) -16.32 -9.60
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if transfer amount decreased, coded as 2 if transfer amount 
remain the same, coded as 3 if transfer amount increased. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): The work status variables are based on the 1992-1996 data. All other variables are based on 
the 1992 data to avoid endogenous estimations.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Unlike in 1992, adult children who were married in 1992 become 
significantly more likely than their unmarried counterparts to increase time transfer in 
1996 (p<=.01 to mothers and p<=.001 to fathers, respectively). Perhaps married adult 
children have a more stable economic situation due to the income pooling, thus a 
better ability to increase their transfer amount to parents. Later I will further discuss 
how adult children spouses’ characteristics affect the transfer outcome over time.  
Having more brothers causes a higher likelihood for adult children to increase 
their time transfer to fathers (p<=.01). Hence, brothers’ time contributions add up to 
what adult children have given and can be viewed as complementary. If any sibling 
lives with mothers, adult children are more likely to decrease or maintain their levels 
of contribution (p<=.05). On the other hand, if any sibling lives with elderly fathers, 
adult children’s probability to increase their transfer also expands (p<=.01). 
Having any sibling gave time to parents significantly reduces the likelihood for adult 
children to increase their transfer amount in 1996. This phenomenon may indicate 
that certain siblings are bearing more and more caregiving burden when their parents 
get older. The division of care becomes less even among the siblings over time.  
Grandchildren compete for resources with their grandmothers (p<=.01). When 
both biological parents live together, adult children are less likely to increase their 
amount of transfer because coresident mothers and fathers could support each other 
(p<=.05). If the parent lives alone, the situations will be different. In transfer to 
mothers’ case, adult children are more likely to increase their transfer amount to lone 
mothers (p<=.10), whereas when transfer to fathers is assessed, adult children are less 
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likely to increase their transfer amount (p<=.05). Some possible explanations include 
(1): Mothers tend to have more chronic health conditions and ADL difficulties than 
fathers, thereby increase their need for time transfer. (2): Based on the empirical 
studies, if the reason for both parents live separately is divorce, it is likely that adult 
children would have a closer parent-child relationship with their mothers. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that lone mothers would receive more time transfer than fathers 
who live alone.  
Compared to others, black adult children are the most likely to increase their 
time transfer amount (p<=.001). While having a greater amount of assets is associated 
with an increase in transfer to mothers (p<=.01), good health reduces the likelihood. 
Finally, it seems that when fathers’ case is evaluated, it is adult children’s 
motivation, rather than fathers’ need, has more influence in the time transfer practice. 
Not only are adult children less likely to increase their transfer amount when fathers 
suffer from ADL difficulties (p<=.05), the analysis also shows that if fathers are in 
excellent or good financial situation adult children will be more likely to contribute 
longer hours in the caregiving chores in 1996 (p<=.001). Conversely, adult children’s 
transfer to mothers mainly reflects mothers’ need. Adult children will increase their 
time transfer if their mothers have functionality limitations.
Married adult children
Table 6-10 summarizes the time transfer change for married adult children. 
Adult children spouses’ characteristics are included in the regression models to 
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examine adult children spouses’ role in the transfer practice.  In general, the results 
are very similar to the information presented in Table 6-9. 
Compared to those who returned to the labor force, retired adult children and 
adult children who became a homemaker are more likely to give a larger amount of 
time transfer to their mothers in 1996 (p<=.05). Hence, we may infer that adult 
children do adjust their later-life work plan in order to accommodate their 
intergenerational transfer duties. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, holding everything constant, a greater age 
difference between spouses and the adult children is related to a higher likelihood of 
increase in transfer. Therefore, older spouses do not compete for caregiving time with 
their parents-in-law. What matters more is spouses’ health. Married adult children are 
less likely to increase their transfer amount to mothers if their spouses have poor 
health (p<=.01). Although spouses’ health does not have a significant impact on adult 
children’s time transfer behaviors in 1992, after four years, spouses’ health effect 
becomes more salient.
A final note for this part of the analysis: although the prior discussions 
mentioned that adult children’s transfer to mothers is affected by mothers’ need (i.e., 
ADL difficulties), here I found that mothers who have more years of education are 
also more likely to experience an increase in receiving time transfer (p<=.10). 
Therefore, married adult children’s motivation influences their long-term transfer 
behaviors—including transfer to mothers and to fathers.  
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Table 6-10:Change in time transfer amount from married adult children to their parents 
from 1992 to 1996, multivariate statistics using ordered logit regression (a)
   To mothers
  (n=2340)
        To fathers 
           (n=889)
Model 1 Model 1

















Did not work in 1992 and worked again in 1996 
(Reference category)
-- --
Adult children spouses’ characteristics, 1992
Age difference 





Years of education difference 














Adult children siblings’ characteristics, 1992
















Competition for adult children’s resources, 1992
 Children compete for resource




 Parents compete for resources








  Only mother/father living (Reference category) -- --
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Table 6-10 (cont.) : Change in time transfer amount from married adult children to their parents





Model 1 Model 1










  White  0.57**
(0.23)
     2.30*
(0.41)
  Black  1.37
(0.29)
     2.63+
(0.51)
  Other (Reference category) -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --





































  Intercept for transfer remain the same (2)    31.97    74.45
  Intercept for transfer increased (3)    24.50    66.18
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if transfer amount decreased, coded as 2 if transfer amount remain the same, 
coded as 3 if transfer amount increased. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): The work status variables are based on the 1992-1996 data. All other variables are based on the 1992 data to avoid 
endogenous estimations.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.      
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Summary of time transfer
Adult daughters are more likely than adult sons to provide more hours of time 
transfers, and this contribution does not decline even when daughters are well-paid in 
the labor force. Adult daughters would reduce their time transfer only if they have to 
work long hours for their paid-jobs. In addition to the time availability issue that may 
fundamentally affect adult daughters’ time contribution, the consequence of uneven 
transfer loads between adult daughters and sons can be attributed to gender norms. 
Even with large opportunity costs in the labor market, adult daughters are still more 
likely than sons to give time transfer because the society expects women to play the 
caregiving role. 
Other family members’ characteristics also affect adult children’s time 
transfer behaviors. Adult children’s spouses may compete for the time resources with 
their parents-in-law, if they are in poor health. Having more sisters decreases adult 
children’s transfer efforts therefore they can be viewed as the substitution to the adult 
children. Siblings live with elderly parents have the closest proximity to fulfill 
parents’ daily need and hence adult children can spend less time helping their parents. 
However, these results also point out one issue. That is, the caregiving responsibilities 
are unevenly distributed among the siblings. Especially for siblings who coreside with 
the elderly parents, their transfer burden may increase over time. 
Grandchildren do not always compete for time resources with their 
grandparents. When two parents live together, adult children would be less likely to 
give transfer because parents can obtain support from their coresident spouses. 
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However, over time, adult children would be more likely to give greater amount of 
time to mothers who live alone. 
Examination on adult children’s ability offers partial explanations to the 
transfer outcomes. According to the analysis, adult children with higher transfer 
ability do not necessary give more time to their mothers and fathers. Likewise, 
parents with a higher need may not receive a greater amount of transfer as expected in 
my study hypotheses. This result can be interpreted as the function of adult children’s 
transfer motivation. The fact that better educated parents and parents who are 
financially well-off tend to receive more transfer means that their receipt of transfer is 
not need-based. Instead, adult children may have some rational calculations when 
they give transfers. It is possible that these adult children wish to use their time 




The United States is being transformed into an aging society. Accompanied by 
a decline in fertility, the speed of population aging becomes even more drastic. 
Satisfying later-life needs and providing essential care to the elderly has become a 
crucial issue for society as a whole. Without comprehensive welfare policies, the 
families of seniors have the major responsibilities to support their elders, and the 
adult children, in particular, are leading candidates to perform important caregiving 
tasks.
While a sense of obligation mandates that adult children provide monetary 
and time resources to their aging parents, social forces bring many challenges to adult 
children who are shouldering elderly-care duties. This is especially difficult for 
women. Although women are increasingly participating in the labor force, care for 
elderly parents undoubtedly brings more stress for women than men. Deep-rooted 
gender norms insist that women’s lives should center on their families. For many 
women, paid-jobs outside the home are primarily subsidies to husbands’ income. In 
the past, working women needed only to struggle between their child-care and wage-
job duties. But in a graying society, women also have to bear elderly caregiving 
responsibilities. The baby boomer generations will soon be entering old age. If men 
do not share the time transfer burden with their female counterparts, how can women 
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protect the wellbeing of the senior population alone, in addition to their paid work 
and child-care duties?
 Why do men rarely provide caregiving services to their elderly parents while 
women are relegated to this duty? Numerous studies point out that there is a gender 
gap between men and women’s caregiving involvement. Both daughters and 
daughters-in-law spend longer time than men taking care of elders. The conventional 
role expectations of women suggest that this phenomenon is somehow rational, and 
people never challenged this establishment until very recent decades. But simply 
using gender role to analyze the caregiving discrepancy between women and men 
fails to reach a satisfactory answer to the question, because the discussion overlooked 
the fact that gendered labor force structure may also contribute to this undesirable 
consequence. Analysis of the labor force effect is very important because it points out 
the major constraint that women have experienced over the past decades. It also offers 
a guideline for the future generations since the aging process and women’s labor 
force participation will only proceed in the forthcoming years. This research 
demonstrates how future sandwich generations will cope with support of their elders 
within the constraints of the labor market and American gender norms.
Moving beyond the existing research framework, this study addressed the 
above question by incorporating additional element of labor force participation 
inequality into the analysis. Using the 1992 to 1996 Health and Retirement Study, this 
project examined how gender norms, labor force structure, family support network, 
resource competition between grandchildren and elderly parents, may jointly affect 
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adult children’s provision of support to their non-coresident parents. The longitudinal 
analysis approach not only allows investigators to evaluate the long-term effect of the 
labor force inequality on adult children’s intergenerational transfer outcomes, it also 
permits an assessment of how late-middle-aged adult children’s life course transition 
needs may cause adult children’s adjustment in their transfer plans for the following 
years. 
In the following sections, I first summarize the major findings, and then 
address the social and policy implications based on the study results.  I conclude by 
discussing limitations of this research and provide suggestions for future studies. 
Summary of major findings 
Major finding 1: The differentials in transfer practices between adult daughters and 
sons are a by-product of gender norms and the gendered labor force structure. The 
wage inequality between men and women dominates adult sons’ and daughters’ 
monetary transfer ability and transfer options.
 Because the gender norm encourages men to prove themselves in the work 
arena, their way of providing feedback to parents becomes intrinsically embedded in 
their job achievements. Compared to their female coworkers, men are paid better in 
the wage market. When men enjoy a higher wage rate, their incentives to stay in the 
labor force also increase. Longer work hours often correlate with greater earnings, 
making it economically inefficient to sacrifice work hours for the sake of caregiving. 
Based on this rationale, adult sons certainly would prefer to use their work income to 
defray caregiving costs, which is usually a tolerable amount relative to their wages. 
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Conversely, since adult daughters do not possess comparative advantages when 
competing with men in the wage market, they become service providers, which is 
another way of showing their dedication to the elderly parents. At an aggregated 
level, these support-giving strategies are associated with adult children’s employment 
experiences. It is not surprising that adult sons would give proportionally more 
monetary resources than adult daughters. Nevertheless, this is not to say that adult 
sons do not give time transfers. Based on the descriptive statistics, adult sons simply 
start their time transfers later than adult daughters. As parents grow older, adult sons’ 
transfer involvements increase. Adult sons’ senses of obligation of providing time 
transfer increases with parents’ aging process.
In this study, the multivariate analysis confirmed that adult sons give greater 
amount of monetary transfer than adult daughters, while adult daughters are more 
likely than adult sons to give time transfers. Examinations on adult daughters’ labor 
force participation variables show that a higher earning potential of the adult 
daughters is positively associated with their monetary contributions to mothers. 
Compared to adult sons, adult daughters’ lower wage rates and shorter work hours 
may constraint their financial transfer ability and hence push them to perform 
caregiving chores. This discussion generally fits Gary Becker’s theory that 
comparative advantages in the labor force have an effect on the household division of 
labor (1991). 
While a higher wage rate may enhance adult daughters’ monetary transfer 
ability, the analysis also found that adult daughters’ time contributions do not decline 
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with their earning potentials. Well-paid daughters still spend longer hours than sons 
to fulfill elderly parents’ caregiving need. Therefore, we can see that adult daughters 
do not use monetary resources to substitute for their time transfers to parents. Instead, 
it is more likely they provide monetary and time transfers simultaneously and view 
both transfer capitals as a complement to each other. Why don’t well-paid adult 
daughters use money as their major transfer capital in the same way as men? This 
may be explained by gender role expectations.
Gender norms play a very important role in the time transfer practice. 
Regardless of adult daughters’ career achievement, the society expects them to be the 
primary caregivers because women are more caring and loving than men. Rather than 
a market mechanism, the gendered differential in time transfer provision is therefore 
cultivated by a social norm and can be better explained by the theory of gender roles. 
Adult daughters sometimes reduce their time transfers, however. The fundamental 
constraint is their own time availability. In contemporary society, where women’s 
work full-time has become more and more common, how to satisfy elders’ caregiving 
need without sacrificing women’s career development is important.
Major finding 2: While spouses may substitute, or complement adult children’s 
intergenerational transfer efforts, they can become resource competitors to their 
parents-in-law as well. 
Spouses’ transfer contributions to their parents-in-law alleviate adult 
children’s burdens. Thus, spouses are important helpers to adult children in general. 
For instance, this study shows that if husbands have a paid-job, adult daughters would 
be more likely to give monetary transfers to their mothers, and their transfer amounts 
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are greater. However, based on the 1992 analysis, before controlling for spouses’ 
characteristics, married adult children are indeed less likely to give monetary and
time transfers to their senior parents. This study focuses on transfers from adult 
children to their non-coresident parents. Therefore, the closest person who may have 
a claim on an adult child’s transfers is not their elderly parent but their spouses. Since 
sharing a residential space promotes monetary and time transfer flows among 
household members, spouses, who usually coreside with adult children, are very 
likely to receive transfers from adult children. Because the vast majority of adult 
children have limited monetary and time resources, elderly parents will not receive a 
large amount of transfer after these transfer capitals are divided into two shares. 
Based on this rationale, one can posit that spouses of adult children are potential 
resource competitors to needy seniors. Married adult children may first allocate their 
money and time to their coresident family members. If they have extra resources left, 
they will incorporate their parents’ need and provide intergenerational transfers. 
The long-term effect of spouses’ characteristics on adult children’s transfer 
outcomes makes the resource competition even more clear. As spouses become older, 
adult children are less likely to give major amounts of money and time to their 
parents. The longitudinal analysis indicates that when spouses are much older than 
the adult children, adult children would decrease their amount of monetary transfer to 
fathers. In addition, if spouses have poor health, adult children would reduce their 
time transfer amount to mothers in order to provide care to their needy spouses. The 
life course perspective accounts for these results rather well. When parents and 
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spouses are both growing older, adult children must develop a coping strategy and 
prioritize their transfer flows between the two parties.  
Major finding 3: Siblings play an important role in the transfer practice. Sisters often 
substitute for adult children’s monetary and time transfer efforts to their mothers. 
Over time, adult children shift their time transfer responsibilities to siblings who 
coreside with the parents, indicating that the distribution of caregiving duties among 
siblings will become less even. 
This study supports the hypothesis that in some situations siblings can 
substitute for adult children’s transfer role. Men’s gendered wage advantage affects 
transfers. Having more brothers helps adult children to lower their monetary transfer 
duties, this result is consistent with what Zissimopoulos (2001) has posited 
previously. On the other hand, having more sisters decreases adult children’s 
monetary and time transfer pressures. Overall, siblings’ transfer involvements would 
encourage adult children’s transfers. As long as any sibling provides monetary or 
time resources to parents, adult children’s transfer incidence and amount also 
increase. Apparently, there is a consensus among the siblings that supporting elderly 
parents should be a joint effort, although each sibling’s ability and degree of 
involvement may be different.  
Non-coresident adult children’s time transfer responsibilities may be 
substituted by siblings who live with the elderly parents. Siblings who coreside with 
the needy parents have the closest proximity to provide time transfers and adult 
children’s time contribution would decrease accordingly. This study also indicates 
that in the long-term, adult children may increase their amount of monetary transfers 
to mothers to compensate their lower amount of time transfers if mothers live with 
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one of the siblings. This result not only implies that adult children may use monetary 
transfer to replace for their time contribution, it also demonstrates that the distribution 
of caregiving duties would gradually shift onto siblings who live with the elderly 
mothers, causing higher level of pressures of the co-resident adult children.  
Major finding 4: Grandchildren sometimes compete for resources with their 
grandparents. In addition, if adult children’s biological parents are living, depending 
on their coresident status, there will be a different competition dynamic. 
 
If adult children have several financially dependent children, it is likely that 
adult children would try to satisfy their children’s need by decreasing their monetary 
and time transfer amount to parents. When both parents are living, depending on their 
coresident status, adult children would develop a different transfer strategy. In 1992, 
if both parents live together, adult children would be less likely to give financial 
transfers because two parents can share the financial resources with each other 
thereby have a lower level of need for monetary transfer. Nevertheless, in 1996, adult 
children may increase their transfer amount. As parents getting older, their need also 
increases. Adult children’s increases in monetary contributions potentially benefit 
both parents but not just one of them. 
Conversely, if both biological parents are living but they live separately, adult 
children may adjust their time transfer decisions. The longitudinal analysis shows that 
adult children would increase their time transfer amount to lone mothers, but it is less 
likely for them to increase the time transfer to fathers who live alone. This is not a 
surprising result because elderly mothers may have a greater later-life need than 
fathers, and adult children may have a better parent-child relation with their mothers. 
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Major finding 5: As adult children get older, they incorporate their own life course 
transition into consideration, causing variation in transfers to parents over time. 
Because late-middle-aged adult children are also approaching the young-old 
stage, their stage of life course transition is the key issue in their long-term transfer 
plans. Older adult children eventually exit the labor force and have a reduced income. 
Yet leaving paid jobs also allows adult children to have more time. Adult children 
would evaluate these conditions before they give transfers. 
This study found that over a four-year period, although adult children are 
likely to increase monetary transfers to their parents, the extent of increase is mainly a 
function of their financial withholding.  Specifically, adult children who worked in 
1992 and stayed in the labor force in 1996 are the most likely to increase their transfer 
amount because they still receive work-related income. On the other hand, adult 
children who worked in 1992 and retired in 1996 have the highest likelihood of 
increase in time transfer. These results demonstrates that adult children evaluate what 
they can offer based on their own life course transitions, and deliberately adjust their 
actual transfer plans to the parents.
Major finding 6: All else being equal, while adult children’s ability and parents’ 
later-life need are crucial to intergenerational transfer practices, there are 
significant exceptions. Sometimes adult children with good transfer ability do not 
offer more support to their parents; others may find that parents with a higher level 
of need do not necessarily receive more support from their children. These 
inconsistencies could be interpreted as reflective of adult children’s sense of 
obligation and transfer motivation.
Even when controlling for relevant factors, adult children’s transfer ability 
and parents’ later life need do not sufficiently to explain all of the studied hypotheses. 
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The study finds that the likelihood for adult children to offer time transfers will 
increase if elderly parents have better financial situations. One can see that the 
concepts of “ability” and “need” inadequately capture the transfer dynamics. Adult 
children’s transfer motivation could provide a valid explanation in this regard. The 
exchange theory and altruism have been widely used to delineate adult children’s 
transfer motivations, and the results based on my analysis again confirmed that the 
conventional adult children’s ability vs. parents’ need approach do not offer a 
sufficient knowledge to the intergenerational transfer studies.
Tables 7-1A through 7-8 summarize the results of the analyses on which these 
conclusions are based. These Tables are attached in the back of this chapter.
Social and policy implications 
There are various problems associated with an aging society. Support  for 
needy elders deserves prioritized attention, but the dynamics of providing support are 
inherently complicated. It must be viewed as structurally conditioned by the nature of 
inequality. While family, market, and welfare policy all impact elders’ later-life 
wellbeing, a senior’s family is still the dominant source of transfers. On the other 
hand, gendered social institutions deepen the tensions embedded within the family 
support system. Society as a whole must re-examine how elderly support should be 
delivered so that the gendered disparity of transfer practices can be minimized. 
As noted in this study, the caregiving issue is also a gender issue. Acker 
(1992) contends that gender is a dimension of discrimination and social institutions 
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are defined by men without women’s presence or input. Moreover, gender is a crucial
element in economic and power relations, as well as in life course transitions. The 
incorporation of gender into my theoretical model, therefore, allows me to use the 
social inequality perspective to appraise intergenerational transfer practice. 
According to this study, wage inequality between men and women is the 
central cause of adult daughters’ disuse of monetary transfers. In a globalization 
context, women of different class and race/ethnicity compete unequally with men for 
a greater wage reward. The existing labor force structure creates a difficult situation 
for women with elderly-care responsibilities, and it is exceptionally hard for low-
income women to shoulder their elderly parents’ economic wellbeing. Yet gender 
inequality in employment is sustained not only in the public sphere, “it also 
interdependent with the household division of labor” (Ridgeway, 1997). At present, 
gender norms remain unable to catch up with the pace of social change, thus women 
spend long hours in caregiving tasks regardless of their employment status. 
Additionally, because women tend to marry older men, many women not only have to 
provide caregiving services to their senior parents but are also required to offer 
supports to their aging husbands. Is it possible that in the future reduced caregiving 
time will no longer be an unpractical dream, and women can be in the position to 
adopt monetary transfers, rather than using their time to fulfill their transfer duties? 
To broaden women’s elderly-care and transfer options, it is necessary to 
inquire in to the role of the state. Can the U.S. government develop policies that 
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satisfy the needs of our elders but preserve and nurture women’s rights for self-
fulfillment? 
While the state recognizes that it is critical to act against gender-related 
discrimination and make certain that women will be paid equally, over the years, 
market wage regulations have not worked as effectively as originally expected. For 
instance, Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (1998) contend that the Equal Pay Act has had 
relatively little impact on market wage regulation. The reason for this ineffectiveness 
is that even when men and women work for the same firms they rarely do exactly the 
same type of work—which is a tacit form of gender discrimination that allows the 
employers to lower female workers’ financial rewards. 
A remedy to the Equal Pay Act is affirmative action. It posits that the 
employers should develop a thorough management program that critically evaluates 
all personnel procedures to enhance equal employment and promotion opportunity for 
women and minority groups (Thomas and Garrett, 1999). With affirmative action, 
employers can give employment and promotion preference to women thereby 
increasing their earning potential. Nevertheless, because a large number of 
affirmative-preference programs have quota limitations that limit number of people 
who can be hired or promoted, only a few women can really benefit from it. As for 
women who are hired or promoted, they are easily stigmatized as less competent. As 
McWhirter (1996) states, so long as affirmative action is enacted as a license to hire 
or promote people with the “right sex” regardless of ability, women will still be 
victims. 
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The ineffectiveness of state policies on women’s work and wage protection 
points out that it is very arduous to improve women’s monetary transfer abilities by 
changing the labor force structure per se. So why not let the state share women’s time 
transfer burdens?
What has government done on the issue of elderly welfare? Policymakers may 
need to reconsider what kind of outcomes they plan to target. Do policy makers 
expect to see elders who can spend their later-lives without worry for their economic 
wellbeing? Do they want to make sure elders in general have access to affordable 
medical and long-term care services? Or, more ambitiously, do policymakers wish to 
see both happen in our society, and gradually transfer the elderly care burdens from 
the families to the state? 
Apparently the Social Security system cannot guarantee the older population’s 
financial wellbeing in their later stages of life. Firstly, Social Security is not gender 
neutral as the policy does not make efforts to compensate for the sex-based 
differential in labor force participation and the wage gap (Estes, 2001). This implies 
that older women, especially minority women, are most disadvantaged in terms of the 
economic outcomes of Social Security policy (Harrington Meyer, 1996). 
Furthermore, with the increasing age of eligibility to collect benefits, given the 
variations in life expectancies and morbidity, elders of different race and ethnic 
groups are likely to be vulnerable due to the changing regulations of Social Security. 
At least for now, providing satisfactory medical and caregiving services 
through state intervention is not yet plausible. Although currently need-based benefits 
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such as Medicaid, and universal-based ones like Medicare, are both available to the 
elderly, with the unmet need of having affordable prescription drug for the older 
population, the current elderly welfare programs are seriously flawed. In 2003, 
seniors comprise approximately 12% of the population and consume nearly 40% of 
all prescription drugs, yet nearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries do not have 
some type of prescription drug coverage, and those without coverage often pay the 
highest prices for their medications (108th Congress “Expanding Coverage of 
Prescription Drugs in Medicare” hearing report, 2003).  Without reasonable coverage 
for their prescription drugs, the elderly may either forgo their medication or turn to 
their adult children for financial help. Thus, it is very important for the government to 
expand the scale of need-based benefit programs in the upcoming years, otherwise 
elders’ families will have to absorb all of these burdens. And if they do, women are 
likely to experience most of the caregiving stress.  
Limitations and suggestions for future study
 While this study extends previously used concepts and analytical approaches, 
there are some limitations and future study plans that need to be addressed. First, 
because very few fathers had received transfers from their adult sons in the 1992 
study, including adult children’s sex and related interaction terms into the statistical 
models to evaluate how gendered labor force participation experiences may affect 
adult children’s transfers to fathers was not possible. In the near future, I plan to use 
the 1998 HRS, which has been adding new cases and merged with the Assets and 
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Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old datasets (AHEAD), to conduct a parallel 
research if the 1998 sample contains sufficient numbers of adult children before 
retirement age.
Second, my 1992 analysis only examined how adult children’s current labor 
force participation experiences affect their transfer behaviors. This approach provides 
limited insight into how adult children’s earlier life course transition may have an 
impact on their transfer provision ability at their late-middle-ages. HRS has detailed 
questions on adult children’s employment history. If I incorporate this information 
into my analysis, I should be able to address adult children’s labor force participation 
effect more completely. 
Third, although I have included many parents’ characteristics to evaluate 
parents’ need, since this study is based on the adult children’s perspective, the control 
variables are somewhat biased by the fact that adult children may not necessarily 
know all the details regarding their non-coresident parents. Unfortunately, this is the 
nature of the data and there is no other way available to independently verify the 
quality of parents’ information.
In sum, this dissertation has confirmed the importance of including adult 
children’s labor force participation experiences and structural effect in the study of 
intergenerational transfers. It also built the foundations for several research projects to 
be conducted in the future. Data availability is a major problem in intergenerational 
transfer research, yet as studies on aging become increasingly necessary, this data 
problem must be addressed. 
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Table 7-1A: Summary of hypotheses and findings, monetary transfer incidence 
                     to mothers in 1992














Adult children who are working for pay are more 
likely to give transfer 
Does not 
support
Adult daughter who are working for pay are more 
likely to give transfer
Supports 
A higher wage rate is associated with a greater 
likelihood of giving transfer
Supports
Adult daughters with a higher wage rate have a 
greater likelihood of giving transfer
Supports Supports
Longer work hour is associated with a greater 
likelihood of giving transfer
Does not 
supports
Adult daughters who work longer hours are more 
likely to give monetary transfer
Supports Does not 
supports






A greater age difference between husbands and 




A greater educational difference between 
husbands and adult daughters decreases the 
incidence of giving transfer
Does not 
support
When husbands are employed, adult daughters 
will be more likely to give transfer
Supports
Having unhealthy husbands decreases adult 
daughters’ incidence of transfer
Does not 
support






Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Supports Supports Supports
Any sibling lives with mothers increases adult 







Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 







When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children are less likely to give 







When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 






Table 7-1B: Summary of hypotheses and findings, monetary transfer amount
                     to mothers in 1992








Adult daughters give smaller amount of transfer 
than adult sons
Supports Supports
Adult children who are working for pay give 
greater amount of transfer 
Does not 
support
Adult daughter who are working for pay give 
greater amount of transfer 
Does not 
support




Adult daughters with a higher wage rate give 
greater amount of transfer
Supports Supports
















A greater age difference between husbands and 
adult daughters decreases the amount of transfer
Does not 
support
A greater educational difference between 




When husbands are employed, adult daughters 
will give more transfer
Supports
Having unhealthy husbands decreases adult 
daughters’ amount of transfer
Does not 
support
Brothers substitute for adult children’s transfer Does not 
supports
Supports Does not 
support
Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Supports Supports Supports
Any sibling lives with mother increases adult 







Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 







When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children give smaller amount of 
transfer to mothers  




When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children give more transfer to 






Table 7-2A: Summary of hypotheses and findings, monetary transfer incidence 
                     to fathers in 1992
Hypotheses All adult children Working adult children
Adult daughters are less likely than adult sons 
to give transfer
Does not support Supports
Adult children who are working for pay are 
more likely to give transfer 
Supports
A higher wage rate is associated with a greater 
likelihood of giving transfer
Does not support
Longer work hour is associated with a greater 
likelihood of giving transfer
Does not support
Married adult children are more likely to give 
transfer
Does not support Does not support
Brothers substitute for adult children’s transfer Supports Supports
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Supports Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers increases adult 
children’s likelihood of giving transfer 
Does not support Does not support
Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Does not support Partially support
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are less likely to 
give transfer to fathers  
Supports Supports
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
give transfer to fathers   
Does not support Does not support
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Table 7-2B: Summary of hypotheses and findings, monetary transfer amount
                     to fathers in 1992
Hypotheses All adult children Working adult children
Adult daughters give smaller amount of transfer 
than adult sons
Does not support Supports
Adult children who are working for pay give 
greater amount of transfer 
Supports
A higher wage rate is associated with a greater 
amount of transfer
Does not support
Longer work hour is associated with a greater 
transfer amount
Does not support
Married adult children give greater amount of 
transfer
Does not support Does not support
Brothers substitute for adult children’s transfer Supports Supports
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers increases adult 
children’s transfer amount 
Does not support Does not support
Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Does not support Partially support
When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children give smaller amount of 
transfer to fathers  
Supports Supports
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children give more transfer 
to fathers   
Supports Does not support
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Table 7-3: Summary of hypotheses and findings, change in monetary transfer 
amount to mothers from 1992- 1996
Hypotheses All adult children Married adult 
children
Adult daughters are less likely than adult sons 
to increase transfer
Supports Supports
Adult children who did not work in 1992 and 
96 are less likely to increase transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who worked  in 1992 and still 
working in 96 are more likely to increase 
transfer (a)
Supports Supports
Adult children who worked in 1992 but retired 
in 96 are less likely to increase transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Married adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer
Supports
A greater age difference between spouses and 
adult children decreases the transfer 
Supports
A greater educational difference between 
spouses and adult children decreases the 
transfer
Does not support
When spouses are employed, adult children 
will be more likely to increase transfer
Does not support
Having unhealthy spouses decreases adult 
children’s transfer
Does not support
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Supports
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with mother increases adult 
children’s likelihood of increase transfer 
Supports Does not support
Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Does not support
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandmothers  
Does not support Does not support
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to mothers  
Supports Does not support
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to mothers   
Does not support Does not support
Note: (a) based on both 1992 and 96 data. The reference category is adult children who did 
not work in 1992 but work again in 1996.
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Table 7-4: Summary of hypotheses and findings, change in monetary transfer 
                  amount to fathers from 1992 to 1996
Hypotheses All adult children Married adult 
children
Adult daughters are less likely than adult sons 
to increase transfer
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who did not work in 1992 and 
96 are less likely to increase transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who worked  in 1992 and still 
working in 96 are more likely to increase 
transfer (a)
Supports Supports
Adult children who worked in 1992 but retired 
in 96 are less likely to increase transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Married adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer
Supports
A greater age difference between spouses and 
adult children decreases the transfer 
Supports
A greater educational difference between 
spouses and adult children decreases the 
transfer
Does not support
When spouses are employed, adult children 
will be more likely to increase transfer
Supports
Having unhealthy spouses decreases adult 
children’s transfer
Does not support
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Supports Does not support
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers increases adult 
children’s likelihood of increase transfer 
Does not support Does not support
Siblings’ monetary transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Partially supports Does not support
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to fathers  
Supports Supports
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to fathers   
Does not support Does not support
Note: (a) based on both 1992 and 96 data. The reference category is adult children who did 
not work in 1992 but work again in 1996.
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Table 7-5A: Summary of hypotheses and findings, time transfer incidence 
                     to mothers in 1992







Adult daughters are more likely than adult sons to 
give transfer
Supports Supports
Adult children who are working for pay are less 
likely to give transfer 
Supports
Adult daughters who are working for pay are still 
more likely to give transfer
Supports
A higher wage rate is associated with a lower 
likelihood of giving transfer
Supports
Adult daughters with a higher wage rate have a 




Longer work hour is associated with a lower 
likelihood of giving transfer
Supports
Adult daughters who work longer hours are less 
likely to give time transfer
Supports Supports






A greater age difference between husbands and 
adult daughters decreases the incidence of giving 
transfer
Does not support
A greater educational difference between husbands 
and adult daughters decreases the incidence of 
giving transfer
Does not support
When husbands are employed, adult daughters will 
be more likely to give transfer
Does not support





Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Supports Supports Does not support
Any sibling lives with mother decreases adult 
children’s likelihood of giving transfer 
Supports Supports Does not support
Siblings’ time transfer involvements complement 
adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 






When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children are less likely to give 
transfer to mothers  
Does not 
support
Supports Does not support
When both biological parents are living but not live 
together, adult children are more likely to give 





Table 7-5B: Summary of hypotheses and findings, time transfer amount
                     to mothers in 1992








Adult daughters give greater amount of transfer 
than adult sons
Supports Supports
Adult children who are working for pay give 
smaller amount of transfer 
Supports
Adult daughters who are working for pay still 
give greater amount of transfer
Does not 
support




Adult daughters with a higher wage rate give 









Adult daughters who work longer hours give 
less time transfer
Supports Supports






A greater age difference between husbands and 
adult daughters decreases the amount of transfer
Does not 
support
A greater educational difference between 




When husbands are employed, adult daughters 
will give more transfer
Does not 
support





Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Supports Supports Does not 
support
Any sibling lives with mother decrease adult 
children’s transfer amount 
Supports Supports Does not 
support
Siblings’ time transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandmothers  
Supports Supports Does not 
support
When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children give smaller amount of 







When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children give more transfer 








Table 7-6A: Summary of hypotheses and findings, time transfer incidence 
   to fathers in 1992
Hypotheses All adult children Working adult children
Adult daughters are more likely than adult sons 
to give transfer
Supports Supports
Adult children who are working for pay are 
less likely to give transfer 
Supports
Adult daughters who are working for pay are 
still more likely to give transfer
Does not support
A higher wage rate is associated with a lower 
likelihood of giving transfer
Does not support
Longer work hour is associated with a lower 
likelihood of giving transfer
Does not support
Married adult children are more likely to give 
transfer
Does not support Does not support
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers decreases adult 
children’s likelihood of giving transfer 
Supports
Siblings’ time transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Does not support Does not support
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are less likely to 
give transfer to fathers  
Does not support Supports
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
give transfer to fathers   
Does not support
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Table 7-6B: Summary of hypotheses and findings, time transfer amount
                     to fathers in 1992
Hypotheses All adult children Working adult children
Adult daughters give greater amount of transfer 
than adult sons
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who are working for pay give 
smaller amount of transfer 
Supports
Adult daughters who are working for pay still 
give greater amount of transfer
Does not support
A higher wage rate is associated with a greater 
amount of transfer
Does not support
Longer work hour is associated with a smaller 
transfer amount
Does not support
Married adult children give greater amount of 
transfer
Does not support Does not support
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Sisters substitute adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers decreases adult 
children’s transfer amount 
Supports
Siblings’ time transfer involvements 
complement adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Does not support Does not support
When both biological parents are living and live 
together, adult children give smaller amount of 
transfer to fathers  
Does not support Supports
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children give more transfer 
to fathers   
Does not support Does not support
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Table 7-7: Summary of hypotheses and findings, change in time transfer amount
                   to mothers from 1992- 1996
Hypotheses All adult children Married adult 
children
Adult daughters are more likely than adult sons 
to increase transfer
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who did not work in 1992 and 
96 are more likely to increase transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who worked  in 1992 and still 
working in 96 are less likely to increase 
transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who worked in 1992 but retired 
in 96 are more likely to increase transfer (a)
Supports Supports
Married adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer
Supports
A greater age difference between spouses and 
adult children decreases the transfer 
Does not support
A greater educational difference between 
spouses and adult children decreases the 
transfer
Does not support
When spouses are employed, adult children 
will be more likely to increase transfer
Does not support
Having unhealthy spouses decreases adult 
children’s transfer
Supports
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with mother decreases adult 
children’s likelihood of increase transfer 
Support Does not support
Siblings’ time transfer involvements substitute 
adult children’s transfer
Support Does not support
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandmothers  
Supports Supports
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are less likely to 
increase transfer to mothers  
Supports Does not support
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to mothers   
Supports Supports
Note: (a) based on both 1992 and 96 data. The reference category is adult children who did 
not work in 1992 but work again in 1996.
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Table 7-8: Summary of hypotheses and findings, change in time transfer 
                   amount to fathers from 1992 to 1996
Hypotheses All adult children Married adult 
children
Adult daughters are more likely than adult sons 
to increase transfer
Supports Does not support
Adult children who did not work in 1992 and 
96 are more likely to increase transfer (a)
Supports Supports
Adult children who worked  in 1992 and still 
working in 96 are less likely to increase 
transfer (a)
Does not support Does not support
Adult children who worked in 1992 but retired 
in 96 are more likely to increase transfer (a)
Supports Does not support
Married adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer
Supports
A greater age difference between spouses and 
adult children decreases the transfer 
Does not support
A greater educational difference between 
spouses and adult children decreases the 
transfer
Does not support
When spouses are employed, adult children 
will be more likely to increase transfer
Does not support
Having unhealthy spouses decrease adult 
children’s transfer
Does not support
Brothers complement adult children’s transfer Supports Does not support
Sisters complement adult children’s transfer Does not support Does not support
Any sibling lives with fathers decreases adult 
children’s likelihood of increase transfer 
Does not support Does not support
Siblings’ time transfer involvements substitute 
adult children’s transfer
Supports Supports
Financially dependent children compete for 
resource with their grandfathers  
Does not support Does not support
When both biological parents are living and 
live together, adult children are less likely to 
increase transfer to fathers  
Supports Does not support
When both biological parents are living but not 
live together, adult children are more likely to 
increase transfer to fathers   
Does not support Does not support
Note: (a) based on both 1992 and 96 data. The reference category is adult children who did 
not work in 1992 but work again in 1996.
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Appendix Table 1: Adult children provided both monetary and time transfers,
            by adult children and parents’ sex
To mothers To fathers
Transfer in 1992












Transfer in 1996 












Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note:   Number of cases for each cell presented in parentheses. Weighted statistics.
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Appendix Table 2: Bivariate analysis on adult children gave both monetary and time 
transfers using logistic regression (a), by parents’ sex and year 
To mothers To fathers
        1992





















































  Number of children under age 18  1.28
(0.18)
 NA   NA

















Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996. 
Note: (a): The dependent variables for 1992 and 1996 analyses are coded as 1 if adult children gave at 
least $500 and 100 hours in that year, 0 if otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): All the independent variables are from 1992 data.
          (c): Because very few adult children provided both types of transfers to their fathers in 1992, this 
part of analysis results are unstable. Therefore, they are excluded from this table. 
(d): Unweighted statistics. Results of major explanatory variables are presented.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Appendix Table 3: Adult children provided monetary and time transfers to their 
mothers in 1992, multivariate statistics using logistic regression
All adult children 
(n=5157)
Working adult children 
(n=3029)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2









Work for pay       0.44**




Female*work for pay --  3.07*
(0.62) 
-- --
Hourly wage rate, centered at grand mean and logged -- --  1.32*
(0.11)
     1.92**
(0.22)
Female* hourly wage rate -- -- --  0.63+
(0.24)




Female* weekly work hour -- -- --  0.70*
(0.22)






     0.10***
(0.48)
Adult children’s sibling characteristics














     0.62**
(0.09)
















  Any sibling gave time to mother 13.31***
(0.30)
13.17**
*    (0.30) 
 8.22***
(0.46)
     9.62***
(0.49)
Competition for adult children’s resources
Children compete for resources














     5.13***
(0.47)
Parents compete for resources












  (c)   (c)
  Only mother living (Reference category) -- -- -- --
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Appendix Table 3 (cont.) : Adult children provided monetary and time transfers to their 
mothers in  1992, multivariate statistics using logistic regression




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
 Adult children’s characteristics












(c)    (c)
Race




    0.49
(0.62)
     0.41
(0.65)




     0.86
(0.72)
     0.74
(0.73)
  Other (Reference category) -- -- -- --
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- -- -- --









































































  Intercept 5.52  6.07 5.47  6.28
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children gave at least $500 and 100 hours in 1992, 0 if 
otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): Unweighted statistics.      
          (c): Variable excluded from the statistical model to ensure the convergence of the estimation procedures.      
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Appendix Table 4: Adult children provided both monetary and time transfers to mothers in 1996, 
multivariate statistics using logistic regression (a)  
All adult  children
     (n=2340)
  Married adult children 
    (n=1877)





















Adult children married, 1992  1.47
(0.39)
-- 
Adult children spouses’ characteristics
Age difference 
(Spouses’ age-adult children’s age)
--  1.00
(0.03)
Years of education difference 
(Spouses’ years of education-adult children’s years of education)  
--  0.90
(0.07)
Spouses working for pay --  2.18+
(0.42)
Adult children siblings’ characteristics, 1992




















Competition for adult child’s resources, 1992
Children compete for resource








Parents compete for resources








  Only mother living (Reference category) -- --
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Appendix Table 4 (cont.) : Adult children who provided both monetary and time transfers to 
mothers in 1996, multivariate statistics using logistic regression (a)
All adult  children
     (n=2340)
  Married adult children 
    (n=1877)


















  Other (Reference category) -- -- 
Educational attainment
  Lower than high school (Reference category) -- --




















Mother’s  characteristics, 1992
















  Intercept -17.44 -16.11
Source: Author’s analysis using Health and Retirement Study 1992 and 1996.
Note: (a): The dependent variable is coded as 1 if adult children gave at least $500 and 100 hours in 1992, 0 if 
otherwise. Results are presented in odds ratios.
          (b): The work status variables are based on the 1992-1996 data. All other variables are based on the 1992 
data to avoid endogenous estimations.
          (c): Unweighted statistics.
+<=.10, *<=.05, **<=.01, ***<=.001, +<=.10. Standard errors presented in parentheses.
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